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Abstract
This thesis contains three empirical essays in banking. The empirical analyses focus on the
role of information in banking. This will be done by analyzing the effectiveness of three types
of signals that are sent by banks. The rst signal is the CAMEL-type indicators that measure the
soundness of the banks. The second signal is the price offered by banks in attracting deposits.
The third signal is the amount of risk related information that banks disclose in their nancial
statements. This thesis aims to answer a few key questions that are relevant in banking. Firstly,
it aims to nd if CAMEL-type indicators are able to predict subsequent decisions by regulators
to fail banks. This analysis will focus on the banks' liquidity ratio before and during crises in
nding whether high liquidity holding and high reliance on external funding contribute towards
the subsequent failure of the banks. Secondly, it aims to nd if depositors discipline banks by
focusing on depositors' reaction to the price signal from banks. Lastly, it aims to nd if depositors
react to the amount of risk-related information that banks disclose. The empirical issues are
analyzed using the sample of nancial institutions in ve crisis led East Asian countries namely
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Among the striking ndings in Chapter 2
are that the effect of liquidity on the probability of bank failure varies before and during a crisis.
The results show the vulnerabilities of banks to failure declines as a result of higher liquidity
holding. The results also show that banks' probability of failure increases as a result of high
reliance on external funding. Findings in Chapter 3 conrm the endogenous relationship between
the price and quantity of deposits in the depositor discipline model. Panel data analysis shows
that depositors' behavior in East Asia is driven by bank fundamentals and risk aversion activities
and also by price movements. Dynamic panel data analysis is carried out to account for the
lagged dependency of the deposits growth variable and endogeneity of the price mechanism in
xi
the depositor discipline model. The results show that depositors in East Asia do not demand a
higher price for deposits. Analysis by subdividing the sample of banks into healthy and weak
banks shows that the relationship between price and quantity is not non-linear. Healthy banks
are not able to attract more deposits by raising price. Depositors do not discipline weak banks
by demanding a higher return. Lack of responsiveness by depositors to price signals may be
attributable to large the outow of deposits that happened during the crisis period and regulations
on interest rates. Analysis in Chapter 4 conrms that depositors are inuenced by the content
and also quantity of risk-related information disclosure. Panel data analysis shows that higher
risk-related information disclosure enables banks to attract more funds only during the post-crisis
period. Once the lagged dependency of the deposits growth variable and endogeneity of the price
and disclosure mechanism is taken into account, estimation using dynamic panel data analysis
shows that disclosure is a more effective signal in attracting deposits than price. These ndings
provide support to the proposition of the third pillar of the Basel II which aims to encourage
market discipline by requiring banks to disclose more risk-related information. In line with
the wake-up-call hypothesis, the ndings show that depositors' responsiveness to the amount
of information disclosure is higher during the post-crisis period. This study also nds that the
effectiveness of disclosure signal varies according to the quality of banks. Depositors in East
Asia reward good banks for disclosing more information but they do not discipline weak banks
by demanding greater disclosure. Greater responsiveness of depositors to the disclosure signal
of healthy banks compared to weak banks implies that disclosure is a more effective signal for
healthy banks than for weak ones. Other issues analyzed in the thesis pertain to the relevance of
the different type of econometric analysis used in carrying out the empirical analyses.
xii
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
A bank is a nancial institution that accepts deposits from the public and issues loans to
individuals and businesses. These functions distinguish a bank from other nancial institutions.
Due to the information asymmetry that exists in the nancial market, a bank plays a role of
a delegated monitor between lenders and borrowers. In addition to this, a bank also provides
liquidity to lenders and borrowers. A bank's role as the delegated monitor and liquidity provider
enables capital to be allocated efciently in the economy. However, uncertainties in asset
return and depositors' consumption preference make banks to vulnerable to a liquidity shock.
Asymmetry of information may induce some depositors to make early withdrawals even though
they do not need to consume early. Large and sudden withdrawals by depositors can increase a
bank's vulnerability to a run.
A run on a single bank can have a contagion effect on the rest of the banking system through
its inter-bank claims, payment systems linkages and information sharing (Allen and Gale, 2007).
Diamond and Rajan (2001) shows that bank failures can cause systemic illiquidity through the
contagion effect. Bank failures subtract liquidity from the system and this negative spillover
effect raises the likelihood of other banks' failure. A banking crisis happens when a signicant
segment of the banking system becomes illiquid or insolvent. Even healthy banks with strong
fundamentals can fail due to depositors' panic behavior.
Between the period from 1980 to 1995, 133 out of the International Monetary Fund's 181
member countries experienced some form of banking crisis (Lindgren et al., 1996). Historically,
banking crises have been a common occurrence in United States. The Great Depression
(1929-1933) had a signicant impact on the banking system of the United States. The number
1
of bank failures in the US averaged over 2000 per annum in the period from 1930 to 193312.
In recent years, banking crisis has also become a common occurrence in the emerging markets.
This can be seen in the 1995 Latin American crisis, the 1997 East Asian crisis and the late 1990s
Russian crisis. Large numbers of bank failures also happened as a result of these crises. The crisis
also brought a large scale of disruption in the economy through output losses. For example, the
cumulative scal costs incurred in the resolution of the banking crises expressed as a percentage
of GDP was as high as 50 to 55 percent in Indonesia and 42.3 percent in Thailand as the result of
the 1997 East Asian crisis (Hoggarth et al., 2001).
Given the important role that banks play in the economy, the occurrence of banking crises
brings forward the need for greater understanding of issues relating to banking fragility. Since
bank runs are an essential part of banking crises, a good understanding of factors that inuence
deposits growth is also essential. Signaling theory posits that the information asymmetry that
exists in the banking model can be reduced by the signal sent by the informed party to the
uninformed (Moris, 1987). Banks that wants to attract deposits therefore have to signal to
depositors that they are in good nancial health. This is done by revealing information about the
quality of their management and loan portfolios. This study looks at three types of signals that
are often used by banks to reduce the informational asymmetry. The rst is the CAMEL type
indicators that regulators believe are good indicators of a bank's nancial health. The second is
the price signals that banks use to attract deposits. The third is the detailed risk related information
that banks disclose in their nancial statements.
1.1.1 Motivation
During the twentieth century formal economic decison-making models were derived based
on the assumption of perfect information. Economists generally assumed that a market with
1 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) explain that the bank failures during this time had an adverse effect on income mainly
through a negative wealth effect for bank shareholders and through a contraction in the money supply.
2 An approximately 40 percent drop in nominal prices in the United States from the period between 1929 to 1932
caused a debt deation that lowered borrowers' net worth and increased the default rate (Bernanke,1983).
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some information imperfections would function in a similar manner to a market with perfect
information (Stiglitz, 2001). Akerlof's (1970) study on the market for used cars looks at the
inefciency that arises as a result of the information asymmetry that exists between the sellers and
buyers. Sellers will be unable to receive a fair price for their car because it will be viewed as just
another lemon. This results in an adverse selection problem whereby the good cars will be driven
out from the market and only the bad cars will be offered for sale.
Credit market imperfections can result in under-lending. Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) asserts
that credit rationing can happen because the probability of borrower default is linked to the rate
of interest charged on the loan. As a result of this, a better-informed borrower (agents) with a
relatively protable project may not get nancing while others with similar potential may get it.
This may happen even when the borrowers are willing to pay a higher interest rate or increase
their collateral. The banks (less-informed principal) would not be willing to lend above a certain
threshold level of interest due to adverse selection problems and incentive effect. The former
arises because borrowers who are willing to pay a very high rate may be willing to do so because
they perceive that their probability of repaying the loan is small. The later happens because a
higher interest rate provide incentive to borrowers to choose projects that are very risky.
In the markets for good and services, price clears the market and signals to the market
information about resource scarcity. However, given the problem in the loan market, price may not
always be used to clear the market. Price is used in credit markets to signal quality (Stigliz, 1987).
Since the quality of the borrowers that banks attract changes as price changes, excess demand may
persist without any tendency for price to move to correct the market imbalance. Banks may keep
the loan rate low in order to get higher quality borrowers who will make repayments. This may
cause the demand for loans to exceed the supply of loans at low interest rates. Unlike rms, which
would prefer to sell as many products and services for a given price, banks would prefer to limit
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the number of loans that they disburse. Credit needs to rationed and this may cause banks to use a
non-price measure, like borrower quality or favoritism, to decide whom to nance. The threat of
credit rationing may reduce borrowers' moral hazard.
Information asymmetry can be reduced in the credit market through the signal sent by the
better informed party to the less informed one (Spence, 1973). In the presence of information
asymmetry, good rms would want to signal their quality to the market. Managers can send
signals about rms' value through their actions of issuing debt (Ross, 1977) and dividends
(Bhattacharya, 1979). These models posit that only stronger rms can pay a better return over the
long term. Firms with poor performance will not be able to make such payments. Hence, these
signals are perceived by investors as a reliable communication of rms' quality.
The classic paper by Leland and Pyle (1977) shows that the type of nancing that rms use
will send a signal to market about the potential of the projects that the rm intends to undertake.
Since the owners of the rm have private information about the prospect of the projects that
they are investing in, by retaining a higher amount of equity the owners will send a signal to
the market that the project's return is high. From the perspective of the banks, the quality of the
projects that are nanced through loans can be questionable as loan nancing may send a signal
to the banks that the returns of the projects are likely to be low. In light of this, existing literature
emphasizes banks' role of screening borrowers by producing signals about their creditworthiness
(Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). Banks have informational and cost advantages in monitoring
borrowers3. The monitoring service provided by banks avoids the duplication of monitoring costs
for investors (Diamond, 1984).
In the presence of information asymmetry about a borrower's credit quality between a bank
that monitors the borrowers and individual investors that do not, the bank can raise lending rates
because of either demand-side factors or supply-side factors. The former include the borrower's
3 Demand deposits give banks access to private information that they can use to monitor borrowers.
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credit risk (Berlin and Mester, 1992), differential screening capabilities among intermediaries
which induce lending specialization (Daniels and Ramirez, 2008), relationship lending (Boot
and Thakor (1994) and Sharpe (1990))4 and the borrower's choice of debt and lenders (Kwan
and Carleton, 2009). The latter, on the other hand, looks at the effects of the lender's nancial
position on loan pricing. Among other things, a decrease in a bank's capital adequacy can lead
to an increase in the bank's lending rates (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and worsening return in
their own portfolio may lead the bank to write tighter loan contracts (Murn, 2010). In addition
to this, studies also have looked into how different shocks to lenders inuence credit availability
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995 and Peek and Rosengren, 1997)5.
A bank plays a very important and distinct role in the economy. In addition to providing
lending services, a bank also provides deposit taking facilities. Handling the deposit accounts
gives banks access to important information that facilitates their role of a delegated monitor.
Banks' deposit contracts provide insurance to depositors against liquidity risk by promising
to pay them on demand (Bryant 1980). Hence, in addition to providing liquidity to borrowers
through the lending activities, a bank also provides liquidity to depositors through the issuance
of demand deposit contracts (Kashyap et al., 1999). These requires a bank to hold adequate
liquidity at all times. However, offering both services together allows a bank to have economies
of scope between lending and deposit taking. This enables it to a retain smaller buffer than other
institutions that can only offer these services separately.
Information asymmetry exists in the banking model because banks are not able to observe the
true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are not able to observe banks assets' risk.
This makes a bank vulnerable to liquidity shocks. Depositors have incentive to monitor banks due
4 Boot and Thakor (1994) shows that loan interest rates should decrease as a relationship matures, while Sharpe (1990)
shows that the rates will rise over time.
5 Bernanke and Gertler (1995) shows that changes in monetary policy effect the supply of loans by banks, while Peek
and Rosengren (1997)) nds that large size of Japanese bank lending operations in the United States caused the
nancial shock in Japan to effect the supply of bank lending in United States.
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to the inherently fragile nature of banks as shown in the seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). The fractional reserve system allows banks to only keep a fraction of their deposits in
reserve and lend out the remainder. Since banks have full obligation to redeem all deposits on
demand, this system only works well when banks are able to fulll this contractual obligation.
Asymmetry of information may induce some depositors to make withdrawals even though they do
not need to consume early. Stability of banks is threatened when private arrangements are unable
to overcome the coordination problem among depositors.
The existence of informational asymmetry between depositors and banks is highlighted in the
studies by Bryant (1980), Chari and Jagannathan (1984) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988),
Gorton (1988) and Allen and Gale (1998) as the reason that precipitates runs on banks. A run can
either happen because of weak fundamentals or pure panic as shown by Chari and Jagannathan
(1988). They illustrate a signal extraction problem where some depositors withdraw money for
consumption purposes while others withdraw money due to the bank's weak fundamentals. They
posit that when there are long lines to withdraw at banks, depositors will not able to distinguish
whether the queue is due to high consumption needs or because informed depositors are getting
out early due to receiving bad signal about banks' performance. In this case, a run on a bank can
happen not only when the outlook is poor but also when liquidity needs are high despite no one
receiving information on future returns.
A run on a bank that is due to weak fundamentals is an extreme form of depositor discipline.
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) show that the threat of a bank run is always benecial since they
prevent the bank from engaging in high risk taking and allow the salvage of some of the bank's
value. The existence of information cost and sequential service constraints gives depositors an
incentive to monitor the bank. Allen and Gale (1998) shows that an information based run is
efcient because it results in optimal risk sharing between depositors with immediate and late
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consumption needs. However, a run on a bank due to pure panic can be inefcient as postulated
by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Waldo (1985), and Postlewaite and Vives (1987). Gorton and
Winton (2002) dene a panic as a systemic event in which consumers want to hold currency in
exchange for their demand deposits. When this happens, banks that are not able to honor all their
depositors may incur high liquidation costs. This may disrupt the production process and create
negative externalities for the entire economy.
Depositors monitor banks in order to safeguard their interests. Depositors can discipline banks
either by withdrawing their funds or by demanding higher returns (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). The
threat of action by the depositors puts the management under heightened scrutiny. Disciplining
action by the depositors encourages greater prudence and efciency among bank managers. Early
detection of weak banks enables the problems in a particular bank to be contained before they
spread to the entire banking sector. Due to the informational asymmetry that is present between
the borrowers and individual depositors, the bank needs to send a signal about the quality of its
portfolio to attract deposits. The signal can either be through a price or a non-price mechanism.
The latter can be done through disclosure of nancial information while the former can be done
through the interest rate mechanism.
Regulations are needed in banking due to the existence of market imperfections and negative
externalities. They are also aimed at protecting the welfare of the unsophisticated investors.
Bank regulators reduce the information gap between depositors and banks by creating minimum
disclosure requirements. Regulators have traditionally relied on CAMEL framework in measuring
the relative soundness of a bank. This framework measures the performance of a bank by means
of ve parameters, namely Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings and Liquidity6. Information
disclosed in the nancial statement enables depositors to distinguish between weak and strong
banks.
6 A sixth component, a bank's Sensitivity to market risk was added in 1997.
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Apart from withdrawing their funds from weak banks, depositors may demand a lemons
premium from these banks. Stronger banks, on the other hand, may be able to attract deposits at
a cheaper price (Allen et al., 2009). They show that, in the absence of deposit insurance, holding a
capital buffer enables banks to attract deposits at lower cost. This happens because a high capital
buffer signals to investors that the bank will have more incentive to screen and monitor borrowers.
Hence, depositors will be willing to accept a lower rate that is safe.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) illustrate that inefcient bank runs can be prevented by the
implementation of a deposit insurance scheme. Even though it is a component of a nancial
system safety net that is designed to promote nancial stability, in actual fact it can do the
opposite. This scheme reduces depositors' incentive in monitoring banks and, as a result, it may
encourage banks to engage higher in riskier activities. However, empirical studies by Cook and
Spellman (1994), Park and Peristiani(1998), Martínez Pería and Schmukler (1999), Calomiris
and Powell (2000), Barajas and Steiner (2000) and Ungan et al. (2008) show that depositors
disciplined banks in countries like United States, Argentine, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Russia
even in the presence of explicit deposit insurance schemes. This essentially shows that depositors
may not assume insured deposits to be entirely safe as they may also be worried about banks'
solvency and other safety nets in a banking sector (Berger and Turk-Ariss, 2011). The economic
solvency and credibility of the insurer also matter (Cook and Spellman, 1994)7. This is more so
in the case of developing countries where the doubt about the ability of the insurers to cover their
guarantees is higher (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002).
1.1.2 Conceptual Framework
Broadly speaking, this thesis aims to address three important issues in banking: i ) before and
during a crisis does liquidity risk play an important role in causing bank failures? ii ) do depositors
7 Cook and Spellman (1994) nd that even though the deposits of U.S. savings and loan associations (S&Ls) are fully
insured, their interest rate is still related to the level of risk taken by the individual institutions. This happened mainly
due to the weakening nancial position of the federal guarantor at that time.
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react to banks' price signals? and iii) should banks disclose more risk-related information?
Existing literature has relied on CAMEL-type indicators to help predict subsequent failure
of nancial institutions. This strand of literature focuses on the early identication of nancial
difculties. These analyses are carried out by comparing the specic traits of nancially troubled
banks with those of the healthy banks. The fragility of banks has often been associated with
insolvency. In line with this, Basel capital adequacy rules are aimed at ensuring that banks'
fundamentals are sound. However, solvency alone cannot guarantee the soundness of a bank.
Illiquidity in the banking sector can cause solvent but illiquid banks to be unable to source fresh
funds from the capital market in order to repay their current obligations. This can damage a bank's
capital adequacy and hinder the well functioning of the banking system. The severe consequences
of liquidity risk to banks can be observed during the recent Global Financial Crisis (Allen and
Carletti, 2008)8. This crisis highlights the importance of liquidity for the well functioning of the
banking system and proves that liquidity risk is an important issue that needs to be looked into.
Liquidity risk also played a very important role in the East Asian crisis. Before the onset of the
crisis, nancial market liberalization policies caused a large inow of international capital into
the region. However, liberalization without a sufcient supervisory and regulatory framework
encouraged banks to engage in high risk taking activities prior to the crisis. Even though existing
studies offer different views on the causes of this crisis9, most of these studies agree that it was
triggered by a drastic outow of international lending. A sudden and strong outow of funds
caused a liquidity crisis and subsequently caused depositors to run from weaker to stronger banks
and from the banking system as a whole. Widespread banking failures happened in these countries
8 Liquidity provision was affected by 1) the fall of the prices of AAA-rated tranches of securitized products below
fundamental values 2) the effect of the crisis on the interbank markets for term funding and on collateralized money
markets. 3) the fear of contagion in the event that a major institution fails.
9 Scholars like Krugman (1998), Corsetti et al. (1999b) and Glick and Hutchison (2001) argue that the East Asian crisis
is caused by weakening fundamentals while scholars like Radalet and Sachs (1998) and Stiglitz (1999) asserts that the
extent of macroeconomic imbalances and nancial sector weaknesses are not sufcient in explaining the magnitude
of the crisis.
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Figure 1.1: Signalling in Banking
as a result of the crisis (IMF, 1998). The abundance of liquidity before crisis and drastic drying up
of liquidity during and after the crisis brings forward the case for analyzing the role of liquidity
risk in the East Asian banking system. Hence, the following question analyzed in the second
chapter of this thesis arises: does liquidity risk before and during a crisis play an important role in
causing bank failures?
The third pillar of the Basel II emphasizes the role of market discipline. Depositor discipline
is one form of market discipline. Depositors' ability to discipline banks makes risk taking costly
for banks. This in turn could contribute to a more stable banking system. Depositor discipline
can only take effect when depositors have sufcient information about banks' risk prole.
Regulators require banks to disclose CAMEL-type indicators. Availability of such information
facilitates depositors' decision making. In addition to relying on the information disclosed in the
CAMEL-type indicators, depositors may base their decisions on other signals from banks.
Chapter 3 of this thesis aims to nd if depositor discipline is present in the East Asian banking
system. Depositors can discipline banks for high risk taking and poor performance by either
withdrawing their funds or demanding a higher price. Worsening bank fundamentals may cause
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depositor withdrawals. This raises the price of deposits. If depositor discipline is effective,
depositors will require higher compensation from banks that have taken higher risk on-balance
sheet portfolio and off-balance sheet activities. Banks may react to depositor withdrawals by
raising price. Hence, worsening bank fundamentals may cause changes in both the quantity and
price of deposits. This chapter aims to nd if banks are able to use price signals in attracting more
deposits. This will be done by controlling for the endogenous relationship between price and
quantity of deposits.
In addition to using the information disclosed in the CAMEL-type indicators and price signals
in attracting more funds, banks may also use detailed disclosure of risk related information in their
nancial statements as a signal to attract more deposits. Greater disclosure makes banks more
transparent and this further facilitates market discipline. In line with this, chapter 4 of this thesis
will examine the effectiveness of greater risk-related information disclosure in attracting more
deposits. Disclosure Index will be used for this purpose. This index is constructed at the bank
level using the amount of information available in banks' annual report on fteen core disclosure
items that relate to interest-rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, and capital.
In comparison to the CAMEL-type indicators which measures the soundness of banks,
Disclosure Index measures the amount of risk related information that banks disclose. By
disclosing more information, banks are effectively being more transparent about their nancial
conditions. Disclosure Index is used in this chapter in answering a very important question in
banking: Should banks disclose more risk related information? Deteriorating bank fundamentals
may cause changes in both quantities of deposits and the amount of risk related information that
banks disclose. Hence, this study aims to analyse depositors' responsiveness to the amount of risk
related information that banks disclose by accounting for the endogenous relationship between
these two variables.
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1.2 Outline of Thesis
This thesis consists of four additional chapters. Three chapters contain new empirical
contributions. The nal chapter summarizes the conclusions and policy recommendations. A brief
overview of the various chapters and their main conclusions is given below.
Chapter 2 contains the empirical analysis on the role of a liquidity inux before a crisis and
illiquidity during a crisis on banking fragility in East Asia. This study aims to shed light on
whether banks in East Asia hold "too little" or "too much" liquidity before and during a crisis
and how their vulnerabilities to failure change as a result of that. The IV method takes into
account the fact that the probability of bank failure is inuenced by the bank level liquidity risk
variables which, in turn, are affected by international liquidity. The study nds that the effect of
liquidity risk on the probability of bank failure varies before and during a crisis. The results show
that higher holding of liquidity reduces banks' vulnerability to failure while higher reliance on
external funding increases it. These ndings bring forward the case for stronger regulation of
banks' liquidity holdings, which can be brought forward by better liquidity management.
Chapter 3 empirically examines the existence of depositor discipline in the East Asian banking
sector. It is mainly interested in investigating the reaction of depositors to the price signal of
banks to nd out if banks in East Asia are able to attract more deposits by offering higher interest
rates. Panel data analysis conrms that depositor discipline is present in the East Asian banking
system. It shows that depositors prefer banks that are solvent, big and offer an interest rate that are
closer to the government debt rate. Further to this, dynamic panel data analysis is used to account
for the endogeneity between price (interest rate) and quantity of deposits. The ndings conrm
the endogenous relationship between price and quantity of deposits. Once the endogeneity
is controlled for, the study nds that deposits growth in the sample banks is driven by bank
fundamentals but not price signals. In order to account for the possible non-linear relationship
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between quantity and price of deposits, analysis is performed by dividing the sample of banks into
healthy and weak categories. The results suggest that healthy banks are not able to attract more
funds over time by raising their interest rate. The results also show that depositors in East Asia did
not discipline weak banks by demanding a higher price. Lack of responsiveness by depositors to
the price mechanism may be attributable to large outows of deposits during the crisis period and
regulations on interest rates.
Chapter 4 focuses on nding out whether greater risk-related information disclosure enables
banks to attract more deposits. This is done by controlling for the soundness of banks using the
CAMEL-type indicators and price mechanism using the deposits interest rate. Panel data analysis
shows that banks are able to attract funds by disclosing more risk-related information during the
post-crisis period. Dynamic panel data analysis conrms the endogeneity between the amount
of information disclosure and quantity of deposits. Once this is controlled for, the study nds
that deposits growth in the sample banks is driven by the CAMEL-type equity ratio, size and the
quantity of risk-related information disclosure, but not price. This nding provides support to the
proposition of the third pillar of Basel II which aims to encourage market discipline by requiring
banks to disclose more risk-related information. In line with the wake-up-call hypothesis, this
study nds that depositors are more responsive to the changes in information disclosure during
the post-crisis period. The results also show that stronger banks are able to attract more funds
by disclosing additional information but weaker banks are not able to do so. This implies that
disclosure is a more effective signal for healthy banks than for weak ones.
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Chapter 2 Liquidity Risk and Banking Fragility
2.1 Introduction
Banks have traditionally played a much larger role in the East Asian countries like Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand due to the underdevelopment of the debt and equity
market. This can be seen by the rapid increase in the ratio of domestic credit provided by banking
sector to GDP from 7.23 percent in 1995 to 14.83 percent in 1997 (Figure A.4). Scarcity of capital
has caused these countries to rely more on external funding in nancing their rapid economic
development. A large percentage of capital inows was channelled into these countries through
the banks. This inuenced the type and amount of liquidity held by the banks in East Asia. When
a sudden and drastic outow of international lending happened in 1997, banks were under great
pressure to meet the withdrawal demands of depositors and international lenders. This triggered a
liquidity crisis in the banking system and subsequently caused widespread bank failures. Existing
studies by Rojas-Suarez (2001), Bongini et al, (2001), Bongini et al, (2002) and Arena (2008)
show that banks that failed in East Asia were fundamentally weak ex-ante. Since illiquidity was
at the heart of this crisis, this study will complement the existing ones by focusing on the role of
liquidity risk in causing banking failures in East Asia.
The inux of international liquidity into the East Asian banking system prior to the crisis and
the illiquidity of the banking system during the crisis expose banks to different types and degrees
of liquidity risk. This study aims to shed light on the effect of international liquidity on individual
banks' liquidity risk in East Asia. More specically, this study aims to nd how the liquidity
inux before a crisis and international illiquidity during a crisis affects banks' vulnerability to
failure. In addition to this, it also focuses on nding if banks in East Asia that relied more on
external funding before and during the crisis are vulnerable to failure. A good understanding of
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the extent and the type of liquidity risk that banks are exposed to before and during the crisis is
important in conrming whether this action improves or worsens banks' probability of failure.
The central contribution of this study arises from the methodology that is used in the analysis.
Two-stage equation models have been used in the existing studies on bank failure (Gajewski,
1988; Demirguc-Kunt, 1990; Thomson, 1992 and Godlewski, 2006) to separate the risk factors
affecting bank solvency from other factors that inuence a regulator's closure decisions10. In
the present study, IV estimation is used to account for the endogeneity of liquidity risk variable.
Sudden shifts in international investors' expectations that happen during the crisis are captured
in the error term of the failure model. This effect not only increases the probability of bank
failures, but it also may lead to higher liquidity risk. Estimating the above equation using logistic
regression generally produces biased and inconsistent estimates due to the endogeneity of the
liquidity risk variable.
This paper lls in the gap in the existing literature by using alternative liquidity risk measures
such as the ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets and the Financial Gap ratio as
the proxies of banks' liquidity risk. These ratios focus on different aspects of liquidity risk that
are relevant in the context of East Asian crisis. Firstly, the ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds
to Total Assets measures the sensitivity of banks to a possible run by depositors and short-term
fund holders. Secondly, the Financial Gap ratio measures the effect of higher reliance on external
funding on bank failures.
IV probit analyses using bank level data during a crisis (i.e. 1997) show that higher deposits
and short-term base signicantly reduces the probability of bank failure while higher reliance on
external funding signicantly increases the probability of bank failure. Probit analyses using crisis
data (i.e. 1997) show that higher deposits and short-term base signicantly reduce the probability
10 Solvency risk is treated as an endogenous variable in the regulator's closure decisions model to allow distinction to be
made between economic insolvency and administrative failure.
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of bank failure. Differences in the ndings of IV probit and probit estimation suggest that, once
the endogeneity of bank specic liquidity measures is taken into account, the ability of higher
deposits and short-term base in reducing the probability of bank failure diminishes. This change
could be driven by the effect of international liquidity on the ratio of Deposits and Short-term
Funds to Total Assets as shown in the reduced form estimation.
Analyses using probit and IV probit estimations shows that higher reliance on external funding
increases the probability of bank failure. This nding is in line with Diamond and Rajan (2000)'s
proposition which postulates that nancial institutions' vulnerability to failure increases as a result
of higher reliance on short-term funding. This could be due to the fact that external or wholesale
funds like short-term debts are more volatile and costly to service compared to customer deposits
and as a result banks that rely more on them are exposed to higher liquidity risks. Higher reliance
on external funding also increases banks' exposure to both maturity and currency mismatch.
When a large outow of international funds happened during a crisis year, banks that relied more
on external funding had to source domestic funding. Scarcity of funds raises banks' costs of
funding. This, in turn, could have increased their probability of failure.
Analysis focusing only on the sample of commercial banks shows that their reliance on
external funding before a crisis does not affect their probability of failure. But, analysis which
includes other types of nancial institutions shows that reliance on external funding before a
crisis increases their probability of failure. A number of conclusions can be made based on these
ndings. Firstly, these ndings may suggest that commercial banks' costs of funding external
funds may have been lower than that of other nancial institutions. Secondly, this may suggest
that other nancial institutions may have relied more on external funds before the crisis compared
to commercial banks.
In conclusion, the ndings of this study conrm that the effect of liquidity risk before and
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during a crisis on the probability of bank failures in East Asia varies. This study highlights the
greater benets of having a higher deposits base and also the vulnerability of banks to failure as
a result of high reliance on external funding. This brings forward the need for better liquidity
management in the East Asian banking system. Overall, the ndings of this study also implies
that CAMEL-type indicators alone are not able to explain the large number of bank failures that
happened in East Asia. Other banks specic variables, like size and ownership structure of the
banks, also plays an important role in predicting failures. in addition to this, the institutional
environment of these countries also strongly inuences the fragility of banks.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2, describes the East Asian crisis by focusing
on the role of international liquidity before the crisis and illiquidity during the crisis. Section 2.3
discusses the link between liquidity risk and banking fragility. The literature review in Section
2.4 focuses on the theory and empirical ndings on bank failure. Section 2.5 describes the
methodology and data used in the analysis. Section 2.6 reports and discusses the empirical results.
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The East Asian Crisis
Laeven and Valencia (2008) dene a systemic banking crisis as an episode where there is a
large number of defaults that result in the increase in non-performing loans, reduction in capital,
depressed asset prices (such as equity and real estate prices) before the onset of the crisis, sharp
rise in real interest rates, and a decrease or withdrawal of capital ows. A large number of bank
failures is also one of the prominent features of banking crisis. Based on these descriptions,
Laeven and Valencia (2008) classied ve countries in East Asia namely Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand as countries that experienced a systemic banking crisis in
1997. In order to better understand the role of international illiquidity in triggering the crisis, this
section provides a brief overview of the East Asian crisis.
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2.2.1 Overview of the East Asian Crisis
In the 1980s, East Asian countries introduced nancial and capital liberalization policies. These
policies encouraged deregulation and increased competition in the market. Capital ow was also
facilitated by favorable government policies. For example, the Bangkok International Banking
Facility which was established by Thailand in March 1993 to deal in foreign-currency transactions
received special tax breaks. This encouraged a "hot money" ow into Thailand amounting to
USD31 billion up to the end of 1996 (Radelet and Sachs, 1998a and Khor, 1998). Similarly,
Philippines reduced tax rate to 10 percent for onshore income from foreign exchange loans while
other incomes were subject to a corporate income tax rate of 35 percent. Banks in Philippines did
not have a reserve requirement policy on foreign-currency deposits but had a reserve requirement
policy of 15 percent on peso deposits in 1996 (IMF, 1997). These encouraged more capital
ow into Philippines. Malaysia liberalized its nancial market by giving greater freedom for
foreign funds to invest in the stock market and allowing conversion between foreign and local
loans11. Even though Korea was hesitant in allowing short-term capital ows, it relaxed the rules
in order to meet the requirements for entering the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) (Khor, 1998). This allowed its banks and rms to receive large inows of
short-term loans from international banks.
Changes in domestic policies in the Asian-5 countries went hand in hand with a more
liberalized international capital market in causing the surge of capital ow into the region in the
1990s. The globalization of nancial markets helped in reducing portfolio concentration and
`unreasonable' home bias in investment decisions. Literature on the determinants of international
capital ows to emerging markets shows that economic cycles in lending countries (Jeanneau and
Micu, 2002), a slowdown in US industrial production index and a drop in the US interest rate
11 However, the Central Bank retained control on foreign-currency loans by private rms. Bank Negara Malaysia's
Annual Report 1997 page 53 to 54 states that private ms wanting to borrow foreign-currency loans exceeding RM5
million need to obtain the Central Bank's approval. Firms are also prohibited from raising external borrowing to
nance property purchase in the country (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1998).
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(Calvo et. al, 1993; Chuhan et al, 1998 and World Bank, 2001) are among the push factors that
have inuenced the ow of international lending to these markets.
The net private capital ow into the Asian-5 countries doubled from 5.38 percent of GDP
in 1994 to 11.10 percent in 1996 (Table A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6 and A.7)12. A substantial
amount of net private capital inow averaging $208.02 billion continued to enter the region in
rst half of 1997. The bulk of the capital inow into these countries was in the form of bank
lending. In total, foreign bank lending increased by 41.05 percent in 1995 and 21.70 percent in
1996. Foreign banks lending remained exceptionally high in Korea and Thailand. In the rst and
second quarter of 1997, total foreign bank lending increased by $10.62 billion and $12.77 billion
respectively. This accounts for an average increase of 7.65 percent in the rst half of 1997.
Rapid growth and large capital inows in the Asian-5 countries were partly facilitated by the
pegged exchange rate regime13. This caused limited variation in exchange rates. For example,
Thai Baht movements ranged mostly between 25 and 27 baht to the US dollar for thirteen
years (Edwards, 1999). This provided stability and functioned properly while the US dollar
was relatively weak in international currency markets. The devaluation of the Chinese renminbi
and the Japanese yen caused the strengthening of the US Dollar in mid 1996. Appreciation of
US dollars against the yen posed upward pressure on the Asian-5currencies as result a of the
peg (Figure A.2). This reduced the countries' export competitiveness and worsened the current
account decit.
Based on Goldman-Sachs' assessment, exchange rates were overvalued in all ve countries
in 1996 and mid 1997 (Edwards, 1999). Central banks in the Asian-5 countries reacted to the
increased demand for domestic currencies by accumulating reserve holdings. The increase in the
12 Net private capital ow is measured using Financial Account balance that records transactions in nancial assets and
liabilities between residents and non-residents.
13 Nominal exchange rates in the Asian-5 countries were effectively pegged (de facto, pegged or quasi pegged) to US
Dollars.
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money supply caused liquidity to remain high as shown by the ratio of M2 as a percentage of Total
Reserves (Figure A.3). Money supply expansion raised price levels and further eroded Asian-5
countries' export competitiveness.
A sharp decline in semiconductor prices reduced export revenues and caused the slowdown
in economic activities. In 1996, things started worsening in Thailand as a result of a substantial
decline in export growth. Investors were expecting a devaluation of Thai baht. However, the
monetary authority refused to oat or adjust the peg of the overvalued currency. Pressures in the
foreign exchange market escalated concern on the sustainability of the peg and made the currency
susceptible to speculative attacks. Thailand's central bank was not able to defend its currency due
to the insufcient amount of reserve holding. This hindered its ability to act as a lender of last
resort in the domestic nancial market. The collapse of Thai baht in July 1997 instigated massive
currency devaluations in the rest of the East Asian countries14.
In 1997, exchange rates depreciated by an average of 32 percent against US dollar (measured
in dollars per unit of Asian currency) in the Asian-5 countries with the highest drop recorded in
Indonesia (95 percent) and lowest in Malaysia (12 percent) (Figure A.2)15. Drastic devaluation of
the domestic currencies raised the effective value of existing external liabilities.
Exodus of international capital or sudden stops rather than simply deation of asset values
brought the underlying problem to the surface in Asian-5 countries16. Net private capital ow as
shown by nancial account balance fell from the high of $75 billion in 1996 to a low of -$13
billion in 1997. Capital inow fell to $47.40 billion in the third quarter of 1997 before turning into
14 In line with the "Wake-up call" hypothesis postulated by Goldstein (1998), problems faced by nancial intermediaries
in Thailand and the ineffectiveness of government's policy response made the foreign investors realize that they had
a poor understanding of the working of these economies. This subsequently made them re-evaluate their investment
decision in neighboring countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea and Philippines.
15 The Thai Baht's devaluation at the beginning of 1997 had a negative impact on Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and other
countries' economies because it reduced their export competitiveness (Glick and Rose, 1999). This forced Thailand's
trading partners to devaluate their currencies in order to remain competitive.
16 Sudden stops are dened as a period during which there is an unexpected reversal of net private foreign capital ow
and there is a request to pay back foreign loans that are maturing (Calvo, 1998).
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a net outow of $40.41 billion in the last quarter of 1997. A single-year capital ow uctuation of
$88 billion amounts to 10 percent of the 1996 total GDP of the Asian-5 countries.
2.2.2 The East Asian Banking Sector
The East Asian countries had a deeper nancial system mainly due to the underdevelopment
of the debt and equity markets17. Growth in the ratio of domestic credit to GDP was very high as
shown in Figure A.4. For the period from 1995 to 1997, it averaged 10 percent. A high percentage
of this credit was provided through the banking sector. Credit provided by banking sector ranged
around 60 percent of GDP in Indonesia, Korea and Philippines. Malaysia and Thailand had an
exceptionally large banking sector as the ratio of credit provided by banking sector to GDP was
185.82 percent and 148.98 percent respectively.
Prior to liberalization, ceilings on real interest rates and credit rationing are often imposed.
After liberalization, interest rate spread widens and competition in the banking sector increases.
Liberalization of the nancial market in East Asia caused a rapid inow of international funds into
the banking system. Foreign bank lending was channelled to both domestic bank and non-bank
corporate borrowers (Table A.8). Lending to the banking sector was higher in Korea while lending
to the corporate sector was higher in the rest of the countries.
A high percentage of foreign bank lending that went into Indonesia, Korea and Thailand was
on a short-term basis. This aggravates maturity mismatch in the balance sheet as funds borrowed
abroad on a short-term basis was used to nance long-term assets domestically. In the event of
a crisis, short term debts increase the possibility of coordination failure among lenders as they
refuse to roll over their funding.
Domestic banks also had a substantial amount of foreign-currency borrowing (mostly in
dollars) which was lent out at home in domestic currency. High Domestic Liability Dollarization
17 The depth of the nancial sector is measured by the value of Private Sector Ccredit to GDP, which is measured using
the value of credits by deposit-taking institutions allocated to the private sector divided by GDP. It excludes credit
issued by the central bank, credit to the public sector and inter-bank loans (Krozner, Laevan and Klingeniel, 2007).
21
(DLD) exposes the banking systems to increased risk in the event of a large depreciation in real
exchange rates (Eichengreen et al.,2003)18. As a result, banks' balance sheets became vulnerable
to currency mismatch. Even though the ratio of dollar liabilities to total liabilities was not large in
the Asian-5 countries, their sizeable banking system caused DLD to have a signicant effect on
the economy (Calvo et al., 2008). DLD doubled from 13.72 percent in 1995 to 27.95 percent in
1997 for the Asian-5 countries (Figure A.5). Philippines and Thailand had an above-average DLD
of 43.23 percent and 41.34 percent respectively.
Before crisis, Asian-5 banks recorded high deposit and short-term funding growth (Table A.9).
In 1995, the growth of the short-term fund (46.32 percent) was almost double that of total deposits
(24.36 percent)19. Growth of short-term funds and deposits slowed down to 11.46 percent and
15.41 respectively in 1996. Growth in the total amount of loans extended by banks was also in
tandem with growth in deposits and short-term funds. Net loans increased by 29.65 in 1995 before
slowing down to 16.12 percent in 1996. Similarly, banks' holding of liquid assets increased by
29.42 percent in 1995 before slowing down to 4.99 percent in 1996. Banking sector growth can
also be observed by the expanding total assets. From 1994 to 1996, Asian-5 banks' total assets
increased by 32.66 percent.
When the crisis happened, foreign bank position, as shown by Net Bank Liabilities, fell by
$25.7 billion in 1997 (Table A.6). The outstanding amount of lending, extended by the Bank of
International Settlement reporting countries to Asian-5 banks, dropped by $11.73 billion in the
third quarter of 1997 and $24.90 billion in the last quarter of 1997 (Table A.8). Banks' external
funding was reduced dramatically when foreign creditors refused to roll-over their short-term
debt. This triggered illiquidity in the Asian-5 banking systems.
This caused maturity mismatch in the banking system. Drastic devaluation of domestic
18 Domestic Liability Dollarization is a measured by adding up dollar deposits and domestic banks' foreign borrowing
as a share of GDP.
19 Based on the sample of banks used in this study.
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currencies caused currency mismatch. The demand for liquidity in the banking system increased
as a result. Banks increased their dependence on domestic funding. This subsequently raised the
cost of external nance. For example, nominal interest rate in Indonesia surged by almost 60%
per annum in January 1998 (Basurto and Ghosh, 2000).
Drastic outow of capital from the Asian-5 countries caused all the stock markets to fall. By
the beginning of 1998, all the indices had gone below 50 points and remained at that point until
the middle of 1998 (Table A.13). A large portion of the market capitalization was wiped out as a
result of the drastic drop in the stock markets. Investment in the stock markets was partly funded
through margin nancing that was provided by the nancial institutions. This severely affected
the nancial standing of nancial institutions in the Asian-5 countries that were overexposed to
these sectors. The bubble in real estate also burst and property prices collapsed as a result. Prices
of the commercial and residential property reached the bottom in the fourth quarter of 1997 (Table
A.11 and A.12).
Within the same year, banks' credit expansion was curtailed. Total amount of loans (net)
extended fell by 31.85 percent as a result (Table A.9). Total assets in the banking sector shrank by
35 percent while liquid assets dropped by 22.25 percent in 1997. The fall in asset values cause the
level of Non Performing Loans (NPL) to rise. This lead to a further reduction in banks' prot.
Negative net worth (liabilities exceed assets) causes banks' solvency risk to rise. The worsening
of banks' fundamentals caused domestic depositors to run on the banks. This further aggravated
banks' liquidity problems. Large number of bank failures happened as a result of this crisis.
2.3 Liquidity in Banking
The East Asian crisis highlights the importance of liquidity for the well functioning of the
banking system. It also shows the vulnerabilities that arise as a result of high dependence on
international liquidity. In order to better understand these issues, this section explains about the
role of liquidity in banking. It also describes the type of funds that banks rely on and also the
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Table 2.1: Description about the East Asian Crisis
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nature of these funds.
2.3.1 Liquidity Risk and Banking Fragility
In the context of economic literature, liquidity refers to the ability of an economic agent to
exchange his or her existing wealth for goods and services or for other assets (Williamson, 2008).
This denition encompasses the concept of ows and the ability in realizing these ows (Nikolaou,
2009). Funding liquidity is dened as the ability of banks to meet their liabilities, unwind or settle
their positions as they become due (Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2009)20. Similarly, the IMF denes
funding liquidity as the ability of solvent institutions to make agreed-upon payments in a timely
fashion. Liquidity is inversely related to liquidity risk21. Liquidity ratio is used as one of the
key elements is measuring banks' nancial strength. Banks that have a higher level of liquidity
would have lower liquidity risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) denes
liquidity risk as arising from a bank's inability to accommodate decreases in liabilities or to fund
increases in assets at a reasonable cost, timely. In other words, liquidity risk can be dened as the
risk resulting from the inability of a nancial institution to source funds due to exceptionally high
costs of liquidity transformation, or the inability to honor its debts and obligations when they are
due because its not able to convert assets to cash.
Banks require liquidity for various reasons, among them are to compensate for net outow
of funds, as a buffer for the non-receipt of expected funds inowing, as a source of funds when
contingent liabilities become due and as a source of funds for engaging in new transactions when
desirable. However, due to pure market failures, banks do not have incentives to keep a sufcient
amount of liquid assets (IMF, 2008). These market failures arise as a result of several factors.
20 Existing literature has classied nancial markets' liquidity into three different categories; market liquidity, funding
liquidity and central bank liquidity. Market liquidity refers to the ability to "trade an asset at short notice, at low cost
and with little impact on its price" while Central bank liquidity refers to the ability of the central bank to supply the
needed liquidity to the nancial market (Nikolaou, 2009).
21 In the context of an agent's decision making, the term risk relates to random outcomes with known probabilities
whereby agents have well dened preferences with regard to the random variable of interest (Machina and
Rothschild,2008).
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Firstly, holding a high liquidity ratio during a normal time is costly for banks since it is associated
with lower return on assets without much offsetting benet (Allen and Carletti, 2008)22. Secondly,
the probability of a shortfall in liquidity does not happen regularly. Edwards (2005) nds that
illiquidity that happens as a result of unexpected reversal of net private foreign capital ow
happened in emerging-market countries every decade. Since the frequency of liquidity crisis in
the banking sector is not high, banks do not nd it justiable or protable to keep a high amount
of liquid assets during a normal time. Thirdly, there is a general expectation that central banks
will step in, in the form of the Lender Of Last Resort (LOLR) in providing liquidity for banks in
the event of crisis23.
Banks are normally able to accurately predict the consumption need of their investors and
ensure that they have an adequate amount of low-cost funding that is available at short notice
in meeting the withdrawal demands of the investors. Since most lenders do not need to use all
their money at the same time, banks are able to act as a nancial intermediary by lending out a
large part of the funding that they receive in order to generate prot. A large amount of funds
that are usually available at reasonable costs before the onset of crisis enables banks to engage in
greater nancial intermediation activities and earn a good return. Berger and Bouwman (2008),
for example, nds that banking crises are preceded by a signicant build-up of abnormal positive
liquidity creation by banks24.
However, an extreme form of funding liquidity risk arises during crisis time (Nikolaou, 2009).
This causes bank runs to happen. Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) seminal work on bank runs
highlight the existence of multiple equilibria in a banking model. A bank run is modelled as a
22 Competition in the banking industry encourages banks to invest in long-term illiquid assets that yield higher return
compared to short-term liquid assets. This is especially the case during good times when there are a large amount of
deposits and short-term funding available. As long as there are no runs, banks that keep a high level of illiquid assets
will be able to offer more attractive collateral compared to banks that are more prudent (Cao and Illing, 2009).
23 Even though LOLR provides a safety net for the banks, it also creates a moral hazard problem for banks by reducing
their incentives in keeping sufcient liquidity buffers (Repullo, 2005).
24 The analysis is based on the aggregate liquidity creation of banks at the time before, during, and after ve major
nancial crises in the U.S. from the rst quarter of 1984 to the rst quarter of 2008.
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bad equilibrium whereby depositors decide to liquidate their deposits before the maturity of the
investment, leading to increased demand for liquidity. Banks that do not hold a sufcient amount
of liquid asset or are unable to raise new funds from the market will have a problem in honoring
large amounts of deposit withdrawals that happen at the same time. This happens as a result of
banks' adherence to the fractional reserve system and the imposition of the sequential service
constraint that requires depositors to be served based on the rst-come rst-served basis. The
prospect of a re sale makes it optimal for the depositors to run on the banks if they expect others
to run too since early liquidation lowers value and makes runs costly.
A bank run is contagious (Diamond and Rajan, 2005). A run on one bank can spread to the rest
of the banking system and trigger system wide withdrawals. The following example gives a clear
illustration as to how this can happen. Suppose an investor has provided deposit and short-term
funding to banks A and B at the same time. Any untoward news about bank A causes this investor
to reevaluate his or her investment prospect in bank B too. This is mainly the case if the investor
perceives that the problem faced by bank A is not an isolated case, and that it can send ripples
of shock into the rest of the banking system even though bad news about bank A would not
directly affect any of the accounting data of bank B; it contributes toward the shift in the investor's
expectations towards bank B. Naturally, when a large number of depositors and other short-term
creditors pull their money out of the banking system, a liquidity crisis happens. A run on a single
bank can also spread to the rest of the banking system through its inter-bank claims, payment
systems linkages and information sharing (Allen and Gale, 2007).
2.3.2 Type of Funds
Banks' vulnerability to a run is related to the type of funds that they depend on. Since the
behavioral attitudes of different types of lenders inuence their sensitivity to credit risk and
interest rates, this affects the ow of funds into banks (Duttweiler, 2009). Banks have traditionally
relied more on retail funds provided by individual investors as their major source of funding.
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Although retail funds continue to be a key liability funding source, many banks have experienced
difculty in attracting retail deposits. As a result, banks have supplemented their traditional
funding sources with wholesale funds. These funds are typically provided by large corporations,
banks and other nancial institutions and government agencies (domestic and international).
These funds are managed by professionals who are more informed and as a result more detailed
and careful in assessing banks' performance compared to retail depositors who are relatively less
informed and unsophisticated.
Wholesale funds are large in quantity and highly volatile (Dutweiler, 2009). As a result, any
drastic and sudden withdrawal of funds by this group of investors can have a very damaging effect
on banks. Even though liquidity risk has traditionally been linked to loss of demand deposits,
withdrawals or non-renewals of short-term nancing have been linked to liquidity risks in recent
times as illustrated by Diamond and Rajan (2000). Wholesale funds like short-term debts are also
more expensive to service compared to customer deposits (Saunders and Cornett, 2006). Hence,
during normal times, banks that rely on this type of funds might be more inclined to engage in
higher risk taking activities in order to generate a higher return.
Compared to wholesale funds, retail funds are considered to be a more stable and resilient
source of funds for banks (Yorulmazer, 2008 and Dutweiler, 2009). For example, based on recent
liquidity events such as the Russian default and the fall of Long Term Capital Management
(LCTM), Gatev and Strahan (2006) nds that retail deposits are a more stable source of bank
funding than wholesale funds for the U.S. banks. This means that retail depositors are less likely
to withdraw their funds or fail to renew them, if there is some adverse development or bad news
about the bank. This can be due to the high searching and switching costs that are incurred by this
group of liability holders 25.
25 For example, data obtained from the Financial Research Survey of the National Opinion Poll for the UK shows that
a typical current account holder does not change banks during their lifetime, i.e. only change banks every 91 years
(Gondat-Larralde and Nier, 2006).
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2.4 Literature Review
2.4.1 Theory on Bank Failure
This section provides a brief overview of the literature on the theory of bank failure. Existing
literature is divided on the causes of bank runs. The panic-based view suggests that depositors
run on banks due to undesirable events that are unrelated to changes in the real economy
(Kindleberger, 1978). Panic is described as a random exhibition of `mob psychology' which is
embedded in individual and collective psyches. In this case, irrespective of long-term solvency,
depositors' self-fullling prophecies cause a run to happen. A modern version of this view is
postulated by Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Waldo (1985), and Postlewaite and
Vives (1987).
The fundamental-based view, on the other hand, asserts that bank failures happen as a result
of fundamental changes in the economic activities that affect banks' solvency. Depositors react
to this by withdrawing their funds from weaker banks. This view has been proposed by Gorton
(1985), Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Calomiris and Kahn
(1991), Donaldson (1992) and Allen and Gale (1998). According to this view, bank failures are
determined by banks' fundamentals, and as a result only weak and fragile banks fail.
Moris and Shin (1998) reconcile these two views in a currency attack model and achieve
a unique equilibrium whereby even though agents' withdrawals happen indirectly due to the
weakening of the fundamentals, the resulting panic-based run happens because agents believe that
other agents are going to withdraw too. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) apply this global-games
theory in a bank run model and demonstrate that a panic-based run can happen when a bank's
fundamentals are good enough that agents would not run had they believed that others would
not. A run is, nonetheless, shown to happen if and only if the fundamentals of the economy are
below some threshold level. Chui et al.(2000) illustrate this approach in the context of a model of
sovereign liquidity crises, and nd that shifts in investors' expectations and fundamentals interact
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in causing illiquidity. Weaker economic fundamentals facilitate in making pessimistic investors'
expectations self-fullling.
Chang and Velasco (1998, 2001) models the East Asian crisis as a liquidity crisis and shows
that a bank run equilibrium can emerge in a banking system characterized by insufcient liquidity
to fulll short-term obligations. Their model shows that illiquidity of the banking system increases
its vulnerability to exogenous shocks and shifts in expectations. Dekle and Kletzer (2001), on the
other hand, uses an endogenous growth model that considers the dynamic relationship between
international capital ow, domestic investment, rm debt and value, and also bank equity in
analyzing the East Asian nancial crisis. They show that the fragility of a banking system with
information asymmetry increases in an economy characterized by imperfect prudential regulation
and public sector loan guarantees when there is an expected reversal of capital ows. In their
model, banks have the incentives to renegotiate the rm's debt when there is a rm-specic
productivity shock. When the latter happens, the bank's exposure to risky assets increases the
same time their foreign borrowing increases. In this case, a crisis emerges endogenously in their
model due to the increase in bank fragility as a result of worsening portfolio and higher solvency
risk.
2.4.2 Empirical Work on Bank Failure
Economic failure of the banks is one of the main reasons why regulators decide to fail
banks26. Economic insolvency of banks happens when banks' net worth turns negative, or if
they are unable to operate normally without incurring losses that result in negative net worth
(Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1996). Existing studies have used information in banks' nancial
statements in predicting bank failure. Financial standing of the banks, as reected in their nancial
statements, essentially reects the ex-post results of bank managers' decision making and also
26 Banks operate in a very highly regulated industry. As such, Kane (1989) postulates that the decision to fail a bank is
often made by the regulators based on public choice theory.
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regulators' guidelines (e.g. the required level of capitalization). The information in banks'
nancial statements helps in identifying the extent of banks' leverage and asset risk by capturing
the market, credit, operational and liquidity risk faced by banks (Sinkey, 1975).
Beaver (1966)'s study is one of the earlier studies that has used accounting data to forecast
rms' solvency. The probability of the non-nancial rms going bankrupt is forecasted using
their nancial ratios. Meyer and Pifer's (1970) study is the rst to use nancial statements in
identifying bank failures. Among the methods that have been used in the existing literature are
univariate analysis (Beaver, 1966), multiple discriminant analysis (Deakin, 1972 and Altman,
1977), logistic regression (logit and probit models) (Thomson, 1991; Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1996;
Estrella et al., 2000; Andersen, 2008 and Arena, 2008), survival model (Cox, 1972; Whalen,
1991; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Arena, 2008 and Mannasoo and Mayes, 2008), two-stage
equations model (Gajewski, 1988; Demirguc-Kunt, 1990; Thomson, 1992; Bongini et al., 2001
and Godlewski, 2006) and neural network ( Tam, 1991; Tam and Kiang, 1992 and Salchenberger
et al. 1992).
Most of the earlier studies of bank failures are carried out using United States data. Failed banks
have been found to exhibit poor loan quality, low earnings, high liquidity risk and inadequate
capitalization (Altman, 1977; Martin, 1977; Rose and Scott, 1978; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000).
One of the frameworks that is widely used by the governing authorities in assessing banks'
nancial standing is the CAMEL framework27. Studies by Thomson (1991), Wheelock and
Wilson (2000), Molina (2002) and Arena (2008) conrm that the CAMEL framework is effective
in predicting banking failure. Later studies by Whalen (1991) and Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996)
incorporated macroeconomic factors in predicting bank failures. This is based on the premise that
in addition to being susceptible to their own nancial solvency, banks are also exposed to adverse
shocks in the economy. This creates a link between individual banks' fragility and the banking
27 The ve components of CAMEL framework are capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earning and liquidity.
31
systems vulnerability to crises.
Among the studies by that have looked into the determinants of bank failure in East Asia are
Rojas-Suarez (2001), Bongini et al, (2001), Bongini et al, (2002) and Arena (2008). Bongini
et al (2001) studies the closure decision on banks in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and
the Philippines in order to identify the effect of banks' "connections" to industrial groups or
inuential families, and of weak bank specic fundamentals on bank failure. They nd that
traditional CAMEL type variables like returns on assets (ROA), loan growth, the ratio of loan
loss reserves to capital, net interest income to total income, and of loans to borrowings help in
predicting subsequent distress and closure. Similarly, the size and ownership structure of the
nancial institutions also help to predict failure. They nd that liquidity risk, as measured by the
ratio Total Loans to Total Borrowing, does not inuence bank distress, but it signicantly reduces
bank closure28. In addition to this, they also nd that "connections" increase the probability of
distress and make closure more likely. Bongini et al, (2002), on the other hand, compares the
ability of three types of information (balance sheet, stock markets, and credit rating) in predicting
bank distress in East Asia. Their ndings show that balance sheet indicators coupled with banks'
ownership structures are the most effective predictor of bank distress29.
Rojas-Suarez (2001) evaluates the "true" riskiness of banks in six emerging-market countries
(Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) based on markets that work rather
than just relying on the traditional nancial indicators that work well in industrial countries. Using
a t-test and the `signal to noise approach' methodology proposed by Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) in studying currency crises, they nd that the capital-to-asset ratio performed poorly as an
indicator of banking problems in East Asia and Latin America while alternative indicators such
as the interest rate paid on deposits, and interest rate spreads performed well. They also nd that
28 Bongini et al (2001) denes distressed banks as those that have been closed, merged, recapitalized or suspended.
29 Credit rating information showed a much lower predictive power while stock market information reacted faster than
the other two in incorporating new information sources.
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weaker banks had a lower liquidity ratio before crisis.
Arena (2008) compares the determinants of banking fragility in East Asian and Latin American
countries30. The results show that weaker banks ex-ante are more likely to fail ex-post in the crisis
countries. More specically, the ndings show that higher ex-ante capital adequacy, liquidity
and returns are associated with lower probability of failure while higher loan to total assets
ratio is associated with higher probability of failure. The ndings also show that bank structure
signicantly inuences bank failures as bigger banks and foreign banks are less likely to fail.
Even though existing studies on the East Asian bank failures (Rojas-Suarez, 2001; Bongini et
al, 2001; Bongini et al, 2002 and Arena, 2008) are extremely informative, they have a number
of limitations as far as the objectives of this chapter are concerned. Firstly, they aim to identify
whether failed banks were fundamentally weak ex-ante. However, this chapter aims to nd the
effect of a liquidity inux before a crisis and international illiquidity during the crisis on bank
failures. This nding will help in identifying the amount and type of liquidity risk that banks
are exposed to before and during crises. This information can be useful for policy makers in
regulating the management of liquidity by banks.
Secondly, the existing studies have relied on traditional measures of liquidity risk like the
ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Deposits (Rojas-Suarez, 2001), Total Loans to Total Borrowing
(Bongini et al., 2001) and Liquid Assets to Total Liabilities (Arena, 2008)31. This paper lls in
the gap in the existing literature by focusing on alternative liquidity risk measures namely the
ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets and the Financial Gap ratio to measure
banks' liquidity risk. Using these ratios as proxies for liquidity risks allows this study to focus on
different aspects of liquidity risks that are relevant in the context of the East Asian crisis.
Thirdly, existing studies (Bongini et al., 2001; Bongini et al., 2002 and Arena, 2008) use
30 Their analysis for the East Asian countries includes countries that did not experience a banking crisis (Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Taiwan).
31 Bongini et al. (2002)'s study did not include liquidity risk as one of its determinants of bank failures.
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cross-sectional logit analysis in nding the ex-ante determinants of bank failures32. However,
the present study uses IV estimation to account for the endogeneity of liquidity risk variable.
More specically, this study takes into account of the fact that the probability of bank failure
is inuenced by bank specic liquidity which, in turn, is affected by international illiquidity.
Existing studies on bank failure (Gajewski, 1988; Demirguc-Kunt, 1990; Thomson, 1992 and
Godlewski, 2006) have used a two-stage equation model to allow separation to be made between
risk factors affecting bank solvency and other factors that inuence regulators' closure decisions33.
Solvency risk is treated as an endogenous variable in the regulator's closure decisions model to
allow distinction to be made between economic insolvency and administrative failure34.
2.5 Methodology
2.5.1 Cross Sectional Probit and Logit Estimation
Binary choice model is one of the most common statistical models that are used in analyzing the
probability of bank failure. This model estimates the probability that a given set of characteristics
will be classied as default or no default. Accordingly, the dependent variable y in this model
takes the value of 0 (no default) or 1 (default).
P (y1i = 1 j xi) = F (0 + x1i1 + x2i2 + :::::ui) (2.1)
where x are the explanatory variables. F (:) is the normal cumulative distribution function. The
continuous dependent variable labelled y1i is not directly observed. Instead y1i is observed in only
two possible states
y1i = f0
1
y1i < 0
y1i  0
32 Since these studies focused on the ex-ante determinants of bank failures, 1996 nancial statement variables are used
to capture the changes in bank fundamentals.
33 Demirguc-Kunt's uses a third equation to model bank's net value of the deposits insurance contribution.
34 Using a two step method proposed by Maddala (1986), the rst equation models net value of the bank (solvency)
using OLS estimation while the second models the bank's failure (regulator's behavior) using a logit estimation.
34
As simple linear regression is not a best choice as it does not restrict the estimated value of y to
be in the interval between 0 and 135. A logit or probit model is commonly used in predicting bank
failures. 36. The estimates of the coefcients of the logit and probit model cannot be interpreted in
the same manner as the normal regression coefcients because these coefcients give the impact
of the independent variables on the latent variable y, not y itself. As such, marginal effect is
computed in order to estimate the effect of changes in the independent variables on the probability
of failure.
2.5.2 Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation
In cross-sectional analysis, ordinary least squares is the simplest and oldest method. This
approach assumes that the unobserved factors (u) involved in the regression function are not
related in any systematic way to the observed factors (x) (E[ujX] = 0). Then the only effect of x
on y is a direct effect via the term x. However, there may be an association between regressors and
errors under some situations. OLS regression generally produces biased and inconsistent estimates
when there is a correlation between the unobserved factors (u) and the observed factors (x)37. The
instrumental variable (IV) estimation method, which incorporates two-stage least squares (2SLS)
analysis, provides a solution to this problem (Wooldridge, 2001 and Greene, 2008).
IV Probit estimation ts models with dichotomous dependent variables and endogenous
regressors (i.e. when one or more of the regressors are correlated with the error term). The model
is written as following:
y1i = y2i + x1i + ui (2.2)
35 Compared to OLS, binary choice models constrain the estimated probabilities to be between 0 and 1, and relax
the constraint that the effect of independent variables is constant across different predicted values of the dependent
variable.
36 The major difference between logit and probit models lies in their distributions. The probit model is based on the
normal distribution while the logit model is based on the logistic distribution.
37 Because it takes into account of the direct effect of x on y and indirect effect of x on y via u.
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y2i = x1i1 + x2i2 + vi (2.3)
where i = 1; :::::; N; y2i is a 1  p vector of endogenous variables, x1i is a 1  k1 vector of
exogenous variables and x2i is a 1  k2 vector of additional instruments. The equation for y2i is
written in a reduced form.
IV estimation method uses the additional exogenous x2t as instrument. This instrumental
variable has a property that its changes are associated with changes in yt but do not lead to changes
in yt (except indirectly via yt). More specically, a variable used as an instrument needs to fulll
two conditions; (1) it must be uncorrelated with the error; and (2) it must be correlated with the
regressor. Based on these assumptions, the instrument cannot be a regressor in the structural
model and there should be some association between the instrument and the endogenous variable.
The use of an exogenous instrument separates the variance of the endogenous explanatory
variable into endogenous and exogenous components, and the latter is then used in the structural
estimation.
Even though the asymptotic variance of the IV estimator is usually larger than the asymptotic
variance of the OLS estimators, IV estimation method allows consistent estimation to be obtained
when the explanatory variables are correlated with the error terms (Wooldridge, 2001). The loss
in efciency that happens as a result of using IV estimation is justiable if the OLS estimator
is biased and inconsistent. IV estimation will be preferred to the OLS estimator if the selected
instrument is moderately to highly correlated with the endogenous variable and there is a strong
theoretical or practical argument that can justify why the instrument is considerably more
exogenous than the endogenous regressor (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). However, in the event
that the correlation between the instrument and the x variable is low, and there are concerns about
whether the instrument is truly exogenous, the OLS estimator is preferred to the IV estimator (in
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terms of bias).
2.5.3 The Model
In the context of this study, the binary dependent variable BFAILit+1 takes the value of 1 if
a bank fails during the year, and 0 if it survives. BFAILit+1 is the latent variable, which is not
observable and assumed to depend on a number of explanatory variables. The latent variable is
linked to the observable BFAILit+1 variable by a measurement equation. The latent variable
BFAILit+1 is linked to the observable categorical variable as follows:
BFAILit+1 = 1 if individual bank fails (if BFAILit+1 > 0) (2.4)
BFAILit+1 = 0 otherwise (if BFAILit+1  0) (2.5)
The latent variable link to the explanatory variables as follows:
Prob (BFAILit+1 = 1) = F (0 + 1Capitalit + 2AssetQit + 3MgtQualityit + (2.6)
4Earningsit + 5Liquidityit + 6Ownershipit
+7 Si zeit + 8GovIndicatorjt + "it)
Where,
BFAILit+1: represents the latent variable, and its scale can not be determined.
"it: is a composite error term.
Capital
it
, AssetQ
it
, MgtQuality
it
, Earnings
it
, Liquidity
it
: are vector of bank-specic
CAMEL criteria variables in period t for bank i.
Ownershipit: is a bank-specic ownership variable in period t for bank i.
Si zeit: is a bank-specic size variable in period t for bank i.
GovIndicatorjt: is a country specic Governance Indicator variable in period t for country j.
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The above equation implies that the larger values of BFAILit+1 are observed as
BFAILit+1 = 1 (i.e. failed banks), while those with smaller values of BFAILit+1 are observed
as BFAILit+1 = 0 (i.e. non-failed banks). The coefcient of the independent variable measures
the effects on the odds of failure of a unit change in the corresponding independent variables.
Bank-level and country-level data during the crisis (i.e. 1997) will be used to analyze bank failures
that happened in 1998 and 199938. Analysis will also be carried out using before crisis data (i.e.
1996).
Empirical studies on bank failures have used nancial statement information in predicting bank
failures. The error term in the bank failure model embodies factors other than nancial statement
information that inuence failures. Existing banking theory postulates that sudden a shift in
investors' expectations during a crisis year causes a liquidity shock in the banking system. The
review of the East Asian crisis in the earlier section shows that international illiquidity happened
during the crisis year. This factor, which is embodied in the error term of a bank failure model,
can cause a run on banks. The probability of bank failures increases as a result of this, and so
does liquidity risk39. Hence, estimating bank failure using cross-sectional probit / logit analysis
generally produces biased and inconsistent estimates40. As a result, the IV estimation method is
used to account for the endogeneity of the liquidity risk variables.
Exogenous variables that are relevant in explaining liquidity risks of banks are identied. This
includes included instruments and excluded instruments. Prior to the crisis, huge amounts of
international funds were channeled to the East Asian region. High percentages of these funds were
channeled through the banking system. Based on this condition, factors that inuence the ow of
international capital into these countries can be used as instruments. Two variables that strongly
inuence these ows are Interest Rate Difference and International Capital Control. The Interest
38 A signicant percentage of failures happened in 1998 and 1999.
39 Liquidity risk increases when banks are unable to honour depositors' withdrawal demands.
40 Because it takes into account the direct effect of x on y and indirect effect of x on y via u.
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Rate Difference variable takes into account the difference in the money market rate between the
respective East Asian countries and United States41. Studies on the determinants of international
capital ow and bank lending to emerging markets have found interest rate differential to be a
signicant contributor to this ow (Jeanneau and Micu (2002)42. The International Capital Control
variable, which is obtained from the Abiad et al.(2008) database on nancial reform, accounts for
the restrictions imposed on international nancial transactions43. Higher restrictions are associated
with stronger government control over the ow of international capital into the economy.
These two variables have direct effect on banks' liquidity risk because they inuence the
amount of external funds that enters the East Asian banking system. They should be uncorrelated
with the error term in the bank failure model or exhibit a lower correlation with the error term
in the bank failure model than the liquidity risk variable because their effect on bank failure can
only happen through the endogenous liquidity risk variable. In order to control for the effect of
international illiquidity that happens during crisis year on the liquidity risk variables, the lagged
value of the Interest Rate Difference and International Capital Control variables are used as the
excluded instrument in the reduced form equation.
Analysis is carried out using IV probit estimator 44 (see Appendix B). The structural equation
of the bank failure model is shown in Equation 2.6. Liquidity risk, which is one of the major
components of the CAMEL framework, is one of the determinants of bank failure. The reduced
form equation where the endogenous liquidity risk variable is only a function of exogenous
variables is given below:
41 Money market rate is the rate on short-term lending between nancial institutions. This data is taken from line 60b
of International Financial Statistics.
42 Jeanneau and Micu (2002) provides the summary of the ndings of studies on the determinants of international capital
ows to emerging market countries.
43 These restrictions takes into account the existence of multiple exchange rates for various transactions, restrictions on
capital inows (whether banks are allowed to borrow from abroad freely) and outows.
44 In Stata, the IV probit routine ts models with dichotomous dependent and continuous endogenous regressors and
jointly estimates two equations using maximum likelihood estimator of Amemiya's generalized least squars estimator
(as illustrated in Newey, 1987).
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Liquidityit = it + 1Capitalit + 2AssetQit + 3MgtQualityit + (2.7)
4Earningsit + #Ownershipit +  Si zeit +
GovIndicatorjt + IntDiffjt 1
+IntlCapControljt 1 + "it
Probability of bank failure is inuenced by bank-specic liquidity which, in turn, is affected by
international liquidity. The IV method estimates the effect of liquidity risk during the crisis year
on the probability of bank failures by taking into account of the endogeneity of the liquidity risk
variable, while the probit / logit method estimates the effect of liquidity risk during the crisis year
on the probability of bank failures without taking into account of the endogeneity of the liquidity
risk variable. Comparison of the results using IV probit and probit / logit methods allows us to see
how the coefcient on the liquidity risk variable changes direction or magnitude during a crisis as
a result of the international illiquidity. To my knowledge, at present, there are no other studies45
that have used IV estimation methods to account for the endogeneity of the bank specic liquidity
risk variable in the bank failure model. The results of IV probit and probit / logit analyses using
during crisis data are compared to the results of probit / logit using before crisis data.
A Wald test of exogeneity, under the null hypothesis that the instrumented variable is
exogenous, is carried out to check for the correlation between the error terms in the structural
equation of our bank failure model and the reduced-form equation of the endogenous liquidity
risk variable. A rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity would mean that the error terms
in the structural and the reduced-form equation are correlated and therefore, instrumenting the
endogenous liquidity risk variable is the appropriate decision.
45 Existing studies by Demirguc-Kunt (1990), Thomson (1992) and Godlewski (2004) have used IV estimation in order
to account for the endogeneity of solvency risks, which was modelled as function of regulators' decision making, in
bank failure models.
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The assumption that the instruments are not correlated with the error term in the structural
equation can be tested in an over-identied model (i.e. when the number of instruments exceeds
the number of endogenous regressors). An over-identication test can be used to determine the
validity of the instruments under the assumption that at least one of the instruments is valid
(Hausman, 1978). This test should be performed before the Wald test of exogeneity (Hausman
test) since the latter becomes invalid if the former rejects the validity of the instruments (Larcker
and Rusticus, 2010). The validity of the instruments is checked using the Amemiya-Lee-Newey
minimum chi-square statistic (Amemiya, 1978; Newey, 1987; Lee, 1992). The null hypothesis
is that the error term is uncorrelated with the instruments (i.e. instruments are valid). This test
statistic is obtained by regressing the structural equation's residuals on all exogenous variables.
The residuals should be uncorrelated with all the exogenous variables. If the instruments are truly
exogenous, the coefcients on the instruments should be close to zero.
For robustness, IV estimation is also carried out using two-stage least squares (2SLS) and
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation techniques. Robustness is also checked by
removing mergers and acquisition (M&A) from the failure denition.
2.5.4 Bank Failure Denition
A bank closure happens when banking regulators acknowledge the insolvency of a bank by
either liquidating or assisting it in different ways in order for it to continue operations (Gonzalez-
Hermosillo, 1996). Regulators' decision to close banks does not happen at the same time as
the economic failure. Studies by Bongini et al. (2001), Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) and Arena
(2008) denes banking failure or closure as involving banks that are suspended, recapitalized,
restructured, merged, acquired or receive assistance from relevant banking authorities. These
descriptions encompass a wider scope of failures that has occurred in recent episodes of banking
crisis.
Based on Arena (2008), the present study denes a nancial institution as failed when:
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Table 2.2: Summary of the Failure Status of the Financial Institiutions
(1) the government temporarily suspended or "froze" the nancial institution's operations,
(2) the central bank or the relevant monetary authority recapitalized or injected liquidity into the
nancial institution in order to revive it,
(3) the government closed the nancial institution,
(4) the nancial institution was merged or acquired by another nancial institution.
A nancial institution is classied as failed if it falls in any of the above categories between
1998 and 1999. This classication is done by looking at Central Banks' annual reports and cross
referencing two alternative databases assembled by Bongini et al.(2001) and Arena (2008). Banks
that continued operation during this period are classied as non-failed.
2.5.5 Data Sources
Data for the 252 nancial institutions used in this study has been obtained from BankScope, a
comprehensive database provider for nancial institutions across the world46. The coverage of the
BankScope sample as of end 1996 and 1997 in terms of assets ranges from 80 to 100 percent for
the ve countries47. The breakdown of the nancial institutions' data by countries shown in Table
4 : 69 in Indonesia; 44 in Korea; 71 in Malaysia; 44 in Philippines and 30 in Thailand. Based on
this sample, the number of failed nancial institutions in each country is: 26 in Indonesia; 23 in
Korea; 11 in Malaysia; 2 in Philippines and 13 in Thailand.
2.5.6 Variables
2.5.6.1 Main Variables
The variables used to measure banks' liquidity risk are:
46 BankScope collects annual reports and nancial statements that are prepared according to the various national
accounting standards and adjusts them in order to make them comparable across countries as much as possible.
47 (Source: BankScope and countries' Central Bank statistics)
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Deposits and Short-Term Funds to Total Assets This variable measures the level of deposits
and external credit used to fund normal daily operations and long-term needs of the banks.
Availability of a large amount of funding at a reasonable cost will enable banks to perform greater
nancial intermediation activities and as a result generate higher income. This may make banks
to be less susceptible to failure. However, a high ratio of Deposit and Short-Term Funds to Total
Assets may indicate a higher risk of a depositors' run and is therefore associated with higher
probability of failure (van der Ploeg, 2010).
Financial Gap Ratio Following Saunders and Cornett (2006), Financial Gap ratio is used as
an alternative way to measure banks' liquidity risks. This variable is measured as the difference
between banks' loans and customer deposits48. Based on Shen et al. (2010), Financing Gap is
standardized by dividing by total assets. Since customer deposits are considered as a relatively
more stable and resilient source of funds for banks (Gatev and Strahan, 2006, Yorulmazer, 2008
and Dutweiler, 2009), this variable measures the amount of total loans that is nanced through the
more volatile source of funding as a percentage of total assets. Banks with a higher Financial Gap
ratio must either use their cash, sell liquid assets or rely on an external source of funding to ll the
gap. This results in higher liquidity risk and as a result is positively associated with the probability
of bank failure.
2.5.6.2 Control variables
Capital Adequacy (C) Capital adequacy ratio is measured by the ratio of Total Equity to Total
Assets. A sufcient capital adequacy enables banks to withstand shocks by absorbing losses. A
higher ratio lowers the probability of bank failure. Bank with an adequate level of capital would
be able to match their liabilities with their assets in the event of loan losses and declining asset
48 Saunders and Cornett (2007) generally denes core deposits as demand deposits, negotiable order of withdrawal
(NOW) accounts, money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), other saving accounts, and retail certicates of deposit
(CDs). For the purpose of this study, customer deposit is used to proxy core deposits.
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value. The capital adequacy requirement is regulated by Basel 49. Wheelock and Willson (2000),
Arena (2008), Mannasoo and Mayes (2009) nd a negative relationship between capital adequacy
ratio and bank failures.
Asset Quality (A) Asset quality is a measure of the quantity of existing, and potential future
credit risk associated with the banks' assets. The ratio of Loan Loss Provisions to Total Loans is
an ex-post measure of asset quality (Arena, 2008 and Mannasoo and Mayes, 2009)50. Since loans
are one of the major assets of banks, higher provision ex-ante may indicate lower quality of the
loan portfolio ex-post51. Hence, this ratio is expected to increase the probability of bank failure.
However, higher provision can also indicate greater prudence by banks. In that case, it can be
linked with lower probability of failure.
Management Quality (M) Mannasoo and Mayes (2009) and Wheelock and Willson (2000))
have used Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) as a proxy for management quality. This variable is
measured using the ratio of operating expenses to operating income. High operating expenses in
relation to relatively low operating income are not favorable and as a result are associated with
higher failure probability.
Earning (E) Earning ratio measures a bank's ability to honor its creditors and shareholders and
also absorb losses. This ratio is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Net Interest Margin
(NIM). ROA is calculated using the ratio of average net income to total assets. This variable
measures the efciency and operational performance of banks. A higher ratio is preferred and as
a result this variable is expected to exhibit a negative relationship with the probability of bank
failure. Studies by Thomson (1991), Whalen (1991), Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996), Bongini et al.
49 A broadly based international agreement on minimum bank capital requirements was reached in the Basel Accord of
1988  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988).
50 Even though the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is one of the traditional measure of asset quality, it is
not used because it cannot be found consistently for all the selected countries. This measure varies widely across
countries due to varying accounting standards.
51 Bank managers may use accruals to convey their private information about future performance (Dechow, 1994).
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(2001), Bongini et al. (2002), Arena (2008), Andersen (2008) and Mannasoo and Mayes (2009)
have used this variable as a proxy for bank earnings. Following Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996),
Rojas-Suarez (2001), Arena (2008) and Andersen (2008), this study includes NIM as an additional
variable that measures the earnings of the banks. This variable measures the difference between
the yield on assets and the interest cost of liabilities, expressed as a fraction of total assets. A
higher ratio can either signal lower cost of funding or higher margin. Higher value of NIM is
associated with lower probability of bank failure.
Size Size of banks is measured using Log Value of Total Assets. This variable is expected to
exhibit a negative relationship with the probability of failure. Large banks hold more assets, and
as a result are better able to diversify their portfolio. This enables them to reduce their asset risks.
`Too big to fail' theory suggests that larger banks are less likely to fail as they are more likely
to be bailed-out in the event of their having engaged in higher-risk taking activities. Studies by
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1996), Wheelock and Willson (2000), Bongini et al. (2001), Bongini et al.
(2002) and Arena (2008) controlled for the size effect in predicting bank failure.
Foreign Ownership In order to account for the ownership structure of the banks, a dummy
variable which takes the value of 1 if the nancial institution is foreign owned and 0 otherwise is
used. Foreign banks are likely to be better governed and more diversied. As a result, they are
less likely to fail. Studies by Bongini et al. (2001), Bongini et al. (2002) and Arena (2008) have
controlled for the ownership structure of the banks in predicting failures.
Governance Indicator Countries differ in terms of their regulations, institutional framework
and political stability. In order to take this into account, the World Bank's Governance Indicator
compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2004) is used52. This indicator is measured by adding the values
52 The World Governance Indicator reects the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by
a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported
by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The
data is obtained from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp
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of four indicators: stability and absence of violence, regulatory quality, rule of law and control
of corruption. Studies by Barth et al. (2009) and Houston et al. (2010) have used this indicator
to capture the differences in the country's regulatory and institutional framework. Higher
values, which correspond to better governance outcomes, implies a much better regulatory and
institutional environment. As such, it should lower the probability of bank failure.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Characteristics of Banks Before and During Crisis
The ratios given in banks' nancial statements before and during a crisis are examined in order
to see if there are any statistical differences between them. Comparison of 1997 bank-level data
with 1996 data (Table 2.3) shows that the banks' average capital adequacy ratio was lower during
the crisis year. An increase in the riskiness of loans in a crisis year can be observed by the higher
ratio of Loan Loss Provisions to Net Loans. Banks' CIR is also higher, indicating that costs rise at
a higher rate than income in the crisis year. The lower ROA that is recorded the during crisis year
worsens banks' ability to raise capital.
The liquidity ratio of banks, as measured by the ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets and
the ratio of Liquid Assets to Deposits and Short-term Funds, dropped signicantly in the crisis
year. The Financial Gap ratio of banks is higher, which suggests that reliance on external funding
increased during the crisis year. Banks' Loan Growth and Deposits and Short-term Funds Growth
dropped from an average of 32.8 and 30.23 percent in 1996 to an average of -23.92 and -20.72
percent respectively during the crisis year. This is in line with the massive withdrawals of funds
that happened during the crisis year.
2.6.2 Characteristics of Failed and Non-Failed Banks
Financial statement information of the failed and non-failed banks are examined at the time
before and at the onset of the crisis. Mean comparison tests only identify the statistical differences
in the nancial ratios between failed and non-failed banks. It does not show the contribution of
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Table 2.3: Mean Comparison Test 1996 vs 1997
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Table 2.4: Mean Comparison Test (Failed vs Non-Failed)
these ratios to failures.
Table 2.4 shows that failed banks have signicantly higher solvency risk, as shown by a lower
capital adequacy ratio since 1994. This makes the failed banks less able to absorb the shock that
results from loan losses and declining asset value. Failed banks also made signicantly higher
provision prior to and during a crisis, which suggest that they have riskier loans compared to
non-failed banks53. Failed banks have higher CIR since 1995, which suggests that they are less
efcient. In line with this, failed banks also have signicantly lower prot. NIM of failed banks
is signicantly lower since 1995. This could either be due to their inability in offering more
attractive rates or in sourcing cheaper funding.
53 There is no statistical difference between failed and non-failed banks' ratio of loan loss provision to net loans in 1996.
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Failed banks have a signicantly lower liquidity ratio since 1994 compared to non-failed
banks, as shown by the ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets and Liquid Assets to Deposits and
Short-term Funds. This suggests that they did not hold an adequate amount of liquid assets.
This exposes them to higher liquidity risks during a crisis year when there are large withdrawals
of funds. The ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets of failed and non-failed
banks did not differ signicantly. However, failed banks have a signicantly higher Financial Gap
ratio, which suggests that they rely more on sources of funding other than customer deposits (e.g.
short-term debts) in nancing their loans54. This could have exposed them to higher risks when
large withdrawals of international lending happened during the crisis year.
In comparison to the non-failed banks, failed banks have a signicantly higher ratio of Net
Loans to Total Assets. This suggests that failed banks are inherently exposed to more risk if loan
holders default. Loan Growth of failed banks has been signicantly lower compared to non-failed
banks since 1995. However, the drop in failed banks' Loans Growth is considerably more drastic
compared to the non-failed ones during crisis year. Failed banks also have relatively less Deposits
and Short-term Funds Growth compared to the non-failed banks since 1995. Nevertheless, during
the crisis year, the drops in failed banks' Deposits and Short-term Funds Growth are more drastic
compared to the non-failed ones. This suggests that failed banks were exposed to more risk of a
run by depositors and short-term debt holders than the non-failed ones during the crisis year. This
could have increased their likelihood of failure.
2.6.3 Probability of Failure Analysis
Analyses are carried out using probit / logit and IV probit estimations. Probit / logit estimation
using 1997 bank level data analyzes the effect of bank level liquidity risk variables on the
probability of bank failure without taking into account the endogeneity of the bank level liquidity
54 Financial gap ratio was signicantly higher in 1994, 1995 & 1997. The 1996 gap ratio was higher (but not
signicantly).
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risk variables. IV probit analysis, on the other hand, estimates the probability of bank failure by
taking into account of the endogeneity of the bank level liquidity risk variables. Probit / logit
estimation using 1996 bank level data analyses the effect of before-crisis bank level liquidity risk
variables on the probability of bank failure.
2.6.3.1 Cross Sectional Probit / Logit Estimations Using During Crisis Data
Table 2.5 reports the explanatory variables' marginal effects in the cross-sectional multivariate
probit and logit estimations. The ndings show that holding all else constant, Deposits and
Short-term Funds to Total Assets is associated with signicantly lower probability of failure. This
suggests that banks that have a higher percentage of assets nanced using Deposits and Short-term
Funds during a crisis year are less likely to fail. Given the large outow of funds that happened
during the crisis year, this nding implies that higher deposits base during a crisis year is good for
banks.
More specically, the results shows that one percentage point increase in the ratio of Deposits
and Short-term Funds to Total Assets reduces the probability of failure by 0.0003 units. The result
suggests that this liquidity ratio needs to rise by 100 percent in order to reduce the probability of
failure by 0.03 units. As shown in Table A.9, the amount of Deposits and Short-term Funds in the
East Asian banking system in 1997 was nearly US$600 billion. This means that the central banks
needed to inject an additional US$600 billion into the banking system to reduce the probability of
bank failure by 3 percent. This result implies that a large injection of liquidity is needed to reduce
the probability of bank failure by a very small percentage. The world's largest liquidity injection
happened during the last quarter of 2008 whereby, the Federal Reserve, the European Central
Bank, and other central banks injected US$2.5 trillion into the banking system55. This nding
also conrms that other factors like equity ratio, size, ownership and governance indicator have a
bigger impact on bank failure than liquidity.
55 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007%E2%80%932012_global_nancial_crisis
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Table 2.5: Cross-Sectional Probit and Logit Estimation (Marginal Effects) Using 1997 Data
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Estimation using the Financial Gap ratio shows that higher holdings of external funding during
crisis year is associated with lower likelihood of failure. The nding also conrm that equity
ratio is associated with signicantly lower probability of failure. However, the measure of asset
quality, Loan Loss Provisions to Total Loans, is positive but not signicant. The marginal effect of
Size is positive and signicant. This suggests that banks that are bigger during the crisis year are
more likely to fail. This does not provide support to the `Too big to fail' hypothesis. Regarding
the ownership of the banks, the nding shows that foreign-owned banks are associated with
signicantly lower probability of failures, all else held constant. This suggests that foreign owned
banks in East Asia are better governed. Country level Governance Indicator is also associated
with signicantly lower probability of failure. This shows that apart from bank specic factors,
country-specic factors also play a very important role in determining failures. The nding
conrms that cross-country variation in political stability and absence of violence, regulatory
quality, rule of law and control of corruption plays a signicant role in inuencing the stability of
the banking sector.
Overall, probit / analysis using during the crisis data suggests that only when bank level
liquidity risk is measured by Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets is it a signicant
predictor of bank failures. In addition to this, equity ratio, size, ownership of banks and
governance indicator are signicant predictors of bank failures. Among these variables, ownership
has the biggest impact the probability of bank failure followed by Governance Indicator and
Size. This nding suggests that, during a crisis year, CAMEL-type indicators are less effective in
predicting bank failures.
2.6.3.2 IV Probit Estimation
Table 2.6 reports the results of the estimations using the IV probit method. The result of the
Wald test of exogeneity conrms that the liquidity risk variables are endogenous and that the
lagged value of Interest Rate Difference, and the International Capital Control variables are valid
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Table 2.6: Cross-Sectional IV Probit Estimation (Marginal Effects)
instruments (i.e. the error terms in the structural equation of our bank failure model, and the
reduced-form equation for the endogenous liquidity variable are not correlated). The quality of
the instruments is tested using Amemiya-Lee-Newey over-identication tests. The results fail
to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. The p-value of the chi-square
statistic of the Amemiya-Lee-Newey test indicates that the instruments are uncorrelated with the
error term of the bank failure regressions56.
The reduce form regression results in column 1 of Table 2.6 show that lagged International
Capital Control reduces the ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets while lagged
Interest Difference increases the Financial Gap ratio. The F-test statistic's value of above 10
56 The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test results for over-identication of instruments were generated using Baum, Schaffer,
Stillman and Wiggins' (2006) overid.ado programme for Stata.
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Table 2.7: Reduce Form Regressions of the Endogenous Regressors
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conrms the relevance of these two instruments57.
The cross-sectional IV probit regressions in Table 2.6 show that the ratio of Deposits and
Short-term Funds to Total Assets reduces the probability of bank failure. More specically, it is
observed that a one percentage point increase in this ratio reduces the probability of bank failure
by 0.002 units, all else held constant. Analysis using probit method shows that a one percentage
point increase in this ratio reduces the probability of bank failure by 0.0003 units. The ability of
the ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets to reduce the probability of bank failure
by a higher amount under the IV probit estimation could be due to the signicant effect of lagged
International Capital Control on this variable as shown in the reduced form results in Table 2.6.
Financial Gap ratio is positively and signicantly related to banking failure in the IV probit
estimation. All else held constant, a one percentage point increase in Financial Gap ratio during
a crisis year increases banks' vulnerability to failure by 0.014 units. This result implies that, if
banks were to raise their external funding by 10 percent, their probability of failure will increase
by 0.14 units. In line with the proposition put forward by Diamond and Rajan' (2000), this nding
conrms that higher reliance on external funding (i.e. short-term borrowing) increases banks'
vulnerability of failure. This could be due to several reasons. Firstly, banks incur higher costs
in servicing external funding. As a result, they might be more inclined to engage in higher risk
taking activities in order to get a higher return. Secondly, higher reliance on external funds not
only exposes banks to maturity mismatch, but also currency mismatch (Eichengreen., 2003).
Refusals by international lenders to renew their short-term nancing increases banks' demand for
liquidity. This, in turn, raises banks' costs of funding.
As far as the control variables are concerned, analyses using the IV Probit estimation show that
the effect of these variables on the probability of failure varies depending on the type of liquidity
57 The relevance of the instruments is tested in the reduce form regression using the F-statistic of a joint signicance. As
a rule of thumb, it should be bigger than 10 (Straiger and Stock, 1997).
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Table 2.8: Cross-Sectional Probit and Logit Estimation (Marginal Effects) Using 1996 Data
variable used. Analysis using the ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets as a
measure of liquidity risk shows that only equity ratio is signicantly associated with failure, while
analysis using Financial Gap ratio as a measure of liquidity risk shows that NIM and ownership
structure signicantly inuence failure.
Cross Sectional Probit / Logit Estimations Using Before Crisis Data Table 2.5 reports
the explanatory variables' marginal effects in the cross-sectional multivariate probit and logit
estimations. Analysis using the ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets shows
that holding higher liquidity before a crisis does not inuence the probability of failure. A one
percentage point increase in the Financial Gap ratio before a crisis increases banks' vulnerability
to failure by 0.003 units, all else held constant. IV probit analysis shows that a one percentage
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Table 2.9: Summary of the Type of Financial Institiutions
point increase in the Financial Gap ratio increases the probability of failure by 0.014 units. This
suggests that banks' vulnerability to failure as a result of higher reliance on external funding
increases during a crisis year. This could be due to higher volatility and costs involved in servicing
external funds compared to customer deposits (Saunders and Cornett, 2006). Once the effect of
international illiquidity is taken into account (as shown in the Probit regression using 1997 data),
the ndings show that Financial Gap ratio does not contribute towards failure. This suggests that
higher reliance on external funding is no longer a signicant contributor towards bank failure once
a large outow of external funds happens during crisis year.
As far as other CAMEL-type indicators are concerned, only equity ratio and net interest margin
signicantly predict failures. Higher net interest margin before a crisis signicantly reduces
the probability of failure while higher margin during a crisis year (as shown in the IV probit
regression using 1997 data) increases it. This suggests that net interest margin during a crisis year
is associated with greater risk taking. Banks had to rely on domestic funds once the international
illiquidity happened in the second half of 1997. Tight liquidity conditions force banks to offer
higher interest rate to attract more funds. Banks that offer a high rate may have to engage in
high risk taking activities in order to get a higher return. Hence, this could have increased their
vulnerability to failure. Compared to the CAMEL-type indicators, ownership and governance
indicators are able to reduce the probability by higher percentage.
2.6.3.3 Analysis on Commercial Banks
Table 2.9 provides the summary of the type of nancial institutions used in the analysis.
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Table 2.10: Cross-Sectional Probit, Logit and IV Probit Estimation (Marginal Effects) for Com-
mercial Banks
These institutions consist mainly of commercial banks. Other nancial institutions like nance
companies, securities rms and investment banks which are included in the sample are smaller
in size58. Hence, they may be more vulnerable to failure due to international illiquidity or higher
reliance on external funding compared to commercial banks. In order to nd out if commercial
banks' vulnerability to failure is different to that of other nancial institutions, probit and IV
probit estimation is carried out by using only the sample of commercial banks in the data set. ana
The results in Table 2.9 conrm earlier ndings that the ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds
to Total Assets reduces the chances of bank failure by a lower percentage once the endogeneity of
58 The mean of the Total Assets for commercial banks is USD4 million while the mean of the Total Assets for other
nancial institutions is USD2.4 million.
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this variable is taken into account. Before crisis Financial Gap ratio is not a signicant predictor
of failure for commercial banks but IV probit results suggest that commercial banks' reliance on
external funding increases their likelihood of failure. The latter nding might be due to higher
costs involved in funding external funding during the crisis year. The earlier nding, on the other
hand, may suggest a few things. Firstly, it may suggest that commercial banks' costs of funding
external funds are lower compared to other nancial institutions like nance companies, and as a
result holding of external funds before the crisis did not inuence their vulnerability to failure.
Secondly, it may suggest that other nancial institutions like nance companies relied more
on external funds before the crisis compared to commercial banks, and as a result were more
vulnerable to failure.
2.6.4 Robustness Checks
The robustness of the ndings is checked in different ways. Firstly, IV estimation is carried
out using two-stage least squares (2SLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation
techniques (see Appendix3). The estimations conrm that both liquidity risk measures are
endogenous. The validity and the quality of the instruments are conrmed using the Hansen
overidentication test. Overall, the ndings in Table 2.6.4 show that the results for the liquidity
risk variables are in line with IV probit estimations. More specically, the nding shows that one
percentage increase in the Financial Gap ratio ex-ante signicantly increases the likelihood of
bank failure by 0.021unit under IV 2SLS and 0.027 unit under IV GMM estimation. IV probit
estimation shows that the coefcient for this variable is 0.014. This shows that the parameter
estimates of the IV 2SLS and IV GMM are higher compared to that of the IV Probit estimate. As
for the ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets, similarly to estimation using the
IV probit method, the ndings show that a higher ex-ante ratio of this variable is associated with
lower likelihood of failure but this effect is not signicant under IV 2SLS and IV GMM estimation
methods. Based on the above results, it can be generally concluded that the ndings on the effect
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Table 2.11: Cross-Sectional IV 2SLS, IV GMM and IV Probit without Mergers & Acquisitions
of the ex-ante liquidity risks on bank failure are robust to the type of estimation method used.
Even though regulatory bodies encouraged mergers and acquisitions as part of the effort in
saving troubled banks, merger and acquisitions can also happen due to strategic reasons. As
such, the robustness of the above ndings is checked by removing mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) from the failure denition. The estimations conrm that both liquidity risk measures are
endogenous. The results of the Wald test and Amemiya-Lee-Newey overidentication test for the
IV Probit estimation in Table 2.6.4 show that the instruments are valid. Analysis using IV probit
estimation shows that the ex-ante ratio of the two liquidity risk proxies signicantly inuences the
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likelihood of bank failure59. The direction of the effect also remains the same.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusion
The review of the East Asian crisis (see section 2.2) shows that international illiquidity played
an important role in triggering the crisis. The severity of this crisis highlights the importance of
liquidity for the well functioning of the banking system. Existing studies by Rojas-Suarez (2001),
Bongini et al, (2001), Bongini et al, (2002) and Arena (2008) focus on nding out if banks that
failed ex-post in East Asia were fundamentally weak ex-ante. In contrast, the main objective of
this study is to analyze the role of liquidity in causing bank failures in East Asia.
The main contribution of this study arises from the methodology that is used in the analysis.
The IV estimation method is used to take account of the endogeneity of liquidity risk variable.
Banks' vulnerability to failure is inuenced by bank specic liquidity which, in turn, is affected
by the international illiquidity. Probit analysis using 1997 bank-level data estimates the effect
of banks' liquidity measures on the probability of bank failure after the onset of the crisis while
probit analysis using 1996 bank-level data estimates the effect of banks' liquidity measures on the
probability of bank failure before the onset of the crisis. Differences in the ndings of IV probit
and probit estimation show us how the coefcient on the liquidity risk variable changes direction
or magnitude as a result of the international illiquidity that happened during the crisis year.
In studying the role of liquidity in predicting bank failures, the individual nancial institutions'
data in ve crisis aficted East Asian countries is analyzed. This study lls in the gap in the
existing literature by using new proxies to measure banks' liquidity risk, namely the ratio of
Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets and the Financial Gap ratio. Overall, probit / logit
estimation using during-crisis bank-level data shows that only the ratio of Deposits and Short-term
Funds to Total Assets is a signicant predictor of bank failures while IV Probit estimation shows
59 The results using probit estimation are also similar to the results of the probit estimation that includes M&A in the
failure denition.
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that both liquidity measures are signicant predictors of bank failures. The ratio of Deposits and
Short-term Funds to Total Assets reduces the probability of bank failures by a higher percentage
under the IV probit estimation compared to probit estimation. This change could be due to the
effect of international liquidity on the ratio of Deposits and Short-term Funds to Total Assets as
shown in the reduced form regression.
The ndings of this study also conrm that weaker (or failed) banks in East Asia relied more
on external funding. This nding is in line with Diamond and Rajan's (2000) proposition on
the vulnerabilities that arise as a result of higher reliance on short-term funding in nancing
illiquid investments. Since banks incur higher costs in servicing external funding, they might
be more inclined to engage in higher risk taking activities in order to get higher return. Their
vulnerabilities to failure could increase as a result of this. When large outow of international
funds happen during crisis year, banks that relied more external funding needed to source fresh
funds domestically at higher costs.
Analysis using the sample of commercial banks conrms that international illiquidity increased
the vulnerabilities of banks in East Asia to failure. However, commercial banks' reliance on
external funding before crisis does not effect their probability of failure but IV probit analysis
using crisis year data shows that commercial banks' reliance on external funding increases their
likelihood of failure. These ndings conrm that all banks faces higher costs in funding external
funding during the crisis year. In addition to this, the ndings also suggest that commercial
banks' costs of funding external funds may be lower than those of other nancial institutions, and
other nancial institutions may have relied more on external funds before the crisis compared to
commercial banks.
In conclusion, the above ndings conrm that the amount and type of liquidity that banks in
East Asia held before and during the crisis inuenced their fragility. Illiquidity in the banking
62
sector is very costly. In the case of the East Asian countries, the respective central banks had to
inject large amounts of liquidity into the banking system. For example, the Bank of Indonesia
injected massive liquidity support to troubled nancial institutions. Between November 1997
and March 1998, the increase in net domestic assets of the central bank amounted to more than
twice the entire stock of base money in the beginning of that period (IMF, 1999). Similarly, in
December 1997, the Bank of Korea also injected massive liquidity support (more than one-third
of its reserve money) in preventing the collapse of the banking system. The central banks of
Malaysia and Thailand also injected liquidity worth $9.2 billion and $24.1 billion respectively
into the banking system in order to restore depositor condence (Claessens, 1998). Governments
of the affected countries also responded by issuing unlimited guarantees on nancial systems'
liabilities during 1997 and early 1998 (Klingebiel and Laeven, 2001).
Problems relating to the inux of liquidity and the subsequent illiquidity can be tackled by
introducing more restrictive rules for liquidity risk management and a higher reserve requirement
on foreign-currency deposits (Goldstein and Turner, 2004) or combining solvency requirements
and LOLR interventions with liquidity requirements (Rochet and Vives, 2004). The Financial
Stability Forum (FSF) recommends that liquidity mismatch in the foreign-currency business of
banks should be monitored at the individual bank level and country level. Better rules governing
liquidity management practises also need to be put in place to ensure that banks are able to
withstand liquidity shock in the future.
OOverall, the ndings of this study suggest that CAMEL-type indicators are not able to fully
predict bank failures in East Asia. Other bank-specic variables, like size and ownership structure
of the banks, and country-specic institutional environment also play crucial roles in predicting
failures.
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Chapter 3 Depositor Discipline in the East Asian Banking System:Dynamic Panel Data
Analysis
3.1 Introduction
The East Asian crisis brought forward the discussion about the need for greater monitoring
of banks. Traditionally, regulation in the banking industry has been prescribed as the solution
to market failure that arises as a result of a banking crisis. Existing literature has dwelt well on
the costs and benets of bank regulation (Goodhart, 1987; Miles, 1995 and Shleifer, 2005)60.
Although regulation can enhance social welfare and ensure banking stability, market failure will
not be mitigated if regulators act in the interest of the government (i.e. Central Banks are not very
independent) or in the interest of the industry (i.e. when regulatory capture happens) (Freixas
and Rochet, 2008). Regulation also can be costly (supervisory and administrative costs, dead
weight taxation cost and indirect costs arising from the distortion it generates). This suggests
that deriving optimal regulation in the banking industry is not a very easy task. In light of these
considerations, market discipline is highlighted as one of the key areas of the reform policy in
the banking sector. Market discipline is the tool through which stakeholders can monitor and
discipline banks that have engaged in high risk taking activities by making them pay for the actual
cost of their risk taking. The third pillar of the Basel II highlights the role of market discipline
in easing the existing pressure on traditional monitoring measures like capital requirement and
government supervision that are emphasized in the rst and the second pillars of Basel II6162. In
line with this, the present study will examine the effectiveness of market discipline in the East
Asian banking system by focusing on the role of depositors in disciplining banks.
The structure of banks' demand deposit contracts gives depositors the exibility of
60 Regulation in the banking sector is primarily aimed at protecting individual investors and ensuring systemic stability.
61 Basel II is the second of the Basel Accords. It is an ofcial effort aimed at preventing crises through the formation of
international standards on bank regulation and supervision.
62 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (June 2006) for details.
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withdrawing their funds when necessary. This allows them to reward or punish banks for their
relative performance. Empirical studies have mainly focused on nding if depositors react
to the changes in banks' risk prole that are reected in the information disclosed by banks.
More specically, these studies nd out if depositors punish banks that have taken a higher risk
by withdrawing their funds or demanding higher returns. Existing studies that have looked at
depositor discipline in East Asia are Arena (2004) and Kaoru et al. (2005). These studies have
several shortcomings. Firstly, Arena (2004) did not look at the relationship between price and
quantity of deposits. Kaoru et al. (2005), on the other hand, uses pooled OLS regression in
studying the determinants of deposits growth and interest rate in each individual country. By
doing so, it does not take into account the bank-specic effect and address the simultaneity that
exists between price and quantity of deposits.
This study aims to analyze the existence of depositor discipline in the East Asian banking
sector. This will be done by nding out if depositors' withdrawals respond to ex-ante weaknesses
in an individual bank's fundamentals and the price signal of banks. The present study aims to
ll in the gap in the existing literature by trying to overcome some of the shortcomings that exist
in the studies by Arena (2004) and Kaoru et al. (2005) on depositor discipline in East Asia.
Firstly, since depositors' withdrawal actions and banks' response to them are a jointly determined
process, the simultaneity that exists in the depositor discipline model needs to be controlled for
in order to ascertain if banks are able to attract higher deposits by offering higher interest rates.
Maechler and McDill (2006) use dynamic GMM estimation methods to ascertain if the movement
of the interest rate variable has an exogenous impact on the quantity of deposits, independent of
the endogenous impact of deteriorating fundamentals on interest rate and quantity of deposits.
Studies by Maechler and McDill (2006) and Bowe and Wu (2007) conrms that the relationship
between price (interest rate) and quantity of deposits is dynamic. In line with these studies, the
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present study aims to nd out if depositors in East Asia react to the changes in banks' risk prole
that are reected in the information disclosed by banks and also aims to nd out if banks in East
Asia are able to attract more deposits for a given price once the simultaneous relationship between
price and quantity of deposits is controlled for.
Initial analyses examine depositor behavior in the East Asian banking system from the
before-crisis to the after-crisis period (i.e. 1995 to 2005). This study aims to test for the
wake-up-call hypothesis, which posits that depositors should be more responsive to banks' risk
factors after the crisis. In line with this, depositor behavior will be observed during a post-crisis
period only, and the results will be compared to that of the whole sample period.
This study also aims to analyse the possible non-linear relationship between the price elasticity
and banks' quality. This will be done by separately analyzing depositors' reaction to the price
offered by the weak and healthy banks. Since the banking sector in East Asia underwent a
substantial amount of restructuring exercise as a result of the crisis, this criteria will be used to
subdivide the sample of banks. Restructured banks are classied as weak while Non-restructured
banks are classied as strong. Since depositors respond to ex-ante weaknesses in an individual
bank's fundamentals, they may react differently to weak banks compared to healthy ones. If
depositor discipline is effective, for a given increase in the price, healthier banks should attract
relatively more deposits than average banks while a weaker bank should not be able to do so.
The ndings of this study conrm that depositors in East Asia do discipline the banks. More
specically, this study nds depositors prefer banks that have higher equity ratio and are bigger
in size. Panel data analyses suggest that banks are able to use price signal to attract more deposit.
Price signal is found to be more effective during the post-crisis period. The results also show that
depositors are more responsive to the risk prole and price signal of the healthy banks compared
to the weaker ones.
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However, panel data analyses does not take into account of the fact that banks may raise interest
rates in response to depositors' withdrawal intention that is in itself related to banks' risk prole.
Hence, depositors' response to price signals under the panel data analyses cannot be construed
as signals of depositor discipline. Dynamic panel data analyses are performed to overcome the
above shortcomings. The ndings conrm that the relationship between the price and quantity
of deposits is endogenous. Once the endogeneity is controlled for, the results show that deposits
growth in the sample banks is driven by bank fundamentals but not price signals. Similar results
are obtained during the post-crisis period. Analyses performed by subdividing the sample of
banks into weak and healthy categories conrm that the relationship between deposit growth and
interest rate is non-linear. The ndings imply that depositors are not more responsive to the price
signal of healthy banks compared to weak ones. The ndings also show that depositors in East
Asia also do not discipline weak banks by demanding higher returns.
Overall, this ndings of this study imply that price signal is not effective in inuencing
depositors behavior in East Asia once the endogenous relationship between the price and quantity
of deposits is controlled for. Banks' inability to attract more deposits by offering a higher price
may be attributable to the large outow of deposits the happened during the crisis period and
regulations on interest rates.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the concept of market
discipline. Section 3.3 briey reviews the theoretical and empirical literature relating to depositor
discipline. In Section 3.4, the empirical methodology is described by emphasizing the dynamic
relationship between price and quantity of deposits. This section also discusses the data. Section
3.5 discusses the results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Concept of Market Discipline
Market discipline allows stakeholders to safeguard their interest. Freixas and Rochet (2008)
describe two types of market discipline that exist in banking, namely ex-ante and interim market
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discipline. The former is reected in the rate that banks pay in sourcing their liabilities while the
latter is reected in the shareholders' action of withdrawing their funds. The threat of action by
the stakeholders puts the management under heightened scrutiny and enables suppliers of funds to
exert market inuence (Flannery, 2001). As highlighted by Greenspan (2001), market discipline
essentially acts as `private counter party supervision' in the banking sector.
Market discipline can be signaled by all three groups of banks' shareholders; depositors, debt
holders and equity holders. Depositors can punish banks that engage in excessive risk taking
activities either by demanding a higher return (price effect) or withdrawing their deposit (quantity
effect) (Berger, 1991; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004 and Martinez-Peria and Schmukler,
1999). Accordingly, debt-holders can discipline banks by demanding a higher yield on the bank's
debt for the riskier institutions, while equity holders can do so by selling their shares and exerting
downwards pressure on share prices. Empirical evidence shows that all three parties are able to
impose discipline on banks in the developed countries. However, the underdevelopment of equity
and debt markets in the developing countries limits the ability of shareholder and subordinated
debt holders in disciplining banks. Hence, depositors play a larger role of disciplining banks in
these markets.
Bliss and Flannery (2001) highlight the two components of market discipline. The rst
component involves monitoring while the second involves inuencing. Monitoring refers to
the investors' capability of assessing a rm's actual situation and sending market signals to the
managers. Inuencing, on the other hand, describes the responsiveness of bank managers to
investors' feedback that is reected in their withdrawal actions or stock prices. The latter aspect
of the market discipline process cannot take effect without the former (Flannery, 2001)63.
Llewellyn (2005) identies four stages of the market discipline process which are the
monitoring by stakeholders, reaction by stakeholders, adjustments in price and quantity that
63 The analysis of this study will only focus on the monitoring aspect of market discipline.
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Figure 3.1: Market Discipline Framework
happen as a result of the reactions and corrective behavior by bank managers in response to the
signal sent by stakeholders.
In light of this, Stephanou (2010) developed a market discipline framework as shown in Figure
3.1 that comprises four building blocks, which are:
(1) Information and disclosure - the public availability of information about banks' nancial
standing that is sufcient, consistent, reliable and timely.
(2) Market participants - the existence of independent stakeholders who are able to use the
disclosed information correctly and have incentives in monitoring the banks.
(3) Discipline mechanisms - the different type of tools that can be used by stakeholders in
disciplining banks such as the quantity or price adjustments of nancial instruments, legal
assistance or supervisory actions.
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(4) Internal governance - the organizational and compensation structures that facilitate managers
(senior management and Board of Directors) in understanding and responding to market
signals.
Hamalainen et al. (2003) highlights various social benets of having market discipline. Firstly,
by punishing banks that take excessive risks, it reduces banks' moral hazard incentives that might
arise as a result of government guarantee and deposit insurance. Secondly, it improves efciency
of banks by putting pressure on inefcient banks to become more efcient or leave the market.
Thirdly, efciency of the supervisory process can be further enhanced because the signal provided
by stakeholders on the nancial standing of the banks adds up to the insider information obtained
by the supervisory body64. Lastly, market discipline lowers the social cost of supervision by
providing additional information that can supplement traditional supervisory assessment of bank
condition.
3.3 Literature Review
3.3.1 Review of the Theory
Existing theoretical literature on banking emphasizes the role of the demand deposit contract
in giving incentives to depositors in monitoring bank managers' risk-taking behavior. Diamond
and Rajan (2001) asserts that the monitoring feature of the demand deposit contract is desirable
even though higher reliance on demand deposits causes the capital structure of banks to be
inherently fragile. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) model the interim market discipline using the
demand deposit contract. The informed depositors are able to observe an interim signal about
banks' return, and as a result they are able to `vote with their feet' if the observed signal indicates
that the return is low. In this case, depositors are able to increase their utility and payoff by
prematurely withdrawing their funds from weaker banks. Depositors' risk aversion drives their
withdrawal behavior and allows them to penalize banks that have engaged in higher-risk taking
activities. Information-based bank run models are also propagated by Bryant (1980), Jacklin and
64 This avoids the inherent riskiness of depending only on a single monitoring party that might have a conicting aim.
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Bhattacharya (1988), Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Gorton(1988) and Allen and Gale (1998).
Depositors' sensitivity to risks and having their own investment at stake provide incentives for
depositors in disciplining banks ex-ante through contractual instruments or by demanding a higher
return (Macey, 1988). The cost that depositors need to incur provides them with the incentive to
curb bank managers from undertaking risky investment strategies and expropriating creditors'
wealth (Berger, 1991 and Flannery, 1994). Disciplining by depositors allows fundamentally
sound banks to be rewarded for their prudence and performance and weak banks to be punished
for greater risk taking. This enables early detection of weak banks. Signals sent by depositors
provide incentives for banks to reduce their excessive risk taking activities. This encourages
greater prudence and efciency among bank managers and enables problems in a particular bank
to be contained before they spread to the entire banking sector.
Studies by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Miles (1995) are but a few of the studies in the
existing literature that question depositors' ability in disciplining banks. Depositors need to have
accurate information about banks' performance in order for them to monitor banks. However,
availability and accessibility of such information are not necessarily adequate for the depositors.
In line with this, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) assert that individual depositors have little
incentive or poor ability in monitoring banks due to the informational complexity and free-rider
problem. This limits depositors' capacity to analyze, evaluate and utilize such information in order
to control bank managers' risk-taking behavior. Similarly, Miles (1995) posits that depositors'
knowledge about banks' risk can be limited due to their inability to assess bank balance sheets.
This hinders depositors' ability in evaluating banks' default probability and as a result limits their
ability to discipline banks. The ability of depositors to discipline banks can also be hampered by
the cost inefciency involved in assessing individual banks' nancial condition, which may lessen
their ability to choose across banks (Cordella and Yeyati, 2002).
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3.3.2 Review of Empirical Evidence
Existing empirical literature in banking shows that depositors do discipline banks. Depositors
discipline banks using two approaches; price-based approach and quantity-based approach. Under
the rst approach, banks that engage in higher-risk taking are required to pay a higher return
as compensation. Studies by Baer and Brewer (1986), Ellis and Flannery (1992) and Cook and
Spellman (1994) nd that there is a positive relationship between the rate of large uninsured CDs
of US banks, and the riskiness of the banks. The second approach looks at depositors' withdrawal
actions or `ight to quality'65. Among the studies that nd a positive relationship between banks'
risk and deposit withdrawals are Kane (1987), Goldberg and Hudgins (1996), Saunders and
Wilson (1996), Calomiris and Mason (1997) and Martinez Peria and Schmukler (1999). Studies
that have looked at both approaches are Park and Peristiani (1998), Barajas and Steiner (2000),
Calomiris and Powell (2000), Maechler and McDill (2006), Ghosh and Das (2006) and Ungan et
al. (2008).
Market discipline can be deterred by the existence of a deposit insurance scheme. Empirical
studies by Cook and Spellman (1994), Park and Peristiani(1998), Martínez Pería and Schmukler
(1999), Calomiris and Powell (2000), Barajas and Steiner (2000) and Ungan et al. (2008)
show that depositor's discipline is present in countries like the United States, Argentine, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and Russia even in the presence of explicit deposit insurance schemes. This
essentially shows that depositors may not assume insured deposits to be entirely safe as they
may also be worried about banks' solvency and other safety nets in a banking sector (Berger and
Turk-Ariss, 2011). The economic solvency and credibility of the insurer also matter (Cook and
Spellman, 1994)66. This is more so in the case of developing countries where the doubt about the
65 Bernanke et al. (1996) introduces this term in describing depositors' action of withdrawing funds from the weaker
institutions and re-depositing in stronger ones.
66 Cook and Spellman (1994) nd that even though the deposits of U.S. savings and loan associations (S&Ls) are fully
insured, their interest rate is still related to the level of risk taken by the individual institutions. This happened mainly
due to the weakening nancial position of the federal guarantor at that time.
72
ability of the insurers to cover its guarantees is higher (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002).
Most of the existing studies analyze depositor discipline in a single country. Earlier studies
have focused more on the United States 67. By studying Ohio's thrift institutions during the
March 1985 crisis period, Kane (1987) nds that retail depositors are able to distinguish between
weak and strong depository institutions as they made fewer withdrawals from safe institutions.
Goldberg and Hudgins (1996)'s analysis of the bank run that happened in the US during the
depression era of 1929 to 1933 nds that savings and loan institutions' ratio of uninsured deposits
to total deposits ratio fell as early as two to four-year period before their actual failure. Calomiris
and Wilson (1998)'s study of banks in New York City during the 1920s and 1930s shows that
depositors switched from riskier banks to safer ones. Park and Peristiani (1998) nds that deposits
growth is negatively related to the thrift's estimated probability of default. They also nd that
uninsured depositors exhibit greater market discipline compared to insured ones.
Goldberg and Hudgins' (2002) study of the thrift institutions shows that depositors' discipline
is associated with the thrifts' vulnerability to failure. Saunders and Wilson (1996) nds that, in
1929 and 1933, failed banks had signicantly lower deposits growth. Their ndings also show that
depositors withdrew their investments from weaker banks and deposited them into healthier banks
as early as three years before their actual failure date. O'Grada and White (2002) uses individual
bank accounts of depositors in order to analyze their behavior during the panics of 1857. Their
nding shows that this panic episode, which was caused by systemic shock that affected the entire
banking system, was fundamentally based68. This shows that depositor discipline was in force.
Depositors' discipline has also been studied in Latin American countries that have experienced
crises. Schumacher's (2000) study of the Argentinian crisis, that happened as a result of the
67 Flannery (1998)'s summary of the empirical studies of depositors' discipline in United States provides support for
this.
68 Their study shows that the panic episode of 1854, which was caused by a single bank's bankruptcy, was caused by a
random event.
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devaluation of Mexican peso in December 1994, shows that depositors transferred funds from
fundamentally weak banks to stronger ones. Using both pooled panel and xed-effect panel
models for each country, Martínez Pería and Schmukler (2001) nds that both insured and
uninsured depositors withdrew their funds and required higher returns from banks that engaged in
higher risk taking activities in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. This
shows that deposit protection schemes in these three countries are not credible in all cases. They
also nd that market discipline is weaker during a crisis and stronger after a crisis. Similarly, Levy
Yeyati et al ( 2004)'s study on depositors' behavior in Argentina and Uruguay during the systemic
bank runs in 2000 to 2002 shows that the effectiveness of bank fundamentals in explaining
depositors behavior declines during crisis time.
Calomiris and Powell (2000)'s study of Argentina nds that riskier banks attract smaller
amounts of uninsured deposits. More specically, they nd that high asset risk and leverage are
associated with greater deposit withdrawals. Barajas and Steiner (2000) nds that depositor's
discipline exists in Colombian banks using semi-annual data from 1985 to 1999. Their ndings
show that depositors withdrew their funds from weaker banks even after controlling for the return
offered by these banks and the deposit insurance scheme that was in place. Solvency, liquidity,
assets quality and protability of the banks mattered to the depositors. Levy-Yeyati et al.'s (2010)
analysis of the bank runs that happened in Argentina and Uruguay in 2000 to 2002 using xed
effect panel data method highlights the importance of macroeconomic factors, in addition to the
traditional bank specic factors, in inuencing depositors' withdrawal actions.
In addition, depositors' discipline has also been analyzed in other countries. Birchler and
Maechler (2001)'s study of 250 banks in Switzerland over the period 1987 - 1998 nds that
depositors withdraw uninsured deposits from weaker banks. However, depositors are also
sensitive to banks' institutional variation as they did not withdraw funds from a bank that had
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state guarantee. Their ndings also show that bank-specic fundamental factors accounted
for 75 percent of the variation in the uninsured deposits. Graeve and Karas (2008) studies the
Russian deposit market during the period from 2002 to 2007 using the vector autoregression
(VAR) method. Their ndings show that although depositors run on solvent banks with uninsured
deposits and insolvent banks with uninsured deposits, the run on the latter was four times
higher compared to the run on the former. Ungan et al.'s (2008) study of Russian deposit-taking
institutions during the period from 2001 to 2005 using pooled OLS and the xed effect panel
data method nds that solvency and liquidity of banks mattered for the depositors as larger
withdrawals are made from undercapitalized and low liquidity banks. Their results are mainly
attributed to explicit guarantees for state-owned banks and implicit guarantees for large sound
banks that existed in the Russian banking sector. Debasish and Das's (2009) study of Indian
commercial banks for the period from 2001 to 2008 nds that banking sector policy variables
and bank-specic variables inuence depositor's discipline. In addition to this, they also nd
that macroeconomic variables dominate bank specic variables in inuencing foreign banks'
depositor's behavior.
Among the studies that have carried out cross-country analysis on depositor discipline are
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and Arena (2004). The earlier study uses OLS and two-stage
least squares analysis (2SLS) in analyzing market discipline in 43 countries over the period
from 1990 to 1997. They nd that market discipline prevails even with the existence of deposit
insurance schemes. Arena (2004) analyses deposits growth in the crisis-led East Asian countries
during crisis and non-crisis periods by using a cross-country xed-effect method. He concludes
that the importance of bank-specic factors in explaining depositor withdrawal action declines
during a crisis period. This study has several shortcomings. Firstly, it does not take into account
the dynamic nature of deposits growth. Secondly, it does not take into account the effect of the
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price mechanism (interest rate) that can be used by managers in inuencing depositor behavior.
Kaoru et al. (2005) also analyses depositor discipline in the East Asian countries, namely
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Their analyses, using pooled OLS regression of deposit
growth and interest rate for each individual country during the period from 1992 to 2002, nd that
higher-risk taking by banks reduces deposits growth. They also nd that banks with a higher-risk
prole offer a higher interest rate. This essentially shows that market discipline was effective
in East Asia as depositors are able to demand a higher premium from riskier banks. However,
Kaoru et al. (2005)'s study has several shortcomings. Firstly, it does not take into account the
bank-specic effect and the panel structure of the data. Secondly, it did not take into account of
the dynamic nature of the relationship between price (interest rate) and quantity (deposit quantity).
Maechler and McDill (2006) pioneered the use of Difference-GMM estimation in analyzing the
endogenous relationship between price and quantity of deposits in the depositor discipline model.
They posit that depositors' withdrawal actions and banks' response to them is a dynamic process
that is simultaneously determined. Their ndings conrm that the relationship between price and
quantity of deposits is endogenous. After taking into account this endogeneity, they nd that
banks in the United States are able to raise deposits by raising interest rate, and healthier banks
are able to raise signicantly higher deposits compared to the weaker ones. Similar methodology
is used by Karas et al. (2006) and Bowe and Wu (2007) in analyzing the dynamic relationship
between price and quantity of deposits in the Russian and Chinese banking sector. However, both
studies nd a negative relationship between price and quantity of deposits.
The present study aims to ll in the gap in the existing literature by trying to overcome some
of the weaknesses that exist in the studies by Arena (2004) and Kaoru et al. (2005) on depositor
discipline in East Asia. Firstly, this study aims to nd evidence of market discipline in East
Asia after controlling for the dynamic relationship between price and quantity of deposits as
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illustrated by Maechler and McDill (2006). Secondly, this study aims to take into account the
restructuring exercise that happened in the East Asian banking sector as a result of the crisis
in analyzing depositor behavior. The sample of banks in the study will be divided into weaker
(Restructured) and healthier (Non-restructured) ones, and estimations will be performed in nding
out if depositors react differently to the two groups of banks. More importantly, this study aims
to nd out if stronger banks in East Asia are able to attract more deposits once the simultaneity
between price and quantity of deposits is taken into account.
3.4 Methodology
This study aims to nd out if depositors discipline banks. The null hypothesis is that depositors'
withdrawals do not respond to ex-ante weaknesses in an individual bank's balance sheet. If there
is no depositor discipline, deposits growth should be uncorrelated with bank specic variables that
reect their risk characteristics. In addition to this, the aim of this study is also to nd out if there
is a simultaneous relationship between price and quantity of deposits. Once this is established,
the study aims to nd if banks are able to attract higher deposits over time by raising interest
rates. In answering the above questions, static and dynamic panel data analysis are used. As far
as this study is concerned, using dynamic panel methodology enables us to examine whether the
changes in the interest rate have an exogenous impact on the quantity of deposits, independent of
the endogenous impact of worsening bank balance sheets on the price and quantity of deposits.
3.4.1 Panel Data Analysis
Using pooled OLS regression in analyzing panel data may result in heterogeneity bias as the
standard error of the estimators is not independent of the previous periods. In the case of cross
country analysis, correlation can also exist across individual banks within a country. In order to
overcome this problem, estimation methods that adjust for the correlation in the standard errors of
the estimators need to be used.
Random effect (RE), between effect (BE) and xed effect (FE) estimation methods are
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commonly used in panel data analysis. The individual effect in the regression analysis is treated
as purely random and, as a result, assumed not to be correlated with the regressors under the RE
estimation method. The RE method allows for the estimation of the time-invariant regressors.
This method is better than the ordinary least square (OLS) method because it takes into account
between and within variation in the estimator69. However, this estimation method becomes
inconsistent in the event that the individual effect is correlated with the regressor. The between
effect model focuses on the variation between units.
The xed effect model takes into account within variation in the dependent and independent
variables. In doing so, its removes the effect of the time-invariant characteristics from the
regressor and assesses the regressor's net effect (Green, 2008). Even though the xed effect model
is costly in terms of degrees of freedom lost, it is preferred when there is no justication for
treating the individual effects as uncorrelated with the other regressors. This method contributes
towards consistent estimates even if the time-invariant component of the error-term is correlated
with the regressor. The random effect estimation will be inconsistent and prone to omitted variable
biasness (Hausman and Taylor, 1981).
Consider the following regression equation,
DEPGRi;j;t = i + t + j + DEPGRi;j;t 1 + BANK SPECIFICi;j;t 1 (3.1)
+COUNTRY SPECIFICj;t + "i;j;t
such that i=1,...,N ; j=1,...,J ; and t=1,...,T. DEPGR is the growth rate of real deposits for
individual bank i at time t in country j. N is the number of banks in each country. J is the number
of countries (i.e. 5 countries). T is the number of observations per bank (it varies because the
panel is unbalanced). BANK SPECIFIC is a vector of bank level variables that represents banks'
69 OLS regression does not take into account of the panel structure of the dataset.
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risk characteristics. This vector is included with a lag in order to account for the fact that balance
sheet information is available to the public with certain delay. COUNTRY SPECIFIC represents
macroeconomic variables, banking sector variables and other country-level variables. In analyzing
depositor behavior using the panel data method, bank-specic effect, country-specic effect and
time effect need to be controlled for. In Equation 3.1,  accounts for the bank-specic effect, 
accounts for the country effect and  accounts for the time effect. All the variables are expressed
in levels.
3.4.2 Dynamic Panel Data Analysis
Estimating depositor's discipline using FE model can be biased in the presence of lagged
dependency of the dependent variable. Lagged dependency can arise in the model due to the
inertial behavior of the dependent variable. Estimating an equation with lagged dependency using
static panel estimates or OLS models, omits dynamics. This causes the problem of dynamic
panel bias. Omitted dynamics can result in model misspecication as not all the history of the
right-hand-side variables is taken into consideration in the analysis (Greene, 2008). In the case
of this study, the rate of deposits growth that banks experience in the past is likely to affect their
growth today. For example, smaller banks are likely to attract similar deposits if they remain small
in the subsequent period. Similarly, a more reputable bank is likely to enjoy a similar reputation
in the subsequent year. Estimating deposits growth using a FE model can be problematic as the
lagged dependent variables will be correlated with the compound disturbance terms (i + "ijt) of
the model.
The FE model can also be biased in the presence of endogeneity. In the depositor discipline
model, an endogenous relationship can arise between the deposits growth and interest rate
variables as bank managers who are able to anticipate that bank fundamentals at time t-1
affect deposits at time t may try to adjust banks' interest rate in order to prevent future deposit
withdrawals. The instrumental variable method has been introduced to address the endogeneity
79
problem. This method uses an exogenous variable which is correlated with the independent
variable, but cannot be affected by the dependent variable as an instrument. Among the methods
that are commonly used are two-stage least squares (2SLS), three-stage least squares (3SLS) or
GMM method.
This study uses the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data model that relies on
instrumental variable estimator or a GMM estimator in addressing the endogeneity issues. This
estimator has several econometric advantages. Firstly, it can address endogeneity issues between
the dependent variable and the independent variable (deposits and interest rate) by making use
of the internal instruments (i.e. lagged dependent variable in levels for rst differences). This
saves us from having to nd and use an external instrument that is disputable. Secondly, it can
handle autoregressive properties in the dependent variable (deposits). Thirdly, in the presence of
heteroskedasticity, Baum et al. (2002) asserts that the GMM estimator is more efcient than the
simple IV estimator70. Hence, the GMM estimator is used in this study to control for bank specic
non-observable factors.
In determining whether the movement of the interest rate variable has an exogenous impact
on the quantity of deposits, independent of the endogenous impact of deteriorating fundamentals
on interest rate and quantity of deposits, this study uses Difference-GMM estimation. The main
reason for using this estimation method is because it only focuses on across time variation in the
dependent and independent variables. This is an important dimension for testing the hypotheses
of this study. This estimation method is also suitable in analyzing the sample of banks in this
study as the auto regressive parameter of deposits growth variable is not relatively high (below
0.8) and the number of time periods used in this study is not small (i.e. 11 years). Estimation
for the Difference-GMM is carried out using the xtabond2 user written command in STATA 11
(Roodman, 2006) (refer to Appendix D for details about Difference-GMM).
70 Estimation using Breusch Pagan test conrms that heteroskedacticity is present in the data used for this study.
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3.4.3 Data Description
The analysis of this study is carried out using the sample of commercial banks in ve East
Asian countries namely Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Bank level data
is obtained from BankScope. The database for each bank is obtained for the period between
1995 and 2005. Country level macroeconomic data is obtained from International Monetary
Fund's International Financial Statistics database. Deposits insurance data is obtained from
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005). As part of the contribution of the thesis, a comprehensive database
on bank restructuring in the ve East Asian countries is assembled. The information is gathered
from BankScope, banks' and central banks' websites, and academic sources that have detailed the
restructuring71.
All commercial banks' data that is available from BankScope are used for the analysis. This
yielded an initial sample of 197 banks. The number of observations available for the regression
analysis changes according to the variables used in the regressions. Since two-period lags of the
dependent variable are used in the dynamic panel data analysis, banks with less than three-years
of nancial data in the BankScope database are automatically eliminated in the regressions.
Therefore, the actual number of banks used in the dynamic panel data analysis is around 150.
3.4.4 Variables
3.4.4.1 Bank Specic Variables
Deposits Growth Growth rate of real deposits is used as the dependent variable in the analysis.
This variable is a measure of Total Deposits Growth from one period to another expressed as a
percentage and adjusted for ination (i.e. expressed in real as opposed to nominal terms)72.
Interest Rate The ratio of Interest Expense to Interest-Bearing Debt is used as the measure of
71 Ariff et al. (2001), Ito and Hashimoto (2007a), Ito and Hashimoto (2007b), Kawai and Takayasu (1999), Lindgren
et al. (1999), Num and Lum (2006), Pangestu and Habir (2002), Park (2005), Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2005),
Sato (2005) and Soon and Koh (2005).
72 Total deposits is used because data on customer deposits is not available for the Indonesian and Korean banks in some
of the years.
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Interest Rate73. This variable capture the funding cost per unit of debt. Studies by Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga (1999), Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and Bowe and Wu (2007) have used
this ratio as the interest rate proxy. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Demirgüc-Kunt and
Huizinga (2004) and Fonseca and González (2010) substracted the government interest rate from
the ratio of interest expense to interest-bearing debt of each individual bank to get a cross-sectional
measure of bank risk that is adjusted for the nominal risk-free rate. The government rate is
the Treasury bill rate where available, otherwise the discount rate74. Both rates are used in the
analysis.
Capital Adequacy Capital adequacy is measured using the ratio of Total Equity to Total Assets.
A higher ratio indicates that banks are able to absorb greater losses. This should send a signal to
the market that the default risk is low, and as a result is linked to higher deposits inow (Barajas
and Steiner, 2000 ;Martinez Peria and Schmuckler, 2001; Calomiris and Powell, 2000; Maechler
and McDill, 2003; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Bowe and Wu, 2007 and Levy-Yeyati et
al., 2010).
Protability Return on Equity (ROE) is used to measure banks' protability. This variable is
measured by the ratio of pre-tax prots to total equity. In general, assuming that risk is adequately
controlled for, higher protability should be linked to greater deposits growth (Barajas and Steiner,
2000; Martinez Peria and Schmuckler, 2001; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Bowe and Wu,
2007 and Levy-Yeyati et al., 2010). However, exceptionally risky projects could be associated
with huge rates of return. So, it is possible that for some threshold a high degree of protability
could be associated positively with the risk of failure (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999). In this case,
higher protability can be associated with lower deposits.
Liquidity Bank's liquidity is measured using the ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets. Liquid
73 Data on the detail breakdown of interest charged by banks on their deposits is not available in BankScope.
74 Data for the government debt rate is taken from line 60 zf of the IFS database. Units are in percentage per annum.
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Assets take into account of cash reserves and balances with the central bank. Higher liquidity ratio
can be linked with greater ability of banks in honoring depositors' withdrawals. Therefore, higher
liquidity ratio should be associated with a higher deposits growth rate. However, higher liquidity
ratio also can indicate that banks have not engaged in greater nancing activities and as a result is
linked with lower return. In this case, an increase in this ratio can be associated with lower deposit
growth. Studies by Barajas and Steiner (2000), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and Bowe
and Wu (2007) have used this variable.
Asset Quality Asset quality is measured as the ratio of Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans.
Current loan loss provisions are usually made in order to cover against non-performing loans
that banks expect to incur in the following year. Hence, higher provision can signify prudent risk
management, and as a result be linked to greater deposits growth. However, higher provision also
can be associated with the prospect of lower asset quality. By allocating greater provision, banks
are effectively disclosing that their asset quality is low. In this case, higher provision can be linked
to lower deposits growth. Studies by Barajas and Steiner (2000) and Bowe and Wu (2007) have
used this variable.
Management Quality Management quality is measured using Cost to Income Ratio (CIR).
This variable is dened as the ratio of operating costs (it may include expenses such as salary,
investment in training, and the marketing fees for banks' nancial products) to operating income.
A lower ratio may indicate that banks are run efciently, and as a result may be linked with greater
deposits growth. However, a higher CIR ratio may be linked with greater engagement of banks
in sales and marketing activities to attract more business. In this case, a higher CIR ratio can be
linked with greater deposits growth. Studies by Barajas and Steiner (2000) and Demirguc-Kunt
and Huizinga (2004) and Bowe and Wu (2007) have controlled for this by using the ratio of
non-interest expenditures to total assets as a proxy.
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Size Size is measured as the natural logarithm of Total Assets. It is included to control for bank
assets. Depositors' incentives in monitoring and disciplining banks are likely to be weakened by
the perception that larger banks are less likely to fail. This can either be due to their diversied
customer base, which makes them appear safer, or due to the `too-big-to-fail' hypothesis, which
increases their chances of being bailed-out in the event of nancial difculties. A positive
relationship between size and deposits growth will indicate that depositors perceive larger banks
to be safer. Studies by Park and Peristiani (1998), Barajas and Steiner (2000), Maechler and
McDill (2003) and Bowe and Wu (2007) and Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010) have controlled for size.
Restructured and Non-restructured Banks Studies by Bongini et al. (2001), Bongini et
al.(2002), Rojas-Suarez (2001), Arena (2008) and earlier studies mentioned in Chapter 2 conrm
that restructured banks in East Asia have weak fundamentals. Based on this premise, banks'
restructuring exercises are used to subdivide the sample into two different quality categories. A
bank is classied as Restructured if it is recapitalized, suspended, closed or taken-over by another
bank, and Non-Restructured otherwise. Restructured banks are considered as weak banks while
Non-Restructured banks are considered as healthy banks. Once the restructuring exercise takes
place, the banks are removed from the sample size. For those cases in which a bank merged or
was acquired, the resulting larger bank is treated as a `new' bank in the sample75.
3.4.4.2 Country Specic Variables
GDP Per Capita Deposits growth can be linked to the general economic conditions in a
country76. Higher growth rate stimulates greater nancial intermediation activities. During this
time, greater demand for a bank loan will be accompanied by higher interest rates in order to
attract more deposits. This is especially the case in emerging markets, where a bank's role as
75 Eliminating the merged banks from the analysis will create biases given the relatively large number of mergers and
acquisitions (around 20) in comparison to the number of banks in the sample (about 150).
76 GDP per capita, which is measured as the gross domestic product (GDP) divided by the number of people in the
country, is especially useful when doing cross-country analysis as it shows the relative performance of the countries.
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nancial intermediator is more prominent. Similar to Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), GDP
Per Capita is used to control for the general strength of the economy, which may inuence the
growth of total deposits in a country77.
Market Structure Number of banks in the East Asian banking sector has fallen after the crisis
due to the consolidation that happened in the banking industry. This increases the concentration
levels for assets. The HerndahlHirschman Index (HHI) is one of the most widely used measures
of market concentration, and it is used as a proxy for competition in the empirical analysis. It is
dened as the sum of the squares of market shares of all the banks in a country, where the market
shares are expressed as fractions. It has the following form:
HHIi =
NP
i=1
s2i
where si is the market share of bank i and N is the number of banks in the system. Market
share of banks is measured using total assets as a proxy for bank size. HHI gives higher weight to
larger banks compared to the smaller ones. Higher HHI is associated with greater concentration
in the banking industry while lower HHI is associated with greater competition in the industry.
Similar to Park and Peristiani (1998) and Ungan et. al. (2008), this study controls for market
concentration in the banking sector in analyzing depositor discipline.
Deposit Insurance Depositor discipline can be weakened by the existence of deposits
protection schemes. This study controls for the existence of a safety net in the banking sector by
using a deposit insurance index. This index is based on Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004)'s
study. The variation in the deposit insurance schemes is measured based on three aspects, which
include explicit deposits insurance, unlimited coverage, and inter-bank deposits coverage. The
deposits insurance index ranges from 0 to 3.
3.5 Results
77 Since total deposits is measured in real values, ination is not included as a control variable in this study.
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3.5.1 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 provides the summary of the data set. The results show that there is a great variability
in the deposits growth variable. This variable varied more across time than across bank as shown
by the standard deviation. Interest rate and Interest Rate Ex Gov Debt also displayed variation
across time and bank. Solvency ratio, protability ratio, liquidity ratio, Costs to Income ratio and
provisioning ratio of the banks in the sample displayed greater variation overtime than across
bank. Size (log value of Total Assets) varied more across bank than across time, highlighting the
heterogeneous nature of banks in East Asia.
Table 3.2 provides the summary statistics of the data based on three periods classied as before,
during and after the crisis78. The information obtained for the three periods is compared with
those obtained for the whole sample period. For each period, the table indicates the total number
of observations, the average value for each variable, with the standard deviation presented below
in parentheses. Table 3.2 shows that banks in East Asia experienced a drastic drop in deposits
growth, falling from 32 percent before the crisis to -11 percent during the crisis. Such large
drop in growth reects the severity of the crisis. Deposit growth improved during the post-crisis
period. The total interest paid out on interest-bearing debts rose from 8.88% before the crisis to
more than 12 percent during the crisis. This increase in interest paid out, to some extent, reects
the higher costs of funding arising from large withdrawals of funds. Post-crisis, the interest rate
dropped by half to an average of 5.67 percent. This, in turn, reects the increase in the stability of
the deposits market after crisis. Similarly, government debt rate rose from 9.06 percent before the
crisis to an average of 15.47 percent during the crisis. This rate averaged 6.98 percent post-crisis.
Government debt rate remains higher than the interest rate paid out by banks in all periods.
Although the equity base of the banks did not change much, the protability of banks plunged
from a high of 11.19 percent before the crisis to a low of -14.33 percent during the crisis period.
78 Before crisis consists of 1995 to 1996, crisis consists of 1997 to 1998 while post-crisis consists of 1999 to 2005.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
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This may reect the large drop in the economic growth rate in the East Asian countries during
the crisis period. Hence, it is perhaps not surprising to see the dramatic increase in loan loss
provisioning by the banks. Prior to the crisis, the Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans ratio is
just 2.30 percent for the average bank. During the crisis year, it more than tripled to 7.59 percent.
Such a high rate reects the possibility that banks build up problem loans. Total assets growth in
the banking sector dropped from a high of 18.38 percent before crisis to a low of -23.94 during
the crisis. It is perhaps not surprising to see a turnover in Assets Growth of over 7 percent for the
average bank post-crisis. Deposits insurance was low before the crisis but increased during the
crisis period. It remained high after that.
3.5.2 Partial Correlation
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 exhibit the partial correlations between the dependent and independent
variables in levels and rst differences. Most importantly, negative correlation is observed
between Interest Rate and Deposits Growth in both levels and rst differences. This suggests
that banks that have high deposit growth are likely to offer relatively lower Interest Rates to
their depositors. Meanwhile, a change in Interest Rate is negatively associated with a change in
Deposits Growth. This implies that not all banks can raise deposits by raising the price.
The results also show that there is a positive correlation between Interest Rate Ex. Gov. Debt
and Deposits Growth in both levels and rst differences. This suggests that banks that have high
deposits growth are likely offer their depositors interest rates that are closer to the government
debt rate. Positive correlation between a change in Interest Rate Ex. Gov. Debt and a change
in Deposits Growth suggests that banks that reduce the gap between their interest rate and
government debt rate are likely to attract more deposits.
Equity, liquidity and provision shows positive correlation in levels and differences. However,
ROE shows a positive correlation with the level of deposits and a negative correlation with the
rst difference of deposits. This suggests that banks that have a high level of deposits growth are
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likely to be more protable. However, changes in protability are correlated with lower deposits
growth. As far as the size of the banks is concerned, different signs are shown relative to both the
level of deposits and its rst difference. The positive sign in the rst difference correlation implies
that banks that increase in asset size are likely to obtain more deposits. The negative sign in the
level correlation implies that bigger banks are likely to have lower deposits growth.
3.5.3 Panel Data Analysis
The choice of model specication and variable selection used in this study is based on the
existing literature. The effect of a bank specic variable in inuencing depositors' behavior after
controlling for general country-specic conditions is analyzed. Regression analyses using different
assumptions about the error structure of the basic model are carried out. Heteroscedasticity is a
norm in cross-sectional data. The standard errors are biased when heteroskedasticity is present
(White, 1980). Clustering of standard errors happens when observations in the data are correlated.
Serial correlation in a linear panel-data model happens due to the nature of the data that is
arranged according to time. This causes the standard errors of the coefcients to be smaller than
they actually are. This bias in standard error causes the results to be less efcient79. Tests also
point to the presence of both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals. Therefore,
the assessment of signicance is based on robust standard errors that are valid in the presence
of non-iid errors. Table 3.5 and 3.6 report the ndings using pooled OLS, Random Effect (RE),
Between Effect (BE) and Fixed Effect (FE)80.
The data on East Asian banks seem to support the general hypothesis that deposits growth is
associated with movements in banks' fundamentals. Overall, the ndings conrm that depositor
discipline exists in the East Asian banking sector. The results revealed in Table 3.5 and 3.6 show
that higher equity ratio, protability, liquidity, CIR, loan loss provisions and larger size are linked
79 Baltagi (2008) highlights the need to account for serial correlation in the presence of random and xed effects.
80 Time and country dummies are included in all specication to remove universal time-related and country-related
shocks from the error term.
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to higher deposits growth. In addition to this, greater concentration in the banking industry and
GDP Per Capita are related to higher deposits growth. More importantly, the nding shows that
equity ratio and size have a signicant impact on deposits growth in all the estimations81. This
implies that depositors prefer to bank-in their deposits in banks that have high equity ratio and are
bigger in size. Apart from this, greater concentration in the banking industry also signicantly
improves deposits growth.
The estimation result using pooled OLS method is shown in column 1 of Table 3.5. When the
panel structure of the data set is not taken into account, estimation using pooled OLS shows that
the interest rate variable signicantly reduces deposits growth. In addition to this, equity ratio and
size appear to be signicant determinants of deposits growth. Diagnostic tests on the residuals
of this regression using the Breuch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test suggest non-normal
residuals. This implies that GLS estimation method may be preferred to OLS since it assigns
less weight to large residuals when minimizing the sum of squared residuals to derive parameter
estimates. RE estimation results shown in column 2 take into account the panel structure of the
data set and analyzes within and between variation of the dependent and independent variables.
Similar to the pooled OLS results, the interest rate variable exhibits a signicant and negative
effect on deposits growth while equity ratio and size have signicant and positive effect on
deposits growth. BE estimation highlights the variation of deposits across banks by regressing the
mean of deposits growth of each bank on the mean of the explanatory variables (excludes the time
effects). Estimation using BE suggests that there is no signicant cross-sectional variation in the
interest rate variable. However, signicant cross-sectional variations are observed for the equity
ratio, provisioning ratio and size of the banks which help banks to attract more funds.
A Hausman specication test is carried out in order to test for the equality of the coefcients
81 However, BE estimation shows that the cross-sectional variation in banks' Size is not important in explaining the
cross-sectional variation in Deposits Growth.
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Table 3.5: Panel Data Analysis with Interest Rate Variable
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Table 3.6: Panel Data Analysis with Interest Rate Ex Gov. Debt Variable
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(Green, 2008). This tests for the statistical signicance of the difference between the coefcient
estimates obtained by FE and by RE. The null hypothesis is that the RE estimates are efcient and
consistent, and FE estimates are inefcient. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the RE
estimates will be subject to unobserved heterogeneity bias and will therefore differ systematically
from the FE estimates. The Hausman specication test conrms that RE estimates will be subject
to unobserved heterogeneity bias.
The FE estimator emphasizes on the variation of dependent and independent variables over
time, using deviations from each bank's mean82. Once bank-specic effects, country-specic
effects and time-effect are controlled for, FE estimation shows that the Interest Rate variable
signicantly reduces deposits growth. This nding suggests that banks in East Asia are not able
to use price mechanism to attract more deposits. Higher equity ratio and larger size inuence
depositors' behavior. As far as other bank-specic variables are concerned, the results show
that protability, liquidity, costs to income and provisioning is linked to higher deposits growth.
Concentration in the banking industry helps banks to attract signicantly higher deposits growth.
Deposit insurance and GDP per capita are linked higher deposits growth, but the effects are not
signicant.
In comparison, FE analysis for the post-crisis period shows that the interest rate variable
reduces deposits growth but this effect is no longer signicant. Depositor behaviors are also
driven mainly by the protability ratio of the banks in addition to their equity ratio and size. The
coefcients for the equity ratio and size are higher during the post-crisis period compared to the
estimations for the whole sample period. This suggests that the variation in these variables had a
stronger inuence on depositor behavior after the crisis. This is in line with Martinez-Peria and
Schmukler (2001) and Levy Yeyati et al. (2004)'s ndings, which show that depositor discipline
82 It effectively discards the between-person variation and as a result can yield standard errors that are considerably
higher than those produced by methods that utilize both within- and between-bank variation.
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increased in Chile, Argentina and Mexico after the crisis period. Provisioning by banks during
this period is linked to lower deposits growth. This suggests that depositors associate provisioning
during this period with lower asset quality and not prudence.
FE estimations for the Restructured and Non-restructured banks show that both types of banks
are not able to attract more funds by raising the interest rate. As far as the weaker banks are
concerned, only size is associated with signicantly higher deposits growth. Equity, liquidity
and provisioning ratio are linked to higher deposits growth but protability and costs to income
ratios are associated with lower deposits growth. This nding suggests that higher protability
of the weaker banks is associated with greater risk taking while higher expenditure is related to
inefciency. Analysis for the healthier banks shows that higher equity, protability and costs to
income ratios help banks achieve higher deposits growth. In this case, higher costs to income
ratio of the healthier banks may be linked to greater engagement of banks in sales and marketing
activities to attract more business. By comparing the ndings of weaker banks to those of healthier
ones, it can be observed that variations in the fundamentals of healthier banks are more effective
in explaining depositors' behavior. This nding suggests that depositors in the East Asian banking
system reward good banks for prudence. However, it does not provide good support to the
proposition that depositors discipline bad banks for high-risk taking.
In comparison to the Maechler and McDill (2006), Karas et al. (2006) and Bowe and Wu
(2007) studies which are based on a single country analysis, this study uses a multi-country
analysis. Hence, Interest Rate Ex. Gov. Debt is used as an additional price proxy. This variable
adjusts banks' interest rate for the nominal risk-free rate. Compared to the Interest Rate variable
which only takes into account of the effect of bank specic interest rate on deposits growth,
this variable will also take into account of the effect of any changes in government debt rate on
deposits growth. This variable accounts for the gap between these two rates. Summary statistics
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in Table 3.2 show that Government Debt rate is always higher than the bank Interest Rate. An
increase in the value of this variable implies that the gap is lower, which means that banks are
offering an interest rate that is closer to the government debt rate.
When Interest Rate is used as the price proxy, results in Table 3.5 show that its effect on
deposits growth is negative. However, when Interest Rate Ex. Gov. Debt is used as the price
proxy, estimations using pooled OLS, RE and FE show that this variable is associated with
signicantly higher deposits growth as shown in Table 3.6. This nding suggests that depositors
in East Asia are only driven by the price signal when it competitive to the rate that is offered
by the government. In estimation for the post-crisis period, Restructured and Non-restructured
banks also show a positive relationship between Interest Rate Ex. Gov. Debt and deposits growth.
Comparison of the coefcients of this variable suggests that banks are able raise higher deposits
during the post-crisis period compared to the whole sample period by offering a competitive
interest rate. Results in columns 6 and 7 of Table 3.6 show that healthier banks are able to attract
higher deposits compared to the weaker ones by offering a competitive interest rate.
Even though panel data estimations using Interest Rate Ex. Gov. Debt as the price proxy show
that banks are able to attract deposits by offering competitive interest rate, this cannot be taken as
signal of market discipline because the estimations are performed without taking into account of
the lagged dependency of the dependent variable and endogenous relationship between price and
quantity of deposits. This issue will be addressed in the following section.
3.5.4 Dynamic Panel Data Analysis
Panel data estimations can be biased in the presence of lag dependency of the dependent
variable and endogeneity. This section will address the shortcomings of the panel data analysis
by using dynamic panel data analysis. All variables are entered in difference (not level) terms
in the Difference-GMM estimations. The analyses of the data are carried out using one-step
robust, two-step and two-step robust Difference-GMM estimators to account for the endogenous
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relationship between price and quantity of deposits and also the lagged dependency of the deposits
growth variable. Robustness in one-step estimation species that the resulting standard errors
are consistent with panel-specic autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. A two-step estimator
can produce large efciency gains as the standard covariance matrix is robust to panel-specic
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity However, the standard errors are downward biased. Hence
two-step robust is used to get the nite-sample bias-corrected GMM estimators. This is done by
applying Windmeijer (2005)'s correction (refer to Appendix Dfor more detail).
3.5.4.1 Without Price Mechanism
Price mechanism is not included in the rst part of the depositor discipline analysis. This
enables the comparison of the results from different model specications. The dynamic nature
of the model allows it to capture depositor behaviors, which are simultaneously caused by
improvements of bank fundamentals. The results of the Difference-GMM estimations are shown
in Table 3.7. Column 1 presents the results for the one-step robust estimation, column 2 presents
the results for the two-step estimation and column 3 presents the results for the two-step robust
estimation.
The results show that an increase in the equity ratio and size of the banks helps them to attract
relatively higher deposits over time, all else held constant. This result is consistent with the FE
estimation results. Maechler and McDill (2006) also nd a positive and signicant relationship
between size and deposits. This nding suggests that depositors perceive an increase in asset
size as a good sign. Bigger banks have a greater chance of engaging in nancial intermediation
activities and earn a higher return. As a result, depositors may perceive it as a sign of better
nancial health. However, a rapid increase in asset size may cause banks to pay less attention to
the quality of their loans and as a result be involved in higher-risk taking activities. Banks may
attract more funds by offering higher interest rates. This may motivate depositors to place their
funds in the banks despite realizing the underlying risk prole of the banks. Therefore, the price
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effect (interest rate) needs to be controlled for in the regression model (this issue will be covered
in the next part).
Deposits growth also seems to respond to banking sector conditions. It rises signicantly when
the banking sector is more concentrated. Even though deposits growth rises during a period of
high per capita economic growth, this effect is not signicant. This implies that a high per capita
economic growth rate does not contribute signicantly toward increasing the public's willingness
to hold bank deposits. Even though Maechler and McDill (2006) nd that the growth of uninsured
deposits in U.S. rises signicantly during periods of high GDP growth, the study by Bowe and
Yu (2007) fails to nd similar evidence in the case of the Chinese banking sector83. This nding
implies that investors in East Asia may be able to nd other investment options to invest their
funds.
The results show that depositor behavior does exhibit a strong persistence. This is shown in
columns 1 to 3 of Table 3.7, where the rst lag is signicantly and negatively related to deposits
growth. This result suggests that higher deposits growth today is associated with lower growth
tomorrow. This nding contrasts with the Maechler and McDill (2006) and Bowe and Yu (2007)
ndings, which show that there is a signicant and positive relationship between lag value and
current value of Deposits Growth. Typically, a bank with good reputation that attracts more
deposits today is likely to do the same in the next period. But, one-off shocks to the system would
do the reverse. The negative relationship shown in the present case suggests that banks with rapid
deposit growth in one period does not experience this in the subsequent period. This reects the
relative instability of the deposits growth in the East Asian banking system, which could be due to
the crisis.
The results of Arellano and Bond's (1991) autocorrelation test shown at the end of column 1
83 Maechler and McDill's (2006) study uses uninsured deposits in the U.S. market while Bowe and Yu's (2007) study
uses total customer deposits in the Chinese market.
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to 3 reject no rst-order and second-order autocorrelation in the residuals at normal signicant
levels. This implies that the estimates are consistent. Validity of the instruments tested using
Hansen over-identication tests reject the null hypothesis under both estimation methods, which
suggests that the models are mis-specied.
3.5.4.2 Exogenous Price Mechanism
This section analyses whether the price of deposits inuences the quantity of deposits. Interest
Rate and Interest Expense to Interest-Bearing Debt rate are included as additional explanatory
variables. The model specication aims to nd out if an increase in the interest rate variables is
linked to higher deposits growth.
The interest rate variables are treated as exogenous in this case. As such, it is directly entered
in the dynamic panel data models. Columns 4 to 9 of Table 3.7 show the results. The variable
Interest Rate exhibits a negative relationship with deposits growth under all estimations but it
is only signicant under the one-step robust and two-step estimation. This evidence shows that
banks are unable to increase deposits growth by raising the interest rate. All estimations using
Interest Rate Ex Gov. Debt Rate as the price proxy show a positive relationship between price
and deposits' growth, but this effect is only signicant under the two-step method. However,
inference cannot be made based on two-step estimator as the standard error is known to be biased
downward84.
There is no second-order serial correlation in the residuals of any of the estimations. However,
the Hansen test of over-identication shows that the used instruments are not valid. This could be
due to the failure to control for the dynamic relationship between price and quantity of deposits.
Since the interest rate variables directly enter this set of regressions, it is implicitly assumed
that the deposits growth reacts to exogenous changes of the interest rate and there is no reverse
84 Arellano and Bond (1991) proposes that inference should be made based on the one-step estimator. In the case of this
study, inference can also be made based on two-step robust estimator.
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Table 3.7: Dynamic Panel Data without Price Mechanism and with Exogenous Price Mechanism
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Figure 3.2: The Equilibrium Quantities of Deposits Supply and Demand
causality between these two variables. In other words, the possibility of banks' own attempts to
attract more deposits by raising the interest rate is excluded.
However, worsening bank balance sheet may motivate banks to raise the interest rate in an
attempt to curb withdrawals. The effect of this action on the quantity of deposits will depend on
the overall movement in the supply and demand curve of deposits. Bowe and Wu (2011) illustrate
these two processes in Figure 3.2. Depositors' withdrawals due to greater risk taking by banks
shifts the supply curve to the left (S') and raises the equilibrium level upward along the demand
curve. This lowers the quantity of deposits and raises the price. Banks realize that they will incur
shortages in deposits and, as a result, will not have sufcient sources to fund their loan portfolio.
Weaker banks may react to this shortfall by offering higher interest rates on a given level of
deposits. This action may increase the demands for bank deposits and may shift the demand curve
for deposits to the right (D'). The new equilibrium can be either on the left or right-hand side of
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the original equilibrium. It's very obvious that the interest rate rises (R2) from its original level
(R1) as a result of these shifts. However, concurrent movements in the demand and supply curve
of deposits can obscure changes in the quantity of deposits. The total amount of deposits may (i)
increase (Q2> Q1), (ii) remain the same (Q2= Q1), or (iii) decrease (Q2< Q1)85.
Treating the interest rate variables as exogenous, it is implicitly assumed that changes in the
interest rate affect deposit growth and there is no reverse causality between these two variables.
This does not allow us to take into account possible attempts by banks to get more funds by
increasing the interest rate. In actual fact, banks' action in raising their interest rates may be in
response to a depositors' withdrawal intention that is in itself linked to the banks' risk prole.
So, in analyzing the effect of changes in the interest rate variables on banks' deposits growth, the
effect of changes in banks' risk prole on those two variables needs to be controlled for. This will
allow us to ascertain whether the positive or negative link between the interest rate variables and
deposits' growth are signals of depositor discipline.
3.5.4.3 Endogenous Price Mechanism
This section considers the fact that changes in price and quantity of deposits can be jointly
determined by the nancial strength of a bank. Withdrawals by depositors due to greater risk
taking by banks may trigger movements in the supply and demand curve of deposits, which
may obscure the direct relationship between the movement of price and the quantity of deposits.
These two processes (i.e. movements in the supply and demand curve of deposits) need to be
disentangled by controlling for the possible price effect of worsening fundamentals (shift in
supply curve) and analyzing whether an increase in the interest rate can inuence the quantity of
deposits (shift in demand curve).
The Interest rate variable is treated as endogenous in this case. All the examined statistical tests
satisfy the key assumptions of the Difference-GMM, and conrm that this model is an appropriate
85 The outcomes of changes in quantity will also depend on the relative elasticity of supply of and demand for deposits.
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statistical generating mechanism in this case. The estimation results are shown in columns
1 to 6 of Table 3.8. Treating the deposits' growth and interest rate as endogenous variables
allows for correlation between the interest rate variable and the contemporaneous error term.
Estimations using dynamic panel models show that there is no second-order serial correlation in
the residuals. The Hansen test of over-identication shows that the instruments used are valid at
normal signicance levels. Overall, the results provide evidence that the interest rate and deposits
growth are better modeled as endogenous variables as this estimation procedures take into account
simultaneity or reverse causality between the two variables.
The variable Interest Rate exhibits a negative sign under all estimation methods, but it is only
signicant under the two-step estimation. Results in columns 4 to 6 of Table 3.8 show that there
is a positive relationship between Interest Rate Ex Gov. Debt Rate and Deposits Growth and,
this association is also only signicant under the two-step estimation. Price signal is no longer
effective in inuencing depositor behavior once the downward bias of the two-step estimator is
corrected.
Overall, even though panel data analyses show that banks can use price signal to attract more
deposits, this signal is no longer effective once endogenous relationship between the price and
quantity of deposits is taken into account. This results imply that depositors in East Asia do not
discipline banks by demanding higher price for their deposits. Depositors behavior are mainly
driven by banks' equity ratio, size and the concentration in the banking industry.
3.5.4.4 Post-Crisis
In this section, estimations are carried out using post crisis data (i.e. from 1999 to 2005)86 in
order to nd out if depositors' response to banks' risk prole and price changes after a crisis.
Greater response by depositors during the post-crisis period will be in line with the wake-up-call
hypothesis. All estimations pass the diagnostic tests. The ndings presented in Table 3.9 suggest
86 All period consist of time period from 1995 to 2005.
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Table 3.8: Dynamic Panel Data with Endogenous Price Mechanism
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that price signal are not effective in inuencing depositor behavior during the post-crisis period.
3.5.4.5 Restructured versus Non-Restructured Banks
Asset pricing models imply that banks that take higher risks need to offer depositors higher
returns in order to induce them to deposit their funds in the bank. This suggests that the
relationship between deposit growth and interest rate is linear. Analyses in the previous sections
are performed based on this assumption. However, reformulation of the credit rationing model
suggests that the relationship between deposit growth and interest rate is not linear at all times as
banks that offer too high interest can be perceived as risky87. This section analyses the possibility
of a non-linear relationship between the interest elasticity and banks' quality by examining if
depositors in weak banks are more sensitive and require a higher price premium than depositors
in healthy banks.
Existing studies by Bongini et al. (2001), Bongini et al.(2002), Rojas-Suarez (2001), Arena
(2008) and the study in Chapter 2 of this thesis show that a bank restructuring exercise is a good
proxy for the overall quality of a bank in East Asia. Hence, it is used to subdivide the sample of
banks in the data set into weak and healthy banks. Overall, there are 74 banks in the sample that
are categorized as healthy while 36 that are categorized as weak. A mean comparison test shows
there is a statistical difference in the average interest rate offered by the weak (Restructured) and
healthy (Non-restructured) banks. On average, weak banks offer a 8.33 percent interest rate while
healthy banks offer 7.10 percent. Weak banks also have lower deposits growth compared to the
healthy ones. The latter have an average deposits growth of 21.07 percent while the former have
an average deposits growth of 13.72 percent.
Dynamic panel data estimations for the Restructured banks are presented in Table 3.10 while
estimations for the Non-restructured banks are presented in Table 3.1188. By differentiating
87 Insolvent or near-insolvent banks may wish to follow a risky growth strategy in overcoming their nancial troubles.
As a result, they may offer a very high interest rate.
88 The number lags used as instruments in the Restructured and Non-restructured banks analyses are capped due to
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Table 3.9: Dynamic Panel Data with Endogenous Price Mechanism for Post-Crisis Period
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Table 3.10: Dynamic Panel Data with Endogenous Price Mechanism for Restructured Banks
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Table 3.11: Dynamic Panel Data with Endogenous Price Mechanism for Non-restructured Banks
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between different qualities of banks, this study nds that for each percentage increase in interest
rate, healthier banks are not able to attract higher deposits. Similarly, the ndings also show that
weak banks cannot attract more deposits by raising their deposit interest rates. This suggests that
the relationship between risk and deposit interest rate is not non-linear. The results imply that
weaker banks do not incur more costs in getting deposits. This shows that depositors in East Asia
did not discipline weaker banks by demanding higher returns.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper analyses depositor discipline in the East Asia banking system. Overall, the empirical
ndings indicate that depositors behave in a manner that is consistent with depositor discipline.
The results suggest higher-quality banks are capable of attracting higher deposits growth. Panel
data analyses show that banks are only able to attract more deposits by offering an interest rate
that is closer to the government debt rate. Depositors also prefer to invest their money in banks
that have a high equity ratio and are big in size. In line with the wake-up-call hypothesis, analysis
for the post-crisis period conrms that bank-specic factors are able to explain greater variation in
depositors' behavior. Healthy banks are able to attract more deposits by offering an interest rate
that is closer to the government debt rate compared to the weaker banks.
However, depositor responsiveness to price signal under the panel data analyses cannot be
construed as a sign of depositor discipline because it does not account for the lag dependency
of deposits growth and the endogenous relationship between price (interest rate) and quantity
of deposits. Dynamic panel data analysis is carried out to overcome these shortcomings. Initial
estimation without the price variable shows that equity ratio and size of the banks are highly
signicant in explaining deposits growth. In the subsequent analysis, any price effect is controlled
for by including the interest rate variables as additional exogenous variables in the model. The
ndings conrm that banks' fundamentals help in explaining the amount of deposits that banks
lower number of sample size in each group.
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can attract for a given price. In the subsequent analyses, the interest rate variables are treated as
endogenous. Comparing the diagnostic tests result between the exogenous price mechanism and
the endogenous price mechanism, the study nds that the model specication tests favor the latter.
When the endogeneity between the price and quantity of deposits is taken into account, the
results show that deposits growth in the sample banks is driven by bank fundamentals and risk
aversion activities but not by price movements. This suggests that depositors in East Asia do not
discipline banks by demanding higher price for deposits. Analysis focusing only on the post-crisis
period also shows similar results. Analysis by dividing the banks in sample into weak and healthy
ones suggests that the relationship between the interest elasticity and banks' quality is linear. The
results show that healthier banks are not able to attract more deposits by offering a higher price.
The ndings also conrm that depositors do not discipline weaker banks by demanding a higher
return.
Ineffectiveness of the price signal in attracting more deposits is in line with the ndings by
Bowe and Yu (2007) and Karas et al. (2006) in the Chinese and Russian banking sectors. Lack of
responsiveness by depositors to price signal can be attributable to a number of factors. Firstly, it
may be due to the large outow of funds from the banking system that happened as a result of
the 1997 crisis. In analyzing the equilibrium price and quantity in the deposits' market, it can
be shown that concurrent movements in supply and demand curves of deposits can result in a
lower equilibrium quantity of deposits compared to the initial level. This can happen when the
movement in the supply curve of deposits outweighs the movement in the demand curve. When
this happens, depositors' withdrawal action overwhelms any actions by banks to raise price to
attract more deposits.
Secondly, the inability of the price signal to inuence depositor behavior may also be due to
interest rate controls imposed by the regulatory authorities. All the ve East Asian countries had
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an interest rate regime whereby either deposit rates or lending rates were freed, but the other rates
were subject to a band or only a part of interest rates was determined at market rates (Abiad et al.,
2008). Malaysia and Korea shifted to a partially repressed interest rate regime in 1998 and 2001
respectively whereby either deposit rates or lending rates are freed, but the other interest rates
are set by government or subject to a ceiling/oor. This may have limited banks' ability to raise
interest rate to inuence depositor behavior.
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Chapter 4 Information Disclosure and Depositor Discipline
4.1 Introduction
The severity of the East Asian crisis highlights the need for greater transparency and sufcient
information disclosure in the East Asian banking system. The World Bank (1998) report identies
"unreliable nancial reporting, lack of adequate disclosure, lax enforcement to ensure compliance,
and poor audits" (p.67) to be among the factors that aggravated problems in the banking sector in
East Asia. As a result of this, international banking institutions like the Basel Committee, World
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have urged these countries to enhance their banking
sector transparency by improving disclosure89. Information disclosure is a prerequisite for market
discipline to take effect. The third pillar of Basel II aims to
"....encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements, which will
allow market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital,
risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution"
In line with this, regulatory bodies in the East Asian banking system have taken measures
to enhance disclosure. The present study aims to investigate the effect of greater information
disclosure on banks.
Financial statements act as the most reliable and readily accessible mechanism in disseminating
banking information. The amount of information that banks disclose matters as the absence of
information prevents market discipline from taking place while limited information weakens
it. Existing theory is divided on whether banks should disclose more information. One strand
of literature argues that disclosure is good for banks as it can help them attract more funds and
encourage them to be more prudent. However, another strand of literature argues that disclosure
89 Bank of International setttlement (2006) provides the guideline for banks in disclosing information.
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is bad for banks as it can cause coordination failure among depositors. Banks have a general
tendency to under disclose since full disclosure is not the optimal choice for them as it can be
costly, may cause banks to lose their competitiveness and also may create negative externalities.
Theoretical ambiguity surrounding the role of information disclosure in banking emphasizes
the need for empirical analysis in ascertaining the effect. Nevertheless, to date, there is a lack
of studies that have dwelt on this topic. This study lls in the gap in the existing literature
by answering a pertinent question: Should banks disclose more risk-related information? This
question will be addressed by analyzing whether greater information disclosure can be used by
banks as a signal to attract more deposits.
Deposits represent a very important and stable source of funding for banks. Ability to attract
higher deposits is good for banks as it allows them to perform a greater nancial intermediation
role, and as a result earn higher income. In analyzing depositor discipline, existing empirical
studies have focused on the content of information disclosure. This study will contribute to the
existing literature by looking at the content as well as the quantity of risk-related information
disclosure. This study will directly test the hypothesis of whether banks are able to attract more
deposits by disclosing additional risk-related information by investigating depositors' reaction to
the amount of risk-related information that banks disclose. Greater disclosure requirement has
been shown to enhance market discipline (Jordon et al., 1999), reduce the cost of banking crises
(Rosengren, 1999), reduce the probability of runs on healthier banks (Hoggarth et al., 2003),
improve banks performance (Barth et al., 2004), reduce stock price volatility (Baumann and Nier,
2004) and also reduce the probability of a banking crisis (Tadesse, 2006). To my knowledge, at
present there are no other studies that have empirically analyzed the effect of greater information
disclosure on deposits growth.
This study contributes to the existing literature by adopting a dynamic panel data analysis
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method in analyzing the relationship between the amount of risk-related information disclosure
and deposits growth. In line with the proposition of signaling theory, empirical studies by Nier
and Baumann (2006) and Wu and Bowe (2010) conrm that greater ex-post risk-related disclosure
is associated with lower ex-ante risk taking by bank managers90. Since depositors' withdrawal
actions and banks' response to them is a jointly determined process, the simultaneity that exists
in the depositor discipline model needs to be controlled for in order to ascertain if greater
information disclosure helps banks to attract more deposits. Dynamic panel data analysis is used
to conrm whether changes in the amount of information disclosure have an exogenous impact on
the quantity of deposits, independent of the endogenous impact of deteriorating fundamentals on
disclosure and quantity of deposits.
Analysis on depositors' reaction to the amount of information disclosed by banks is performed
for the period from before crisis to after crisis (i.e. 1995 to 2005) and after crisis only. Greater
responsiveness of depositors to information disclosure after the crisis period will be in line
with the wake-up-call hypothesis. This study also contributes to the existing literature by
looking at depositors reaction to the information disclosed by weak (Restructured) and healthy
(Non-restructured) banks. Since depositors respond to ex-ante weaknesses in individual banks'
fundamentals, they may react differently to the amount of information disclosed by weaker
banks compared to the stronger ones. Weaker banks may, in turn, try to stop deposits' drain by
disclosing less information. If depositor discipline is effective, for a given increase in the amount
of information disclosure, healthier banks should attract relatively more deposits than average
banks while a weaker bank may not be able to do so. Analysis of depositors' reaction to the
amount of information disclosed by banks is performed for the period from before crisis to after
crisis (i.e. 1995 to 2005) and after crisis only. Greater responsiveness of depositors to information
90 Signalling theory posits that by choosing to disclose more information banks chose to lower their default risk in
equilibrium (Cordella and Yeyati, 1998 and Boot and Schmeits, 2000).
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disclosure after the crisis period is in line with the wake-up call hypothesis.
Overall, this results of this study conrm that greater disclosure helps banks to attract more
deposits. Panel data analysis shows that the East Asian banks were able to attract relatively
more funds by disclosing more risk-related information during the post-crisis period. Dynamic
panel data analysis is performed to account for the lagged dependency of the dependent variable
and also endogenous relationship between disclosure and deposits growth. The results conrm
that changes in the amount of disclosure can exogenously inuence depositor behavior. More
specically, the results show that banks in East Asia were able to attract more deposits over
time by disclosing greater risk-related information. In line with the wake-up-call hypothesis,
depositors' responsiveness to greater disclosure was higher during the post-crisis period as
opposed to the whole sample period.
The results also show that healthier (Non-Restructured) banks were able to raise higher deposits
over time by revealing more information. However, weaker (Restructured) banks were not able to
do so. This conrms that the amount of risk-related information that banks disclose is related to
their quality. Greater disclosure is a good signal to attract deposits only for the healthy banks but
not the weak ones. Those results suggest that depositors in East Asia reward healthy banks for
greater disclosure but they do not discipline weaker banks by demanding greater disclosure.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the disclosure practice in East
Asia. Section 4.3 provides the literature review on the theory and empirical evidence that relates
information disclosure to depositor behavior. Section 4.4 describes the methodology used in the
analyses. Section 4.5 explains the results while Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Disclosure in East Asia
Information disclosure and transparency varied across the countries in the East Asian region91.
91 Transparency refers to the process by which information about existing conditions, decisions, and actions is made
accessible, visible, and understandable (IMF report, 1998).
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Within the crisis led countries, information disclosure prior to the crisis was less in Indonesia,
Philippines and Thailand (where the regulatory system was mostly merit-based) compared to
Korea and Malaysia (where the regulatory system was disclosure-based) (Ghosh, 2006 and
Huang, 2006)92. Under the merit-based system, the regulators takes the role of protecting the
investors by reviewing the merits of the issuers' investments, whereas under the disclosure based
system, the issuers and the intermediaries that offers the securities need to provide investors with
adequate, precise and timely disclosure of relevant information relating to the rms performance
and prospects in order for investors to make decision.
As far as the transparency of nancial systems is concerned, Goldman Sachs gave a
"satisfactory" rating to Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, a "fair" rating to Korea and a "poor"
rating to Thailand (Gochoco-Bautista et al., 2000). This variation can be partly attributed to the
differences in the accounting and auditing standards and practices93. Apart from this, nancial
statements of banks in East Asia also lacked compliance with the international accounting
standards such as International Accounting Standard (IAS) 30 (Rahman, 1999)94.
Prior to the crisis, among the weaknesses that were present in the accounting and disclosure
practices in East Asia were:
 Insufcient disclosure of related-party transactions and off-balance sheet nancing that
concealed high corporate leverage.
 Insufcient reporting of contingent liabilities of the parent of a conglomerate or of nancial
institutions for loan guarantee (mainly foreign-currency loans).
 Insufcient reporting of the large foreign-currency exposure by banks and corporations that
happened as a result of high foreign-currency short-term debt.
 Insufcient information disclosure on sectorial loan segmentation, although all countries set a
large exposure limit on them.
 Consolidated statements were usually not provided.
 Weak information disclosure on derivative nancial instruments.
 Weak disclosure on loan classication, provisioning for non-performing loans and interest
92 Thailand was progressing towards a disclosure-based system.
93 This can be attributed to the differences in their legal framework origins. The legal framework of Malaysia and
Thailand originated from the United Kigdom while the legal framework of Indonesia and Philippines originated from
the French. Korea, on the other hand, has German legal origin.
94 IAS 30 prescribes appropriate presentation and disclosure standards for banks and similar nancial institutions that
supplement other requirements standards.
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accrual. Even though the accounting policy governing loan loss provisions was reported
by the banks, information on the aggregate amount of problem loans and advances was not
disclosed. Time periods for overdue criteria of interest suspension and loan classication
ranged between six to twelve months.
 In Korea, there was a difculty in evaluating the solvency of the largest borrowers due to the
existence of cross-guarantees.
Source: IMF (1998), Lindgren et al. (1999) and OECD (2003)95.
Limited information availability hid details about banks over lending, insufcient credit
control and prudential internal regulation of the East Asian banks (MacDonald, 1998). In order
to overcome these shortcomings, measures were taken by the East Asian countries to improve
transparency and nancial disclosure. Among the steps taken by them were adopting IAS,
introducing consolidated reporting requirements for corporate groups and requiring disclosure on
non-nancial information (OECD, 2003)96. Disclosure quality was enhanced by new rules on loan
classication, provisioning and interest accruals and by greater participation of on-site examiners
and international auditors (Lindgren et al., 1999). In addition to this, the Central Bank of Malaysia
mandated more frequent reporting of non-performing loans, provisions, and capital positions for
all nancial institutions and decreased the time lag in releasing data on key indicators of nancial
soundness to public from six to four months. Similarly, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand also
mandated greater and more frequent disclosure.
The World Bank Database on Bank Regulation and Supervision shows that measures have been
taken by regulators in these countries to enhance the disclosure on standards of capital adequacy,
loan classication and provisioning rules. However, regulations on disclosure still vary across
these countries. The bank Disclosure Index shown in Figure 4.1 is based on the measurement
framework originally proposed by Erlend Nier from the Bank of England97. This index shows that
95 The White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia has been prepared by the Asian Roundtable on Corporate
Governance within the framework of the Asia Programme of the OECD Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members.
The White Paper is a collective effort by Asian policy makers, regulators,business leaders and regional and
international experts in identifying the weaknesses that existed before and during the crisis, and formulating common
reform policy in order to improve corporate governance in Asia.
96 A high number of conglomerates, which are mainly family controlled, exists in Asia. They are able to conceal poor
nancial performance of the holding company by moving the incurred losses to their subsidiaries.
97 The index is created for individual banks based on fteen dimensions of risk-related accounting information disclosed
119
Figure 4.1: Disclosure Practices of Commercial Banks in the East Asian Countries
banks in Korea and Malaysia had better disclosure practice before the crisis. Since then, banks in
Indonesia and Thailand have gradually increased their disclosure. Bank disclosure in Malaysia
increased gradually during the crisis before stagnating since 1999, while disclosure by banks in
Korea and Philippines diminished post-crisis before increasing gradually since 2001.
4.3 Literature Review
4.3.1 Review of the Theory
Information asymmetry can lead to an adverse selection problem, which changes the optimal
price and quantity in the market, and as a result, reduces liquidity (Verrecchia, 2001). In
addition to this, information asymmetry also gives rise to the moral hazard problem as it conceals
individuals' actions, and thereby makes it impossible to be monitored (Hölmstrom, 1979). This
insulates managers, who have more information about rms' nancial standing, from risks and
gives them a greater incentive to act in their best interest at the expense of their shareholders. This
can encourage managers to engage in greater risk taking activities. Hölmstrom (1979) asserts that
moral hazard problems can be reduced by requiring additional disclosure of information as it
by banks in their nancial statements. The country level index is created by averaging the index values of each bank
in a country (only banks that are covered in this study).
120
permits more precise evaluation about rms' performance to be made. Disclosure is related to
signaling theory in the economic literature. This theory asserts that informational asymmetry can
be reduced through the signal sent via the disclosure of risk related information by the informed
party (i.e., management) to the uninformed (i.e., investors) (Morris, 1987). Information disclosure
also helps nancial statement users in making better investment decisions and mitigates resource
misallocation in the economy (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
The role of information disclosure in banking is dealt with in the existing literature. Chari and
Jagannathan's (1988) model shows that availability of information can alter depositors' behavior
as it facilitates their investment decision making. The role of interim private information about
banks' assets payoffs in inuencing depositors' behavior has also been looked into in studies
by Bryant (1980), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Alonso (1996), Kaplan (2006) and Chen
and Hasan (2006). Existing theory suggests that disclosure is benecial as it allows depositors
to punish bad banks for higher risk-taking and reward good banks for greater prudence (Berger,
1991 and Flannery, 1994). Cordella and Yeyati (1998) asserts that when there are no bankruptcy
costs and corporate governance problems between bank shareholders and manager, uninsured
depositors are able to discipline banks when banks' risk choices are observable. This happens
because depositors are able punish banks that have engaged in high risk taking by demanding
higher compensation. Cordella and Yeyati (1998) and Boot and Schmeits (2000) assert that
disclosure can reduce moral hazard because by choosing to disclose more information banks
chose to lower their default risk in equilibrium.
However, information disclosure about weak fundamentals can cause coordination failure
among depositors, and trigger panic based runs (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). Information
disclosure by banks can cause investors to misinterpret particular information revealed by a single
bank to reect the weaknesses of the entire banking system. Misinterpretation can be costly as it
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can trigger depositors' panic as shown by Calomiris and Mason (1997) in the case of commercial
bank failure in Chicago during the early 1930s. A contagious bank run is inefcient as it can even
cause strong banks to fail, which reduces depositors' welfare and creates negative externalities.
A review of literature by Healy and Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) shows that full
disclosure is not the optimal disclosure strategy as far as banks are concerned. Markets may not
generate a socially desirable level of disclosure due to various reasons. Firstly, it could be due
to the cost involved in producing and disseminating information (Verrecchia, 1983 and Gorton,
1985). Secondly, information disclosure can be hampered by the negative externalities that it
creates. This may happen when stakeholders have a tendency to free ride (due to the public good
nature of accounting information) and when rms' values are correlated98. This causes banks to
lose their competitiveness. Thirdly, disclosure also can be hampered by entrepreneurs' desire to
extract private benets (Östberg, 2006)99. Lastly, forcing banks to disclose information can be
bad when the return is low as it may cause depositors to make early withdrawals (Kaplan, 2006).
All the above reasons provide incentives for banks not to disclose a socially desirable amount of
information to the public.
4.3.2 Review of Empirical Evidence
Jordan et al. (1999) studies the effect of the U.S. Congress enforcement that requires banks to
drastically increase the amount of information disclosure to the supervisory body in 1989, amidst
the savings and loan crisis. The impacts of this announcement on bank deposits are analyzed
using the quarterly data of 35 problem banks. Using mean comparison tests, their ndings show
that the drop in the uninsured deposits is higher compared to the insured ones. However, the total
deposits' drop is not substantial and many of the troubled banks survived the crisis.
The benet of greater information disclosure in East Asia has been highlighted by Mitton
98 The latter is illustrated by Admati and Peiderer (2000). They show that overow of information from one rm to
another prevents the disclosure of socially optimum level of information.
99 If disclosing greater amount of information reduces rms' opportunity in reaping private benet, rms may not be
keen to undertake certain projects.
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(2002). His ndings conrm that higher disclosure quality and greater transparency are linked
with greater performance during crisis time (1997 to 1998). Caprio (1998) studies the role of
information disclosure in twelve Asian and Latin American nancial systems in 1997. This is
done by developing a transparency score using information about the countries' requirement in
having the banks rated, the number of top ten banks with international ratings and a corruption
index100. His ndings show that countries that were badly affected by the crisis had lower
transparency while countries like Singapore and Hong Kong, which were less affected by the
crisis, had higher transparency101.
Cross-country analysis by Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2006) on banking sector regulation and
supervisory framework shows that greater information disclosure improves banks' performance
and banking sector stability. Similarly, Tadesse's (2006) study of 49 countries in the 1990s
documents the importance of more detailed and accurate regulated information disclosure in
ensuring the soundness of the banking system. His ndings show that the probability of banking
crisis is lower in countries that have higher disclosure standards. More specically, the ndings
show that a one standard deviation increase in regulated bank disclosure reduces the probability
of a banking crisis by about 3.5 percent per annum.
Nier and Baumann (2006) study the relationship between the amount of banks' ex-post
disclosure of risk-related information and managers' ex-ante risk-taking in 729 banks from 32
different countries during the period from 1993 to 2000. They use random effect (GLS) panel
data analysis and incorporate two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation in order to account for
potential endogeneity between the capital ratio and the amount of information disclosure. After
controlling for the banks' protability, NPL, size and the safety net in the banking sector, their
ndings conrm that high disclosure regime decreases banks' tendency to take excessive risks.
100 Corruption index is included because higher corruption is likely to be linked to lower accuracy of information
disclosure.
101 However, this evidence does not show that insufcient transparency caused the crisis to happen.
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Similarly, Wu and Bowe (2010) uses random effect panel data analysis in analyzing the risk-taking
behavior of 120 Chinese banks over the period from 1998 to 2008102. Their nding shows that
banks that disclose more risk-related information to the public maintain larger capital ratios.
A study by Baumann and Nier (2004) analyses the effect of the amount of risk-related
information that banks disclose on investors' investment decisions using cross-sectional regression
analysis. By ignoring the time-series dimension of the data, they study the relationship between
average disclosure and average stock price volatility of 600 banks across 31 countries over
the period from 1993 to 2000. Even though their ndings conrm that greater disclosure of
risk-related information is benecial for banks as it reduces stock price volatility, this nding is
questionable as it does not account for the fact that management decisions to disclose information
change over time103. Looking at the time series dimension will require dynamic analysis of stock
volatility.
Cordella and Yeyati (1998) assert that information disclosure inuences bank managers'
behavior and also depositors' behavior. Hölmstrom (1979) shows that greater disclosure enables
depositors to make more precise evaluation of a bank's performance. Based on this theoretical
framework, the present study aims to address some of the limitations that are present in the above
empirical studies. Firstly, these studies have linked disclosure to banking system performance
and stability, managers' risk-taking behavior and stock market investors' investment decisions
However, none of the studies has linked information disclosure to depositors' behavior. Secondly,
existing empirical evidence, which links banks' information disclosure to depositors' behavior
relies almost exclusively upon the content of the information disclosure (refer to Section 3.3.2).
None of these studies have looked at the content and also the quantity of risk-related information
102 Endogeneity of disclosure variable is addressed using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) instrumental variables
estimation procedure.
103 They assert that lower volatility of equity return is benecial for banks as it is associated with lower cost of capital
and greater effectiveness of stock based compensation.
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that banks disclose. The present study aims to overcome these limitations by analyzing the
effect of the amount of risk-related information that banks disclose in their nancial statements
on deposits growth. Thirdly, since disclosure inuence depositors' and managers' behavior, the
present study aims to control for the simultaneity that exists in the depositor discipline model by
using dynamic panel data analysis.
In nding out if banks are able to attract higher deposits over time by disclosing more
risk-related information, Disclosure Index will be used as an additional variable in the depositor
discipline model. In comparison to the CAMEL-type indicators which measure the level of risk of
the banks, Disclosure Index measures the amount of risk related information that banks disclose
relating to their interest-rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, and capital. This index
is constructed using the information available in banks' annual reports on fteen core disclosure
items. More specically, this index takes account of information on breakdown of loans by
maturity and type, problem loans by total amount and type, breakdown of investments by type and
maturity, securities by type, breakdown of deposits by maturity and type, long-term borrowing
by type, disclosures of reserves, capital ratio, off-balance-sheet items, breakdown of non-interest
income and disclosure of loan loss provisions.
4.4 Methodology
This study aims to analyze the existence of depositor discipline in the East Asian banking
system. The focus of this study is to nd if banks are able to attract higher deposits over
time by disclosing more risk-related information in their nancial statements. Accordingly,
the null hypothesis of this study is that depositors' withdrawals do not respond to the amount
of risk-related information that banks disclose in their nancial statements. If the amount of
risk-related disclosure does not matter to depositors, deposits growth should be uncorrelated with
this variable.
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4.4.1 Panel Data and Dynamic Panel Data Analysis
When Disclosure Index is included as a variable of interest, Equation 3.1 is written as the
following :
DEPGRi;j;t = i + t + j + DEPGRi;j;t 1 + Disclosure Indexi;j;t 1 +
BANK SPECIFICi;j;t 1 + COUNTRY SPECIFICj;t + "i;j;t (4.1)
To overcome the possibility of simultaneity and reverse causality in the model, dynamic GMM
estimation methods developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is used. This method enables us to
determine whether the movement of the disclosure index variable has an exogenous impact on
the quantity of deposits, independent of the endogenous impact of deteriorating fundamentals
on the amount of risk-related disclosure and quantity of deposits. Estimations using dynamic
panel data method remove the potential parameter inconsistency due to simultaneity or reverse
causality between these variables and deposits growth. Analysis of this study will be carried out
using Difference-GMM. Estimation using this method focuses on the variation over time in the
dependent and independent variables. This facilitates answering the question as to whether banks
are able to attract higher deposits overtime by disclosing additional risk-related information (refer
to Appendix D for detail explanations on Difference-GMM and one-step and two-step GMM).
4.4.2 Data Description
The analysis of this study is carried out using the sample of commercial banks in ve East
Asian countries namely Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Detail description
of the data is given in Section 3.4.3.
4.4.3 Variables
4.4.3.1 Bank Specic Variables
Disclosure Index Disclosure Index is one of the commonly used disclosure proxies in the
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existing literature104. Disclosure Index consists of the list of selected accounting information that
can be disclosed in the company report (Marston and Shrives, 1991). More specically, Hassan
and Marston (2010) dene the disclosure index as "a research instrument to measure the extent of
information reported in a particular disclosure vehicle(s) by a particular entity(s) according to a
list of selected items of information".
For the present study, Disclosure Index will be measured based on the measurement framework
proposed by Erlend Nier from the Bank of England. The index for each bank is derived using
the amount of information available in the bank's annual reports on fteen core disclosure items
as reported in the Fitch IBCA BankScope database. This index is constructed using the check
box approach similar to the CIFAR (Center for International Financial Analysis Research) index,
but it is constructed at bank level105. The index combines information from ve categories of
disclosures, including: (1) LOANS: breakdown of loans by maturity and type, and problem loans
by total amount and type; (2) OTHER EARNING ASSETS: breakdown of investments by type
and maturity, and securities by type; (3) DEPOSITS: breakdown of deposits by maturity and type,
and long-term borrowing by type; (4) MEMO LINES: disclosures of reserves, capital ratio and
off-balance-sheet items; (5) INCOMES: breakdown of non-interest income and disclosure of loan
loss provisions. Each category consists of a sub-index. These sub-indices contain a total of fteen
disclosure items relating to interest-rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, and capital106
(see Appendix E). These items are very compatible with the frameworks proposed by IMF's
Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) and Basel Committee (Huang, 2006). Studies by Baumann
and Nier (2004), Nier and Baumann (2006), Huang (2006) and Wu and Bowe (2010) have used
104 Marston and Shrives (1991) provides a survey of the use of disclosure indices. Hassan and Marston (2010) provide
the comprehensive survey of the use of various disclosure proxies.
105 CIFAR index consists of ninety items that are included in the companies' annual reports. Seventy percent of the
companies are involved in the non-nancial sector.
106 Even though the denition of the items included in the index may vary from one country to another, it is less of a
concern as far as this study is concerned because this study is mainly interested in the availability of information
instead of the content of information.
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this index.
4.4.3.2 Country Specic Variables
4.4.3.3 External Instrument
Disclosure Intensity The World Bank provides the database on the regulation of disclosure
in the banking sector for many countries based on the response of the supervisory bodies as
described in Barth et al. (2001). This data has been extensively used in studies by Barth et al.
(2004), Cull et al.(2005), Cleassens and Laeven (2004), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and
Tadasse (2006). Based on Bushman et al. (2004)'s framework in measuring corporate reporting
quality, Tadasse (2006) describes Disclosure Intensity as a measure of the degree and magnitude
of nancial information disclosure that is required by the banking regulators. The variable is
constructed by adding the survey response on information relating to whether banks are required
to disclose information about risk management practices, accurately exhibit non-performing loans,
provide detailed information on bank activity by reporting consolidated nancial statements, and
exhibit detailed information by reporting off-balance sheet transactions. In comparison to the
items in Disclosure Intensity, items in Disclosure Index relate detailed information that banks
provide in their published accounts. This information relates to the risk categories emphasized by
Basel Committee as well as FSI indicators proposed by the IMF. Since the amount of information
that banks disclose is conditional on the regulated disclosure in the banking sectors in each
country, Disclosure Intensity is used as an additional instrument in this study.
Detail descriptions of other bank specic and country specic data are given in Section 3.4.4.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Summary Statistics
Disclosure Index ranges from a minimum of 4 to a high of 23 in the sample of banks in this
study as shown in Table 4.1. On average, banks disclose risk-related information in 11 risk
categories. Disclosure Intensity ranges from 2 to 4 with an average score of 3.24. Disclosure
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Index exhibits a negative correlation with the level of deposits and a positive correlation with the
rst difference of deposits (see Table 3.3 and 3.4). This may imply that a higher deposits growth
arises as a consequence of banks' decision to disclose more risk-related information. However,
in terms of the absolute value of deposits, a large amount of deposits may remain in those banks
where disclosure is lower than others.
As far as the comparisons between periods are concerned, Table 4.2 shows that an average
bank disclosed less risk related information before the crisis than during and after the crisis. On
average, disclosure is higher during the post-crisis period compared with the whole sample period.
Compared to the whole sample period, Disclosure Intensity is lower before crisis and higher
post-crisis. This shows that regulators in East Asia required banks to disclose more information
after the crisis.
4.5.2 Panel Data Analysis
This section analyses depositors' reaction to the amount of risk-related information that banks
disclose and directly test the hypothesis of whether banks should disclose more risk-related
information. All variables are entered in levels. Results of the regression analyses using pooled
OLS, Random Effect (RE), Between Effect (BE) and Fixed Effect (FE) are reported in Table 4.3.
By ignoring the panel structure of the data set and counter factually assuming that all observations
are on the same bank, pooled OLS estimate results in Column 1 suggest that the amount of
information that banks disclose is associated with lower deposits growth but this effect is not
signicant. RE estimation takes into account the panel structure of the data set and analyses the
within and between variation of the variables. RE estimation (Column 2) shows that Disclosure
Index does not inuence depositor behavior107. BE estimation excludes the time effects and only
highlights the variation of deposits across banks. BE estimation results in Column 3 show that
107 Since the random effects estimator is essentially a weighted average of the xed and between estimators, the
coefcient on beta is very small compared to the rest.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics By Time Period
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Disclosure Index has a positive sign. However, cross-sectional variation in Disclosure Index is not
important in explaining cross-sectional variation in deposits growth.
The FE estimator emphasizes the variation over time variation in the dependent and independent
variables, using deviations from each bank's mean. FE estimation results in Column 4 show that
variation in the amount of information that banks disclose is not a signicant predictor of deposits
growth. However, FE estimation using post crisis data only shows that the variation in the amount
of information that banks disclose is a signicant predictor of deposits growth. This nding is in
line with the wake-up-call hypothesis. FE estimation for weak banks shows that greater disclosure
is associated with lower deposits growth while FE estimation for strong banks shows that greater
disclosure is associated with higher deposits growth. As far as the other bank specic variables
are concerned, all estimations show that depositors are inuenced by the equity ratio and also the
size of the banks. Greater concentration in the banking industry also inuences deposits growth.
4.5.3 Dynamic Panel Data Analysis
Panel data estimations can be biased in the presence of lag dependency of the dependent
variable and endogeneity. This section will address the shortcomings of the panel data analysis
by using dynamic panel data analysis. All variables are entered in difference (not level) in the
Difference-GMM estimations. The dynamic relationship between disclosure and deposits growth
is estimated using one-step robust, two-step and also two-step robust Difference-GMM estimator.
This study aims to nd out if an increase in Disclosure Index is linked to higher deposits growth.
Initially, a model specication that treats Disclosure Index as an exogenous variable and directly
enters it in the dynamic panel models is examined. Then, a model specication which treats
Disclosure Index as an endogenous variable is looked into. This will be done with and without
controlling for the interest rate effect. Further to this, the endogenous relationship between
Disclosure Index and deposits growth will be analyzed for the post-crisis period only. Similar
analysis is carried out by segregating banks in the sample into healthy (i.e. Non-restructured) and
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Table 4.3: Panel Data Analysis with Disclosure Index
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weak (i.e. Restructured) ones.
Since there are two endogenous variables in this model, the number of instruments used in
the analysis needs to be limited to ensure that the problem of weak instruments does not arise.
Estimations have been carried out by increasing or decreasing the number of instruments. A
three period lag in level and difference (i.e. lag (3 3)) is chosen as any other limits worsen the
diagnostics.
4.5.3.1 Exogenous Disclosure Mechanism
In this section, Disclosure Index continuos to be treated as an exogenous variable and directly
entered in the dynamic panel models. This specication focuses on whether an increase in
disclosure is associated with a rise in deposits growth. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 4.4 show the
estimation results without controlling for the price effect. The ndings show that an increase in
disclosure, when treated as an exogenous change, affects deposits growth positively. But this
effect is not statistically different from zero. Estimations by controlling for the price effect are
shown in columns 4 to 6 of Table 4.4. The results show that the coefcient of Disclosure Index
is positive but not statistically signicant. The positive relationship between changes in the
disclosure and deposits growth is in line with the positive partial correlation shown in Table 3.4.
The diagnostic tests for the estimation without an interest rate variable show that there is no
second-order serial correlation but the Hansen test of over-identication has a p-value of 0.10.
This provides some support for the proposition that the dynamic process between the deposits
growth and disclosure is still not properly controlled for. The diagnostic test for the estimation
with an interest rate variable shows that there is second-order serial correlation under the one-step
robust estimation while the diagnostic test for the two-step robust estimation shows that the
Hansen test has a p-value of 0.081. This suggests that the instruments used are not valid.
By treating Disclosure Index as an exogenous variable, it is assumed that changes in the amount
of risk-related information disclosure and quantity of deposits are not jointly determined by the
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Table 4.4: Dynamic Panel Data with Exogenous Disclosure Mechanism
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nancial strength of a bank. However, forward looking bank managers may expect depositors to
react to changes in bank fundamentals. In line with this, their decision to disclose information
may change over time depending on the banks' nancial strength. In expectation of depositors'
reaction ex-post, managers of the stronger banks may disclose more information while those in
weaker banks may disclose less information. To address this issue, the impact of a change in
banks' nancial strength on deposits growth and disclosure needs to be controlled for. Doing so
enables the examination of the effect of a bank's decision to disclose information on depositor
behavior.
Endogenous Disclosure Mechanism In this section, Disclosure Index is treated as an
endogenous variable to control for the simultaneity or reverse causality between Disclosure
Index and deposits growth. By doing so, this study aims to nd if changes in the amount of
disclosure can exogenously inuence depositor behavior. Difference-GMM controls for the
dynamic interactions between disclosure and deposits growth by using internal instruments. These
instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous variables and not correlated with the error
term. This technique uses the lagged levels of the endogenous variables as valid instruments and
combines it with rst differences of the strictly exogenous variables to control for potential biases
induced by simultaneity or reverse causality between endogenous variables.
The estimations without the interest rate variable are presented in columns 1 to 3 of Table 4.5.
The results are consistent with the requirement of no second-order serial correlation. The Hansen
test of over-identication has a p-value of 0.058. This suggests that the models presented in these
columns are mis-specied. Columns 4 to 6 present the results of the estimations when the interest
rate is added as an additional endogenous regressor. The model specication passes the Hansen
test, suggesting that the model is correctly specied. The results are also consistent with the
requirement of no second-order serial correlation.
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Table 4.5: Dynamic Panel Data with Endogenous Disclosure Mechanism
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Estimations with the interest rate variable in columns 4 to 6 show that the coefcient of
Disclosure Index is positive and statistically signicant. This implies that once the dynamic
relationship between the amount of information disclosure and the deposits growth is controlled
for; for a given price, banks are able to attract higher deposits by disclosing more risk-related
information. This ndings also implies that depositors in East Asia are more responsive to the
amount of risk-related information that banks disclose than the price that they offer. This suggest
that greater disclosure is a better signal in attracting more deposits. The coefcient of Disclosure
Index is 9.68. This implies that a one-unit increase in Disclosure Index raises deposits growth by
9.68 percent. This nding shows that banks are able to attract more deposits by revealing more
detailed information about their risk proles in the nancial statements. This provides a good
support for the need of greater transparency in the banking sector.
In order to check for the robustness of the ndings, lag value of Disclosure Intensity is
added as an external instrument108. Estimations are shown in column 7 to 9 of Table 4.5. The
diagnostic tests show that there is no second order serial correlation, and the Hansen test shows
this instrument is valid. The results show that greater disclosure signicantly increases deposits
growth. In addition to this, the ndings also show that depositors prefer banks that are more
solvent and bigger. Results in column 7 shows that once the endogenous effect of disclosure and
price is taken into account, protability and provisioning are linked to higher deposits growth
while liquidity and costs to income ratio are linked to lower deposits growth.
4.5.3.2 Post-Crisis
Estimations are performed using post crisis data (i.e. from 1999 to 2005) in order to nd out if
depositors response to banks' risk prole and the amount of information disclosure changed after
the crisis109. Greater sensitivity by depositors to bank-specic information during the post-crisis
108 GMM technique allows the use of external instruments (Roodman, 2006).
109 `All period' consists of the time period from 1995 to 2005.
138
period will be in line with the wake-up-call hypothesis. All estimations pass the diagnostic tests.
Estimation of depositor discipline during the post crisis period is reported in columns 1 to 3 of
Table 4.6. The results show that Disclosure Index is associated with higher deposits growth. More
specically, two-step robust estimation shows that a one-unit increase in Disclosure Index raises
deposits growth by 11.60 percent. Estimation for the whole sample period shows that a one-unit
increase in Disclosure Index raises deposits growth by 9.56 percent. The ndings suggest that
depositors were more responsive to the amount of risk-related information that banks disclose
after the crisis. This ndings provide support to the wake-up-call hypothesis.
4.5.3.3 Restructured vs Non-restructured Banks
In this section, the study aims to nd out whether depositors react differently to the risk-related
information disclosed by healthier banks compared to weaker ones. Existing studies by Bongini et
al. (2001), Bongini et al.(2002), Rojas-Suarez (2001), Arena (2008) and the study in Chapter 2 of
this thesis show that a bank restructuring exercise is a good proxy for the overall quality of banks
in East Asia. In line with this, bank restructuring is used as the criterion to subdivide the sample
of banks in the data set into weak and healthy banks. Restructured banks are categorized as the
weak banks while Non-restructured banks are categorized as the healthy banks. Overall, 74 banks
in the sample are categorized as healthy while 36 are categorized as weak. Mean comparison tests
conrm that healthy banks have deposits growth and Disclosure Index values that are higher than
those of the weak banks. Healthier banks have an average deposits growth of 21.07 percent and
Disclosure Index value of 11.75 while the weaker ones have an average deposits growth of 13.72
percent and Disclosure Index value of 11.10.
The analysis performed in this section aims to nd out whether depositors in weak banks are
more sensitive and as a result require more information disclosure compared to depositors in
healthy banks. If depositor discipline is present, healthier banks in East Asia should be able to
raise more deposits by disclosing additional risk-related information compared to an average
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Table 4.6: Dynamic Panel Data with Endogenous Disclosure Mechanism for Post-Crisis Period,
Restructured and Non-restructured Banks
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bank. The results for the diagnostic tests show that there is no second order serial correlation in
either case. However, estimation for the weak banks can be biased as the number of instruments
exceeds the number of panels, and the p-value of the Hansen J-statistic is close to 1. This suggests
that the depositor discipline model for the weak banks is mis-specied.
The results in columns 7 to 9 of Table 4.6 suggest that healthier banks are able to attract
relatively higher deposits by disclosing more information. More specically, the nding shows
that healthier banks are able to increase deposits growth by 9.79 percent in the next period by
disclosing an additional unit of information. This rate is marginally more than what an average
bank in the whole sample can achieve (9.56 percent). Weaker banks are not able to attract more
deposits by disclosing more information. This result implies that the effectiveness of disclosure
depends on the risk prole of the banks. This nding shows that depositors in East Asia reward
good banks for disclosing more information. This implies that healthy banks can use disclosure
signals to attract more deposits. However, the nding of this study does not show depositors in
East Asia discipline weak banks by demanding greater disclosure. This nding also does not
suggest that greater disclosure is a good signal for weak banks.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This study extends the existing literature on disclosure in banking (Nier and Baumann, 2006;
Wu and Bowe, 2010; Baumann and Nier, 2004; Tadesse, 2006 and Rosengren, 1999) by nding
out if greater risk-related disclosure enables banks to attract more deposits. Overall, the ndings of
this study conrm that depositors in East Asia are sensitive to the content and also the quantity of
risk-related information that banks disclose. This nding is in line depositor discipline hypothesis.
Panel data analysis shows that greater risk-related information disclosure helps banks to
attract more deposits only during the post-crisis period. Subsequently, the relationship between
disclosure and depositor behavior is modelled as a jointly determined process. When banks'
nancial standing deteriorates, a depositor may be inclined to withdraw their funds. Banks in
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turn may adjust the amount of risk-related information that they disclose in anticipation of this.
Simultaneous movements in disclosure and deposits growth needs to be taken into consideration
in analyzing the effect of disclosure on depositor behavior. Hence, dynamic panel data analysis
is performed to account for the lagged dependency of deposits growth and endogeneity of the
interest rate and disclosure variables.
The ndings of this study conrm the endogenous relationship between disclosure and deposits
growth. Once the endogeneity is controlled for, this study nds that depositors in East Asia react
to the changes in banks' risk prole and also changes in the amount of risk-related information
disclosure. The results also show that price signals are not effective in attracting more deposits.
This implies that depositors' behavior is driven by the amount of risk-related information that they
know about the banks rather than the price that is offered by the banks. Overall, these ndings
provide support to the proposition of the third pillar of the Basel II which aims to encourage
market discipline by requiring banks to disclose more risk-related information.
In line with the wake-up-call hypothesis, depositors' responsiveness to the amount of
disclosure increases after the crisis period. When differentiation is made between restructured
and non-restructured banks, the study nds that healthy banks are able to attract higher funds
over time by disclosing greater information, but weaker ones are not able to do so. This suggests
that the amount of risk-related information that banks disclose is related to their quality. These
ndings show that depositors in East Asia reward good banks for disclosing more information
but they do not discipline weak banks by demanding greater disclosure. This ndings imply that
greater disclosure is an effective signal for healthy banks but not for weak ones.
In conclusion, this chapter conrms the presence of depositor discipline in the East Asian
banking system. It also conrms that disclosure is good for banks as it allows them to attract
more funds. Since greater disclosure is not an effective signal for the weak banks, they might not
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be inclined to disclose more risk-related information. This brings forward the need to regulate
information disclosure in the banking system. Admati and Peiderer (2000) asserts that stringent
disclosure requirements can also contribute towards greater investor condence which, in turn,
increases liquidity and market efciency and decreases rms' cost of capital. However, greater
regulated disclosure may generate fragility in the banking sector when bank managers are not able
control banks' risk exposure (Cordella and Yeyati, 1998), when it hampers the bank manager's
ability to use their insights in disclosing information (Östberg, 2006)110, when rms operate under
different constraints (Admati and Peiderer, 2000) and when the return is low (Kaplan, 2006).
This presents a dilemma for regulators since they have to decide to either provide incentives for
bank managers to voluntarily disclose more information or regulate information disclosure in the
banking sector.
110 Firms will be better off by choosing their optimal disclosure policy endogenously in order to maximize rm value
(Ostberg, 2006).
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
The East Asian nancial crisis warrants special attention due to the devastating effect it had
on the economy. Rapid growth in the banking sector prior to the crisis imposed great pressure
on the underdeveloped nancial market in countries like Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines
and Thailand. The central banks and the regulatory bodies in the affected countries did not have
adequate expertise to deal with this. As a result, prudent regulation and effective supervision were
not put in place. This caused excessive risk-taking and increased moral hazard in the banks. The
ndings of this thesis contribute towards understanding of the crisis. Firstly, it highlights the
importance of liquidity management for the well functioning of the banking system. Secondly,
empirical analyses on depositor discipline in East Asia conrm that higher equity ratio and bigger
size enable banks to attract more deposits. However, depositors in East Asia do not discipline
banks by demanding a higher price. This study nds that banks are able to attract higher deposits
by disclosing more risk-related information in their nancial statements. This nding supports the
goals of the third pillar of the New Basel Capital Accord that aims to encourage market discipline
through greater disclosure.
5.0.1 Policy Recommendations
The recent episode of Global Financial crisis that began in mid-2007 highlights the importance
of liquidity in the banking system. This crisis shows that liquidity reserves were necessary as a
guarantee for banks and other nancial institutions to survive the possible effects (Korean Institute
of Finance, 2010). This study shows that liquidity risk played a very important role in the East
Asian crisis. Greater reliance on external funding before the crisis made banks in East Asia more
vulnerable to failures. Since the crisis, changes have been made to the liquidity requirement
and management of the individual nancial institutions in East Asia. Among the measures
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that have been introduced in managing liquidity risk are setting liquidity policies for managing
liquidity risk, performing stress tests and scenario analysis, developing contingency funding plans
in dealing with stress scenarios, setting limits to the amount of liquidity risks that banks can
take, requiring all banks to report their liquidity positions to regulators and also requiring banks
to disclose information about their liquidity risk management to public111. Even though these
countries have set their liquidity risk measurement and management based on the Sound Practices
for Managing Liquidity in Banking Organizations of Basel Committee of Banking Supervision
(2000), different minimum requirements are set by national supervisors in managing liquidity risk
during normal and crisis times112113.
In terms of policy recommendation, chapter 2 of this thesis brings forward the case for stronger
management and regulation of banks' liquidity risk in East Asia114. Regulators need to ensure that
rules and regulations that govern liquidity risk management are reviewed regularly to keep up
with the dynamic nature of banking operations. The recent global nancial crisis highlights the
changing nature of risks that banks are exposed to. Credit derivatives, that facilitate the transfer of
the credit risk of the underlying loan out of the banking system, were used rampantly at the onset
of the crisis. Sale of bank's assets (loan) reduces bank's vulnerability to liquidity shocks. Even
though the stability implication of credit derivatives is highlighted in BIS (2004) report, Wagner
(2007) postulates that it can expose banks to new risks. Using data on both loan purchases and
sales of all domestic commercial banks in the United States from June 1987 to 1993, Cebenoyan
111 The Fiscal Policy Research Institute 2010 Report provides information about the liquidity risk management
frameworks and regulations in the ve East Asian countries post-crisis (Korean Institute of Finance, 2010).
112 In 2008, the Basel Committee has conducted a fundamental review of its 2000 Sound Practices for Managing
Liquidity in Banking Organisations. Since then, these countries have adopted the Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk
Management and Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
113 Every national supervisor has set a minimum reserve requirement as a cushion to absorb shocks, adopted a qualitative
or qualitative approach or a combination of both in managing liquidity risk, set the requirements on liquidity asset
obligations and maturity mismatch analysis, set the asset liability management requirement for banks in the form of
both balance sheet and daily cash management and also set different asset liability management requirements during
irregular times (Korean Institute of Finance, 2010).
114 Large liquidity gap can be managed through asset management and liability management (Diamond, 1997;
Duttweiler, 2009).
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and Strahan (2004) nd that banks that have access to loan sale markets hold a larger share of their
portfolio in risky assets than banks inactive in loan sales. This shows that nancial innovation and
growth of complex nancial instruments expose banks to different forms of risk. Regulators need
to ensure that banks are able to manage the potential contingent liquidity risks.
Chapter 3 of this thesis suggests that market discipline can be a reliable tool to discipline
banks. In terms of policy recommendation, these results suggest that measures should be taken by
banking regulators to build up a more effective market discipline as a component of the regulatory
framework. Financial institutions should be required to release accurate and timely information
to the public in order for them to assess the bank's ability to absorb aggregate shocks and remain
solvent.
Chapter 4 of this thesis validates the benets of disclosure, which is in line with the goals
of the third pillar of the New Basel Capital Accord that aims to encourage market discipline.
By allowing market participants to assess banks' risk exposure, disclosure requirements help in
achieving the broader regulatory objective of promoting banking system stability. In terms of
policy recommendation, regulators can either encourage bank managers to voluntarily disclose
more information or regulate information disclosure in the banking sector. The latter can be
done by requiring banks to adhere to particular accounting practices or rules and also mandates
the disclosure of certain information. The former, on the other hand, requires bank managers to
disclose more information by providing them with an incentive to do so115.
5.0.2 Limitations of the Study
There are some limitations of the GMM methodology used in the analyses. Firstly, the
problem of weak instruments (i.e. instruments that are only weakly correlated with the included
endogenous variables) arises in GMM method (Stock et al, 2002). Secondly, the GMM method
allows for contemporaneous correlations between endogenous variables and the error term.
115 This leads to the corporate governance issue (Kalfaoglou and Sarris, 2006).
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However, the use of lagged values as instruments can sometimes be invalid if the errors are serially
correlated. In overcoming this problem, in Chapter 4 of this thesis, Disclosure Intensity is used as
an external instrument in addition to the lagged values.
Chapters 3 and 4 look into the effectiveness market discipline in the banking system. Even
though the overall benets of disclosure can be viewed from a broader perspective as it is aimed
at increasing the overall stability in the banking sector and also to protect individual investors, the
present study is mainly aimed at analyzing the benets of disclosure to banks.
A breakdown of customer deposits is not available for banks in Indonesia and Korea in some of
the years. Due to this limitation in data availability, Total Deposits is used to derive the Deposits
Growth variable in chapter 3 an 4. Due to the lack of adequate data on interest rates paid by
each bank on deposits, an implicit interest rate calculated as the ratio of Interest Expense to
Interest-Bearing Debt is used as the measure of interest rate in chapters 3 an 4. However, using a
market interest rate may be a better option as it reects the actual costs of funding.
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis conrms that depositors in East Asia do punish banks for weak
fundamentals. However, these studies do not analyze the effectiveness of depositor discipline by
examining the degree to which depositor discipline reduces bank managers' risk-taking behavior.
This limitation, however, is a common feature of research in this area. It is also important to
emphasize that the focus in this thesis is on the content and amount of information banks disclose
and not on the truthfulness of the disclosed information. In fact, it will assumed, as is often done
in the literature on disclosure, that all disclosed information is truthful.
5.0.3 Future Research
Going forward, future research can address some of the limitations of this study. This study
is mainly focused on the role of liquidity risk in the crisis led countries in East Asia before
and during the crisis. Future studies should focus on the management of liquidity risk after the
crisis. More specically, these studies need to focus on the ability of the East Asian banks in
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withstanding the liquidity shocks during the recent Global Financial crisis. Comparison also can
be made between the different regions in order to analyze the regional asymmetry regarding the
resilience of the banking sector to liquidity shocks. This can illustrate the heterogeneity among
the banking sectors of different regions.
In analyzing the depositor's responses to the amount of information that banks disclose, future
studies should segregate the information disclosed by banks into regulated and non-regulated or
voluntary disclosure. Analyzing the effect of greater regulated disclosure on banks' deposits'
growth will help us in answering the question as to whether greater regulation is good for banks
while analyzing the effect of voluntary disclosure on banks' deposits' growth will help us in
answering the question as to whether banks are better off by disclosing more information than is
required.
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Table A.1: Net Portfolio Liabilities to GDP (%)
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Figure A.1: Short-Term Debt as a Percentage of Total Reserve
Figure A.2: Exchange Rate Volatality
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Figure A.3: M2 as a Percentage of Total Reserve
Figure A.4: Domestic Credit Provided by the Banking Sector
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Table A.8: International Claims Held by Foreign Banks - Distribution by sector and maturity (In
millions of USD)Source : Bank for International Settlements
Figure A.5: Domestic Liability Dollarisation as a Percentage of GDP
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Table A.9: Data Summary for the Financial Institutions Covered in the Study (in thousand USD)
Table A.10: Non-Performing Loans as of 1996 (% of Total Lending) Source: BIS Annual Report
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Annual Report 1998
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Appendix B IV Probit Estimation
In estimating limited-dependent variable models with endogenous regressors, Newey (1987)
derived the following reduced form equation:
y1i = (xi+ vi) + x1i + ui
= xi+ vi + ui
= xi+ Vi
where Vi = vi + ui: In this case
 =

1
2

 +

I
0

 = D()
The estimator of  is dened by
max

(e cD )0b
 1(e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Thus the efcient estimator  is
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From Proposition 5 of Newey (1987),
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Based on the properties of the normal distribution,
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ui is written as
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ui = vi
P0
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P 1
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P
21+ei; where ei  N(0; 1   p2); p2 =
P0
21
P 1
22
P
21;and ei is
independent of vi:
Probit estimation is used in the second stage to estimate the parameters of
y1i = zi + vi+ ei:
Since vi is unobservable, sample residuals from the rst stage regressions is used.
Pr(y1i = 1 j zi; vi) = Pr(zi + vi+ ei > 0 j zi; vi) = f(1  p2)  12 (zi + vi)g
Hence, p = 1
(1 p2) 12
 and p = 1
(1 p2) 12
 is estimated instead of  and :
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Appendix C IV2SLS vs IVGMM2S
It is possible to estimate linear probability models by 2SLS and GMM2S.
In the case of overidentication (` > k), the set of k instruments are dened as :
bX = Z 0(Z 0Z) 1Z 0X = PzX
gives rise to two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator
b2SLS = ( bX 0X) 1 bX 0y = (X 0PZX) 1X 0PZy
In the 2SLS method with overidentication, the ` available instruments are reduced to the k
needed by dening the PZ matrix. The IV-GMM method, that reduction is not necessary as all
instruments are used in the estimator. A weighting matrix is used in choosing bGMM so that
the elements of g(bGMM) are as close to zero as possible. The IV-GMM estimator of an over
identied equation is given by:
bGMM = (X 0ZWZ 0X) 1X 0ZWZ 0y (C.1)
The variance-covariance matrix for bGMM is given by
V (
1p
n
bGMM) = 1n(Q0xzWQxz) 1(Q0xzWSWQxz)(Q0xzWQxz) 1 (C.2)
where S is a covariance matrix of the moment conditions g:
S = AV arfg()g = lim
N !1
N 1[Z 0
Z]
and Qxz  E(X 0iZi).
Even though the GMM estimator is consistent for any positive-denite weighting matrix W,
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its efciency is not guaranteed for an arbitrary W. This estimator is referred to as the possibly
inefcient estimator (Baum et al., 2007).
Hansen (1982) suggest using the estimator with an optimal weighting matrix W = S 1. By
substituting this consistent estimator into C.1and C.2, we obtain the efcient GMM (EGMM)
estimator
bEGMM = (X 0Z bS 1Z 0X) 1X 0Z bS 1Z 0y (C.3)
The variance-covariance matrix for bEGMM is given by
V (
1p
n
bEGMM) = 1n(Q0xzS 1Qxz) 1 (C.4)
where the estimate of Qxz is given by
1
n
nX
i=1
X 0iZi =
1
n
X
0
Z
In two-step EGMM, the estimation of S is obtained in the rst step while the estimator and its
asymptotic variance is calculated using C.3and C.4in the second step.
IV2SLS robust is an IGMM estimator while IVGMM2s robust is the two-step FEGMM.
158
Appendix D Difference GMM
The normal method of dealing with the heterogeneity (unobserved time-invariant bank-specic
effects) that can arise in either the xed or random effects' case is to take rst differences.
Equation 3.1becomes:
DEPGRi;j;t   DEPGRi;j;t 1 = 0(DEPGRi;j;t 1   DEPGRi;j;t 2) + (D.1)
0(BANK SPECIFICi;j;t 1   BANK SPECIFICi;j;t 2) +
0(COUNTRY SPECIFICj;t   COUNTRY SPECIFICj;t 1)
+("i;j;t   "i;j;t 1)
Even though Equation D.1 eliminates the individual effects, it is still problematic due to the
correlation between the lagged dependent variable (DEPGRi;j;t 1 DEPGRi;j;t 2) and the new
error term ("i;j;t   "i;j;t 1) that arises from its rst-order moving average process. Anderson
and Hsiao (1981) propose that this problem can be resolved by using appropriate instruments,
namely the lagged levels or lagged rst differences of the dependent variable. In other words,
they propose using (DEPGRi;j;t 2) or (DEPGRi;j;t 2 DEPGRi;j;t 3) which are uncorrelated with
the error term ("i;j;t   "i;j;t 1) but correlated with (DEPGRi;j;t 1 DEPGRi;j;t 2) as instruments
for (DEPGRi;j;t 1 DEPGRi;j;t 2): Arellano (1989) compares the variance of the estimators
produced by both instruments and nds that lagged difference produces a very large variance.
Similarly, Arellano and Bond (1991) also favours the use of lagged levels as instruments based on
the simulation results.
The Arellano and Bond (1991) model relaxes the condition that explanatory variables should be
strictly exogenous. This means that E [xit "is] = 0 for all t and s, implying that x is uncorrelated
with the error term in past, present, and future. The variable is predetermined if E [xit "is] 6= 0 for
159
s < t but E [xit "is] = 0 for all s  t. In this case, the error term at time t has some feedback
on the later realizations of xit. An endogenous variable, on the other hand, has E [xit "is] 6= 0
for s  t but E [xit "is] = 0 for all s > t. This means that endogenous variables allow for the
correlation between xit and "it at time t while predetermined variables do not. This study controls
for the potential endogeneity of the interest rate variable. This removes the potential parameter
inconsistency that may happen due to simultaneity or reverse causality that is present between
deposits growth and the interest rate variable.
Suitable instruments need to be used when applying the dynamic model to the data set. These
instruments must satisfy the condition that instrumental variables are highly correlated with the
endogenous variables and not correlated with the error term. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose
the use of the traditional rst-differenced GMM (denoted as Difference-GMM) estimator in
resolving the endogeneity problem, whereby lagged levels of the endogenous variables are used
as instruments. In this case, lagged values of interest rate variables, which are highly correlated
with the endogenous variables (DEPGR and interest rate variable) but not directly correlated with
the error term ("i;j;t   "i;j;t 1) can be used as instruments. Under the assumption that a) the error
term "it is not serially correlated, and b) the endogenous variables are assumed to be correlated
with the past and present realization of the error term but uncorrelated with the future realization
of the error term, the GMM estimator uses the following moment conditions:
E [DEPGRi;j;t s("i;j;t   "i;j;t 1)] = 0 for s  2; t = 3; :::; T (D.2)
E [Interest Ratei;j;t s("i;j;t   "i;j;t 1)] = 0 for s  2; t = 3; :::; T (D.3)
In Chapter 4, differencing Equation 4.1gives:
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DEPGRi;j;t   DEPGRi;j;t 1 = 0(DEPGRi;j;t 1   DEPGRi;j;t 2) + (D.4)
0(Disclosure Indexi;j;t 1   Disclosure Indexi;j;t 2) +
0(BANK SPECIFICi;j;t 1   BANK SPECIFICi;j;t 2) +
0(COUNTRY SPECIFICj;t   COUNTRY SPECIFICj;t 1)
+("i;j;t   "i;j;t 1)
An additional moment condition will be used as instruments as the following :
E

Lagged Disclosure Indexi;j;t s("i;j;t   "i;j;t 1)

= 0 for s  2; t = 3; :::; T (D.5)
Using dynamic GMM, the validity of the instruments needs to be checked by analyzing the
rst-order and second-order residual autocorrelation. The consistency of the Arellano and Bond
(1991) model requires rst-order, and no second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Hence,
the presence of rst-order autocorrelation in the difference residuals does not imply the estimates
are inconsistent, but the presence of second-order autocorrelation would imply that the estimates
are inconsistent. In order for the instruments to be valid, the null hypothesis that there is no
rst-order serial correlation should be rejected but the null hypothesis that there is no second-order
autocorrelation should not be rejected. All the dynamic panel data regressions outputs in this
study include tests to support the validity of the model specication.
The consistency of the GMM estimator also depends on validity of the instruments, which can
be tested using standard the Sargan test or Hansen's test of over-identifying restrictions. These
tests assess whether the instrumental variables are associated with bank deposits beyond their
ability to explain bank specic fundamentals. Under the null hypothesis that the instruments are
not correlated with the error term, the test is distributed as with degrees of freedom equal to the
number instruments minus the number of regressors. If the data do not reject the null hypothesis,
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then the data do not reject the validity of the instrumental variables.
The Sargan test statistic has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution only when the error terms
are homoscedastic. Hence it is not robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation116. Hence, the
Sargan test is not reported when hetroscedacticity is present. The Hansen J statistic, which is
robust to heteroskedasticity, is reported.
Roodman (2007) emphasizes that the number of instruments used in the dynamic panel needs
to be reported, since those models can generate an enormous number of potentially "weak"
instruments that can cause biased estimates. However, there is no clear guideline on how many
instruments is "too many". Roodman (2006 and 2007) highlights two ways of ascertaining this.
Firstly, the number of instruments should not exceed the number of panels, which is satised in
almost all the estimations in this study. Secondly, a p-value of the Hansen J-statistic should not be
too high. Roodman (2007) suggests that the p-value should be higher than the conventional 0.05
or 0.10 levels but should not be near 1. The number lags in levels and differences and also the
number of instruments used in the analysis are reported in the results tables.
D.0.3.1 One-Step and Two-Step GMM
One-step GMM estimation assumes that errors are homoscedastic. However, heteroscedasticity
of data is a common problem with dynamic panel data models. In line with this, Arellano and
Bond (1991) using the moment conditions D.2 and D.3, propose a two-step GMM estimator. In the
rst step, the error terms are assumed to be independent and homoscedastic. across banks and over
time. In the second step, the residuals obtained in the rst step are used to construct a consistent
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix, thus relaxing the assumptions of independence and
homoscedasticity. Hence, the two-step estimator is thus asymptotically more efcient than the
rst step estimator in the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2001).
However, Monte Carlo stimulations show that the efciency gain is typically small, and that
116 Arellano and Bond (1991) shows that the one-step Sargan test over-rejects in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
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the two-step GMM estimator has the disadvantage of converging to its asymptotic distribution
relatively slowly. In nite samples, the asymptotic standard errors associated with the two-step
GMM estimators can be seriously biased downwards. Thus it is not a reliable guide for inference
(Bond, Hoefer, and Temple 2001). Arellano and Bond (1991) propose that inference should be
made based on the one-step estimator. Windmeijer (2005) creates an extra nite sample variation
which can be used to correct the standard error of the two-step estimation. This correction causes
the two-step estimates and their standard errors to be very similar to the one-step estimates.
Roodman (2006) suggests that the two-step robust GMM estimates are more efcient than
one-step robust ones.
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Appendix E Disclosure Index
Bank level disclosure index is constructed using the BankScope database as the information
source. The indices are intended to measure the level of detail that banks provide in their published
accounts on fteen disclosure items. These indices reveal whether banks disclose information
relating to various sources of risk that they face such as interest rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk,
market risk and solvency risk.
The composite index is dened as
DISC =
15P
i=1
Si
where each sub-index,si can be related to one or more sources of risk. Rather than ordering the
sub-indices based on the sources of risk, the denition and the ordering of the fteen sub-indices
are created based on the presentation in the BankScope database. The table below lists the
sub-indices used in the study in more detail.
For all sub-indices,we assign a value of 0 if there is no entry in any of the corresponding
categories and a value of 1 otherwise, except for the capital sub-index. For the latter, we assign a
value of 0 when there is no entry in any of the four categories, 1 if there is only one entry, 2 if
there are two entries and 3 if there are three or four entries. Note that whenever a bank discloses
information on three of these items,one can infer the fourth. Providing three item is therefore
considered as informatively same as providing four items. The maximum attainable score on the
sum of the sub-indices is 17.
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Table E.14: Sub-indices to Construct the Synthetic Disclosure Index
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Appendix F Disclosure Informativeness
Tadasse (2006) construct this variable to measures the extent and comprehensiveness of the
regulation on banks nancial reporting. The data to construct this variable is obtained from the
responses in the World Bank survey of bank regulation and supervision described in Barth et al.
(2001).
The variable is constructed by adding the survey response on the following indicator variables:
(i) a variable that takes the value 1 if banks are required to disclose risk management procedures
to the public
(ii) a variable that takes 1 if the disclosure regulation requires that accrued income on
non-performing loans (NPL) should not be reported in the bank's income statement
(iii) a variable that assumes 1 if consolidated nancial statements of bank and non-bank
nancial subsidiaries are required
(iv) a variable that takes 1 if off balance sheet items need to be disclosed to the public
The above indicator variables are coded as a 0 or 1, whereby a value 1 represents good
disclosure practice with respect to the disclosure item the variable denotes while 0 otherwise.
Reporting risk management procedures to investors is considered as a good disclosure practise
as it enable investors to assess banks risk prole. Similarly, not reporting the income on NPL is
good as it provides a more accurate representation of banks' nancial condition. Disclosure of
consolidated nancial statements is considered good as it provides comprehensive information
about banks activities. Reporting off-balance sheet items is good as it provides a more complete
picture of banks' nancial standing.
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